Shaneka Taylor

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order bifurcating the liability and damages issues in a non-jury personal injury trial without their consent.

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe head injury, and damages could not be assessed for several years.

The court held that the Master had inherent jurisdiction to order bifurcation in exceptional circumstances, finding that the obiter in Bondy-Rafael abolishing such jurisdiction in non-jury trials was not binding.

Alternatively, applying the Carter test, the court found that Hryniak represented a fundamental shift in civil litigation justifying a departure from precedent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial to allow for further medical assessment of a child who suffered a brain injury after falling from a balcony.

The defendant landlord brought a cross-motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases, arguing that key liability witnesses were elderly and their memories would fade if the trial was delayed.

The court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to order bifurcation without consent, despite conflicting case law on Rule 6.1.01.

Finding this to be an exceptional case where bifurcation would save time and preserve evidence, the court granted both the extension of time and the bifurcation order.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a third mortgage against the defendant's property, claiming it secured loans previously made to the defendant's spouse.

The defendant argued she never consented to securing her spouse's debts and believed the mortgage was intended to replace an existing second mortgage.

The court found the mortgage was intended to replace the second mortgage and that no funds were advanced to the defendant.

The court also applied the defence of non est factum, finding the defendant did not consent to the mortgage's purported purpose.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the mortgage was ordered discharged.

The defendant's counterclaim for slander of title was dismissed.

Following settlement of a mortgage enforcement action, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the mortgagor to the mortgagee.

The mortgage contained a contractual provision requiring the mortgagor to pay the lender’s legal costs on a solicitor-and-client basis.

The court held that such provisions do not displace the court’s discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Concerns about an inaccurate discharge statement under the Mortgages Act, block-billed legal accounts, and proportionality justified refusing full indemnity costs.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court reduced the claimed $65,831.32 in costs to $25,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

In a motor vehicle accident action involving multiple parties, a municipality brought a motion seeking an order requiring an insurer to defend it and allow it to retain counsel of its own choosing without reporting obligations to the insurer.

The municipality and insurer had partially settled the duty-to-defend issue, leaving the court to determine whether counsel retained by the municipality must report to the insurer that also insured another adverse party.

The court held that a conflict of interest existed because one insured was suing another insured in the same litigation and coverage issues remained live.

Given the conflict and the solicitor-client relationship, counsel retained by the municipality was not required to report to the insurer.

A municipality brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement regarding insurance coverage and joint legal representation with a contractor and its insurer in a slip‑and‑fall action involving winter maintenance.

The municipality argued that email correspondence created a binding settlement requiring the insurer to provide legal representation for all potential municipal liability.

The insurer contended that any agreement was limited to liability arising from the contractor’s conduct and did not extend to the municipality’s independent negligence.

The court held that the communications did not demonstrate a meeting of the minds on all essential terms and that factual disputes remained regarding the scope of any agreement.

As a result, the court found no enforceable settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

A municipality sought defence coverage as an additional insured under a contractor’s liability policy in a slip-and-fall action allegedly caused by icy sidewalk conditions.

The insurer brought a Rule 21 motion arguing that the statement of claim did not allege snow, ice, or sidewalks and therefore did not trigger the duty to defend.

The court held that particulars delivered in response to a demand form part of the pleadings and may trigger the duty to defend.

Examining the true nature of the claims, the court found that all negligence allegations potentially arose out of the contractor’s operations under the winter maintenance agreement.

The insurer was therefore required to defend or fund the municipality’s defence in full.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order granting multiple defendants security for costs in underlying litigation.

The motion relied on Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that the order would deny access to justice because the plaintiff corporation was impecunious.

The court found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate credible impecuniosity, noting financial records did not account for more than $2 million previously received from expropriation compensation and land sales.

The court held there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the security for costs order and the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The defendant municipality brought a motion seeking declarations that a contractor’s insurer owed it a duty to defend in a slip‑and‑fall action arising from alleged negligent winter sidewalk maintenance.

The court held that the pleadings test governs the duty to defend and that where allegations, if proven, could fall within policy coverage, the insurer must provide a defence.

Because the statement of claim alleged negligence related to snow removal operations covered by the policy and the municipality was a named insured, the insurer’s duty to defend was triggered.

The court further found a conflict of interest due to counterclaims between the defendants and the insurer’s earlier denial of coverage, entitling the municipality to independent counsel at the insurer’s expense.

The insurer was also ordered to reimburse the municipality’s past defence costs.