M. Claire Wilkinson

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for repayment of investment funds and to amend their Statement of Claim to plead fraudulent misrepresentation.

The defendants sought to remove a Mareva injunction.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their Statement of Claim, maintained the Mareva injunction, and granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs for $1,617,679.53, finding fraudulent misrepresentation by the principal defendant.

Issues of additional quantum owed and punitive damages were reserved for trial.

The plaintiffs and defendants were part of a group of ten investors who purchased a property to improve and sell for profit.

Following the sale, a dispute arose over the distribution of the net proceeds.

The plaintiff claimed entitlement to three shares of the proceeds and compensation for lost rental income, while the defendants argued he was only entitled to one share, subject to a deduction for an unpaid promissory note.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to a single one-tenth share, from which his debt under the promissory note was deducted, resulting in an award of $8,237.82.

The claims for additional shares and lost rental income were dismissed.

The plaintiff, RiverRock Mortgage Investment Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a defaulted mortgage against the defendants, Amadeus Blazys and Luisa Blazys, seeking judgment for the outstanding amount, possession of the property, and leave to issue a Writ of Possession.

The defendants argued that the action should be dismissed due to RiverRock's breaches of the Mortgages Act and the Interest Act, challenging the timing of the Statement of Claim relative to the Notice of Sale, the validity of certain fees (including a renewal fee and a three-month interest penalty upon default), and the interest rate.

The court granted summary judgment to RiverRock for the principal, prejudgment interest, renewal fee, property tax reimbursement, and some additional fees, but disallowed the three-month interest penalty and certain other fees (NSF, default proceedings fee) as offending the Interest Act.

The court also granted leave nunc pro tunc for the Statement of Claim to be issued before the Notice of Sale period expired, noting that this procedural irregularity would be considered in costs.

This eight-day trial addressed the validity of a Separation Agreement, child support, and parenting arrangements.

The court upheld the Separation Agreement as valid, allowing the applicant to purchase the matrimonial home for $50,000 plus prejudgment interest, with CRA liens to be resolved by the applicant paying the CRA directly.

The respondent's claims to set aside the agreement, for occupation rent, spousal support, and pension equalization were dismissed.

The court ordered the respondent to pay ongoing child support of $556 per month and retroactive child support of $15,819.72, along with 38% of past and future s.7 expenses (except post-secondary, which are 50/50).

Joint decision-making responsibility for the child was maintained.

The applicant surviving spouse elected to receive an equalization payment from her deceased husband's estate rather than taking under his will.

She brought a motion seeking to apply her equalization payment towards the purchase of the matrimonial home, which was owned by the estate and specifically bequeathed to one of the deceased's sons.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a vesting order was not appropriate as there was no concern the estate would fail to pay the equalization amount once its properties were sold.

The court ordered all estate properties to be sold to determine the exact equalization payment, with the remaining net proceeds to be divided among the children on a prorated basis according to the sale prices of their specifically bequeathed properties.

This ruling addresses four summary judgment motions concerning two defaulted mortgage loans.

The plaintiff lenders sought summary judgment against the defendant borrowers for repayment.

The defendants counterclaimed, alleging fraud and conspiracy by various parties, including the lenders and their lawyers, and sought relief under the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act.

The court granted summary judgment to the lenders for the outstanding mortgage amounts but stayed enforcement pending the resolution of the counterclaim.

The counterclaim against the lenders (Flexpark, Westhaven, and related individuals) was allowed to proceed to trial due to genuine issues of fact regarding fraud and collusion.

However, the counterclaim against the lenders' lawyers (Sandra De Bartolo and Di Mauro Law Professional Corporation) was dismissed, as they owed no duty of care to the borrowers and no evidence of their involvement in fraud was presented.

The court found insufficient evidence to apply the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act.

This trial concerned a motion to change a 2006 final order regarding child and spousal support.

The Father sought to terminate child and spousal support and obtain reimbursement for overpayments.

The Mother sought continuation of support, retroactive s.7 expenses, and other reimbursements.

The court found the Father owed significant retroactive child support due to non-disclosure of income, but terminated ongoing child and spousal support.

The Mother was granted retroactive s.7 expenses from October 2018, but was ordered to reimburse the Father for spousal support overpayments.

The Mother's claims for tax penalty reimbursement and missed parenting time compensation were dismissed.

The applicant mother sought various orders in an uncontested trial, including sole decision-making responsibility, child support, a vesting order for the matrimonial home, and a restraining order against the respondent father.

The father had not participated in the litigation since 2019 and had a history of criminal charges involving the mother.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and imputed the father's income at $45,000 for child support purposes.

Given the significant child support arrears owed by the father, the court ordered that the mother's 1% interest in the matrimonial home vest in her absolutely.

The court also granted a restraining order, gave the mother sole control over the children's RESP accounts and travel documents, and awarded costs of $16,000 to the mother.

The Applicant, Mari Jane Awitan Coronel-Tan, proceeded with an uncontested trial seeking sole decision-making responsibility for the parties' eight-year-old child, Jaden, and an order that all parenting time with the Respondent, Lorden Tan, be at her sole discretion.

The Applicant also sought to sever the divorce from corollary issues.

The Respondent, who was self-represented and served by substituted service, did not file an Answer.

The court granted the Applicant's requests for sole decision-making and discretionary parenting time, and allowed the divorce to proceed on an uncontested basis.

The Applicant had also withdrawn a request for unequal division of net family property, asserting that the Respondent's claim for equalization had expired under s.7(3) of the Family Law Act.

This was an uncontested trial where the Applicant sought sole decision-making, primary residence, child support (including arrears and section 7 expenses), and a claim for unjust enrichment related to the matrimonial home.

The Respondent failed to participate in the trial and had not complied with previous financial disclosure orders.

The court granted all relief sought by the Applicant, finding that the Respondent had been unjustly enriched by the sale of the matrimonial home and ordering a monetary award to the Applicant.

The defendants brought a motion to admit a supplementary affidavit from Bibi Goriah, sworn after cross-examinations, to be considered at a summary judgment motion.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing prejudice and a violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The court applied the four-part test under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the evidence relevant and that any potential prejudice could be mitigated by allowing the plaintiffs further cross-examinations and the opportunity to file reply evidence.

The court also considered counsel's oversight as a factor.

The motion to admit the affidavit was granted, but costs were not awarded to the successful defendants due to the legitimate concerns raised by the plaintiffs.

The applicants, a consortium of insurers, sought a declaration that the respondent's (Sahara Restaurant) claim for water damage under a hospitality insurance policy was statute-barred due to the expiry of a one-year limitation period.

The respondent argued that the insurers' ongoing communications constituted promissory estoppel, extending the limitation period, and that its demand for an appraisal suspended the limitation period.

The court found that the insurers had explicitly warned the respondent of the limitation period and that normal dealings did not extend it.

Furthermore, the court held that a demand for appraisal does not suspend the limitation period, requiring an action to be commenced to preserve the claim.

Consequently, the respondent's claim was dismissed as statute-barred, and its application to compel appraisal was also dismissed.

The respondents, Barnes, Sammon LLP and Alana Guy, brought a motion to set aside an assessment officer's report that ordered them to jointly pay the applicant, Gaganpreet Blaggan, $22,441.15.

The respondents argued they were denied procedural fairness due to inadequate notice of the pre-assessment and assessment hearings.

The court found that the applicant's counsel failed to ensure proper notice to all parties and did not inform the assessment officer of Ms. Guy's unavailability or adjournment request.

Consequently, the court set aside the assessment report and remitted the matter for a fresh assessment, emphasizing the importance of due notice and counsel's duty of cooperation.

The applicant, Millie Reville, sought to validate a 2019 will naming her as the estate trustee and primary beneficiary of Mark Weeks' estate, claiming to be his common-law spouse.

The respondent, Vania Weeks, the deceased's separated spouse and estate trustee under a 2008 will, challenged the 2019 will's validity, alleging it was not properly signed or was procured by undue influence.

The court heard oral testimony from the 2019 will's witnesses and considered expert forensic document examiner reports.

The court found the 2019 will was duly executed and dismissed the undue influence claim.

The applicant was appointed estate trustee, and the respondent was ordered to return estate property and reimburse funds improperly disbursed.

The applicant, Carol Bellamy, a co-Estate Trustee, brought an application for the passing of accounts for the Estate of Jean Ann Ruston.

The respondent, Carolyn Thompson, the sole beneficiary and co-Trustee, raised numerous objections regarding excessive payments to Carol and her husband, Ron Bellamy, and mismanagement of estate funds, including speculative investments.

The court dismissed Carol's defenses of laches and acquiescence, finding her fiduciary duties to the sole beneficiary paramount.

The court ordered Carol to repay $318,918.27 to the Estate for excessive compensation and reimbursements, and directed several other objections to proceed to trial due to insufficient documentation and credibility issues.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel, Douglas LaFramboise, alleging a conflict of interest.

LaFramboise had previously represented the defendants (Rabba Foods) in an earlier personal injury action brought by the plaintiff, which is now the subject of the plaintiff's current negligence claim against the Alam defendants.

The court found that LaFramboise was a material witness to the communications and negotiations central to the current negligence claim, particularly regarding the costs the plaintiff incurred.

The court determined that LaFramboise's dual role as advocate and potential witness created an inherent conflict of interest, compromising the proper administration of justice.

The motion to remove LaFramboise as counsel was granted.

The Plaintiff, Synergy IT Solutions Inc., brought a motion for a status hearing and a timetable to advance litigation, seeking an order to prevent dismissal for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Defendant, UTC Fire & Security Canada Inc. (Chubb), opposed the motion, arguing that Synergy failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that Chubb was prejudiced by the unavailability of key witnesses.

The court found that Synergy provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, largely due to COVID-19 related disruptions to its counsel's small law firm, and that Chubb did not demonstrate non-compensable prejudice, as the witnesses were unavailable even before the critical deadline.

The motion was granted, and a status hearing was ordered to set a timetable.

Costs were awarded to the Plaintiff.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing its application for a rent increase above the guideline.

The Board dismissed the application after the landlord failed to meet procedural deadlines, finding that the landlord had received the notice of hearing and was the author of its own misfortune.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's determination regarding the receipt of notice was a finding of fact not subject to appeal, and that there was no breach of procedural fairness in the Board's refusal to extend time or reschedule the hearing.

The applicant sought summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation with her common-law partner.

The respondent denied a binding agreement, claiming lack of understanding, duress, and unconscionability.

The court found a binding agreement based on objective evidence, counsel's ostensible authority, and the parties' post-mediation conduct, dismissing the respondent's claims of duress and unconscionability.

The settlement, which included the sale of a farm and division of proceeds, was enforced.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering her eviction.

She argued that she was a 'tenant' under s. 2(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act at the time the property was converted to a condominium in 2011, either by living with her parents and paying rent, or by being an 'heir' to her living parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the first issue was a question of mixed fact and law not subject to appeal.

On the second issue, the court held that the phrase 'tenant's heirs' in s. 2(1) does not include children of a living tenant, noting that the legislature specifically provided protections for spouses of deceased tenants but not children.

The eviction order was upheld.