Michael Code

The appellants were arrested in the middle of the night for break and enter and advised of their right to counsel.

After unsuccessfully attempting to reach their lawyers by phone, they were placed in a police line-up where they were identified by witnesses.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police violated the appellants' rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to retain counsel and by failing to refrain from eliciting evidence before they had done so.

The Court concluded that the line-up evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, rendering it inadmissible under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

He admitted to forcing the complainant to have sexual intercourse but claimed his drunkenness caused the attack.

The trial judge instructed the jury that drunkenness is no defence to the charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sexual assault causing bodily harm is an offence of general intent.

The Court affirmed the rule in Leary, holding that evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered by the trier of fact to negate the minimal intent required for general intent offences, and that this rule does not violate sections 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.

The accused appealed from a Court of Appeal order setting aside his jury acquittal for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge seriously misdirected the jury by inviting application of the reasonable doubt standard to individual pieces of evidence rather than to the ultimate issues on the whole of the evidence, while recognizing a limited exception in credibility instructions.

The Court further held that psychiatric evidence elicited from a defence expert, tending only to place the accused within an abnormal group capable of the offence, was not admissible on identity because it lacked sufficiently distinctive traits and its prejudicial propensity effect predominated.

Although the Court found the Court of Appeal erred on the psychiatric evidence issue, it concluded the Crown met the stringent burden applicable on an appeal from acquittal by showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same absent the misdirection.

The appeal was therefore dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted robbery and use of a firearm.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts of guilt were not unreasonable and were supported by the evidence.

The Court concluded that no error of law was committed at trial and there was no miscarriage of justice.

The accused was convicted of five offences, including rape, arising from a single incident.

At trial, the Crown improperly split its case by calling reply evidence to contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the accused's physical mobility and to introduce a new statement allegedly made by the accused.

This forced the accused to testify a second time and subjected him to cross-examination on collateral issues.

The Court of Appeal found error but applied the curative proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the rape conviction, while quashing the other convictions under the Kienapple principle.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the Crown's improper splitting of its case caused a substantial wrong that could not be cured by the proviso.

A new trial was ordered on all five counts.

The respondent broke into an apartment building with a loaded sawed-off shotgun to confront his estranged wife.

During a struggle with the man his wife was living with, the gun discharged.

The respondent was convicted of attempted murder based on constructive murder provisions.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the mens rea for attempted murder is the specific intent to kill, overruling its previous decision in Lajoie.