M. D. Faieta

The plaintiff, a 63-year-old machinist with 26 years of service, was terminated without cause due to restructuring.

He brought a motion for summary judgment seeking 24 months' reasonable notice.

The defendant argued the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by not using outplacement services and intending to retire.

The court found the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to mitigate and awarded 21 months' reasonable notice, reduced by a 1% contingency for the likelihood of finding future employment, resulting in a final notice period of 20.8 months.

The applicants sought declarations that an agreement of purchase and sale entered by the mortgagee during a power of sale process was a nullity and requested authorization to discharge several mortgages by payment into court.

The applicants had requested a mortgage discharge statement under s. 22(2) of the Mortgages Act but the mortgagee failed to provide one within the statutory time.

The court held the request constituted a valid demand for a statement and that the mortgagee lacked a reasonable excuse for non-compliance.

As a result, the mortgagee’s enforcement rights were suspended under s. 22(3), rendering the subsequent agreement of purchase and sale ineffective.

The court further ordered that the mortgages be discharged upon payment of the claimed amount into court pursuant to s. 12 of the Mortgages Act.

The defendant moved to vary an earlier order requiring that 50 percent of the proceeds from the sale of a property be held in trust pending determination of the plaintiff’s claimed beneficial interest.

The motion alleged that the plaintiff had failed to make full and frank disclosure when obtaining an earlier certificate of pending litigation on an ex parte basis, including failing to disclose prior sworn statements in earlier family proceedings contradicting his asserted ownership interest.

The court held that the newly discovered evidence would likely have affected the earlier decision and that the evidence could not reasonably have been obtained before the earlier motion.

The court varied the previous order to release the sale proceeds to the defendant.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss the action as frivolous or an abuse of process was adjourned and directed to proceed as a summary judgment motion.

Following a successful motion in a construction lien action to refer the matter to a master, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant argued that a reduced costs award was appropriate and disputed the plaintiff’s claimed amounts.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not justified, noting that the defendant’s conduct in seeking an adjournment due to a religious holiday was not reprehensible and that the plaintiff’s settlement offer was not bettered by the motion result.

Considering potential duplication of legal work and all surrounding circumstances, the court awarded a reduced lump sum costs amount.

The defendant financier moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim for unpaid commissions relating to rooftop solar projects.

The plaintiff alleged contractual entitlement, unjust enrichment, partnership liability, and that the financing corporation was the alter ego of the installer company that had agreed to pay commissions.

The court held there was no agreement between the plaintiff and the moving party, insufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil, no partnership within the meaning of the Partnerships Act, and no enrichment supporting quantum meruit.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court dismissed the claim against the moving defendant and awarded costs.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a third mortgage against the defendant's property, claiming it secured loans previously made to the defendant's spouse.

The defendant argued she never consented to securing her spouse's debts and believed the mortgage was intended to replace an existing second mortgage.

The court found the mortgage was intended to replace the second mortgage and that no funds were advanced to the defendant.

The court also applied the defence of non est factum, finding the defendant did not consent to the mortgage's purported purpose.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the mortgage was ordered discharged.

The defendant's counterclaim for slander of title was dismissed.

Following a seven‑day personal injury trial arising from an accident at an amusement park, the plaintiffs obtained damages totalling $304,863.23 and the defendant’s counterclaim for contribution and indemnity against the father was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $226,000, while the defendant by counterclaim sought its own costs.

The court applied the principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing proportionality, the principle of indemnity, and the reasonableness of preparation time and disbursements.

The court reduced excessive preparation hours and excluded certain disbursements but accepted the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates.

Costs were fixed at amounts considered fair and reasonable in light of the trial result and proportionality considerations.

Following settlement of a mortgage enforcement action, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the mortgagor to the mortgagee.

The mortgage contained a contractual provision requiring the mortgagor to pay the lender’s legal costs on a solicitor-and-client basis.

The court held that such provisions do not displace the court’s discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Concerns about an inaccurate discharge statement under the Mortgages Act, block-billed legal accounts, and proportionality justified refusing full indemnity costs.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court reduced the claimed $65,831.32 in costs to $25,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action for indemnity under uninsured and family protection coverage following a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver.

The insurer argued the action was statute‑barred and that the insureds failed to comply with the 30‑day notice requirement under Ontario Regulation 676.

The court held that the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied and began when the insured demanded indemnification from the insurer, consistent with appellate authority governing OPCF 44R claims.

The court further found the insureds’ late notice constituted imperfect compliance and granted relief from forfeiture under the Insurance Act and Courts of Justice Act, noting minimal prejudice to the insurer and significant disparity between the breach and the loss of coverage.

The insurer’s summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order referring a construction lien action to a master for trial under s. 58(1)(a) of the Construction Lien Act.

The action involved a multi‑million dollar lien claim for construction services and a counterclaim alleging delay damages, breach of contract, and damages for registering a grossly excessive lien.

The defendant argued that a referral required evidence of consent or complexity under Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and that the issues were too complex for a master.

The court held that the statute grants broad discretion to refer construction lien actions to a master and that the historical practice and statutory objectives favour such referrals.

Finding no reason why the objectives of the Act would not be served, the court granted the motion.

The defendant moved to set aside the power of sale of his partially-built cottage and to set aside a default judgment arising from mortgage enforcement proceedings.

The court considered the statutory right of redemption under the Mortgages Act and the defendant’s claim that the property was sold below market value.

The court found that the right of redemption had expired when the agreement of purchase and sale was entered into and that the defendant lacked the ability to redeem the mortgage in any event.

Evidence from the listing agent and appraisals demonstrated that the property received reasonable market exposure and that the sale price was not improvident.

The court also declined to set aside the default judgment, finding the defendant had been personally served, provided no explanation for failing to defend, and had no plausible defence to the mortgage default.

The defendant, a retired Canada Revenue Agency investigator, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a civil action alleging conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, defamation, and interference with contractual relations arising from a tax audit and prosecution for tax evasion.

The court found that the plaintiff’s responding affidavit merely repeated vague allegations contained in the statement of claim and failed to provide evidence supporting any alleged tort.

On a summary judgment motion, the responding party must put their best foot forward with evidence demonstrating a genuine issue requiring trial.

The court concluded there was no evidence that the moving party acted improperly or conspired with others, and that the evidence only showed the performance of supervisory duties in good faith.

Summary judgment was granted and the action against the moving party dismissed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The defendants had applied for a line of credit on behalf of their company and signed a personal financial statement indicating they owned their home, which supported their personal guarantee.

After the company went bankrupt, the defendants claimed they held the home in a bare trust for their children and transferred it to their son.

The court found that oral evidence was not required to decide the motion and held that the defendants knowingly or recklessly made a false representation about their beneficial ownership of the home, which induced the bank to grant the line of credit.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank.

The applicant sought payment of the outstanding balance under a promissory note after the respondents failed to make required quarterly instalment payments.

The proceeding was brought under Rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for determination of rights dependent on the interpretation of a contract.

The court held that the note required payment of the full $100,000 instalment on the first day of each quarter and rejected the respondents’ argument that payment could be completed anytime within the quarter.

The court further held that written notice of default had been provided and that the respondents failed to cure the default within the 30‑day notice period required to avoid the acceleration clause.

The entire outstanding balance therefore became immediately due and payable.

The applicant sought to enforce Letters Rogatory issued by a United States District Court to compel the examination of two former employees of a corporate defendant, including its former in-house counsel.

The former in-house counsel opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application against the former in-house counsel, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate her evidence was necessary for trial or not otherwise obtainable from other former executives.

The court concluded that enforcing the Letters Rogatory would impose an undue burden on the respondent.

A university brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim alleging negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith arising from alleged deficiencies in a medical residency training program.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because discoverability and factual context had not yet been fully developed.

The court further held that although courts generally defer to universities on academic matters, contractual claims may proceed where the plaintiff alleges failure to meet express or implied contractual obligations.

However, several causes of action were insufficiently pleaded or legally unavailable in the context of academic discretion.

Portions of the claim were therefore struck, some with leave to amend and others without leave.

The plaintiff, a former nursing student, sued the defendants for damages after they falsely accused her of academic fraud.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, related to an academic matter, and was an abuse of process.

The court found that while the university has broad discretion in academic matters, this does not extend to the negligent performance of an internal investigation or intentional torts.

The court struck the claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, bad faith, and breach of privacy due to pleading deficiencies, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim.

The plaintiffs, VoIP service providers, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant from suspending network carrier services and to allow the migration of telephone numbers without paying port-out fees.

The court determined the requested relief was a mandatory injunction, requiring a strong prima facie case.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case for breach of contract or intentional interference with economic relations, failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

The court also noted the plaintiffs did not come to court with clean hands due to unpaid invoices.

The plaintiff, a former member of the Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers, sued the College, its external counsel, the complainant, and witnesses for damages arising from the revocation of her registration following a disciplinary hearing.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the College and its counsel were protected by statutory immunity under the Social Work and Social Services Work Act, 1998, and that the complainant and witnesses were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The court also struck claims relying on evidence rendered inadmissible by statute and claims lacking sufficient material facts, granting leave to amend only certain specific claims.

A construction crane collapsed onto a partially completed retirement residence, causing significant property damage covered by the owner’s “all risks” construction insurance policy.

The owner’s insurer commenced a subrogated action and co‑defendants sought contribution and indemnity from the contractor and crane supplier.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing the crossclaims, arguing that the construction contract contained an insurance covenant allocating the risk of property loss to the owner’s project insurance and benefiting contractors and subcontractors.

The court held that the covenant barred claims against those parties and prevented contribution claims under the Negligence Act.

The court further held that the insurer’s waiver of subrogation and the doctrine recognizing insurable interests of trades on construction projects also barred the claims.

All crossclaims against the moving parties were dismissed.