McLachlin C.J.

The applicants brought motions seeking an order to amend a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada or for a re-hearing of the appeal to clarify the disposition.

The Court dismissed the motions, finding they did not meet the criteria under Rule 81(1)(a) for accidental slips or omissions, nor the criteria under Rule 76 for exceptional cases involving a failure of justice.

The Court held that its previous judgment clearly expressed that the matter must be remitted to the Government and National Assembly for reconsideration.

The appellants applied for permanent residence in Canada under the investor and self-employed classes.

Both applications were denied because their dependent children had intellectual disabilities that medical officers concluded would cause excessive demands on Canada's social services.

The visa officers refused to consider the families' wealth and willingness to pay for private social services.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the legislation requires an individualized assessment.

A family's ability and willingness to attenuate the burden on the public purse are relevant factors in determining whether a disabled child might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on social services.

The respondent mortgage company purchased trailers and leased them back to the vendor to claim a substantial capital cost allowance (CCA) and offset revenue from other leased assets.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the respondent and disallowed the CCA claim under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the transaction resulted in a tax benefit and was an avoidance transaction, it was not abusive tax avoidance under s. 245(4) of the Income Tax Act.

The Court found that the transaction was consistent with the object, spirit, and purpose of the CCA provisions, which permit deductions based on the cost of assets acquired, regardless of the economic risk involved.

The appellants, arm's length taxpayers, sought to deduct over $10 million in losses against their own incomes through a series of transactions involving partnerships.

The original losses belonged to an insolvent trust company, which transferred a portfolio of mortgages with unrealized losses to a non-arm's length partnership.

The trust company then sold its interest in the partnership to an arm's length party, and the appellants subsequently joined a new partnership to claim their proportionate shares of the losses.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the appellants and applied the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to disallow the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that allowing the appellants to claim the losses would defeat the purposes of s. 18(13) and the partnership provisions of the Income Tax Act, thereby constituting abusive tax avoidance.

The appellants, permanent residents ordered deported for serious criminality, appealed their removal orders under the former Immigration Act, triggering automatic stays.

Before their appeals were heard, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) came into force.

Section 196 of the IRPA discontinued pending appeals for serious criminals unless they had been 'granted a stay'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'granted a stay' refers only to actively ordered stays, not automatic statutory stays.

Applying principles of bilingual statutory interpretation, the Court found the narrower English version aligned with Parliament's intent to expedite the removal of serious criminals.

The Court also dismissed arguments that the retroactive removal of the appeal right violated section 7 of the Charter, concluding that deportation does not inherently implicate section 7 interests and the transitional scheme did not breach principles of fundamental justice.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident with the deceased.

Unaware that the deceased had died of unrelated causes, the respondent issued a statement of claim within the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, but outside the shorter limitation period under the Survival of Actions Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that neither the discoverability rule nor the confirmation provisions of the Limitations Act applied to extend the Survival of Actions Act limitation period.

Furthermore, the Court established the test for estoppel by convention and found that the requirements were not met, as there was no shared assumption or detrimental reliance.

The appeal was allowed and the statement of claim was struck out.

The appellants challenged the validity of provisions in Quebec's Health Insurance Act and Hospital Insurance Act that prohibit residents from purchasing private health insurance for services covered by the public health care plan.

They argued that waiting times in the public system deprived them of access to timely care, violating their rights under the Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal.

A majority found that the prohibition violates the right to life and personal inviolability under s. 1 of the Quebec Charter and is not justified under s. 9.1.

Three of the judges also found that the prohibition violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter because it arbitrarily deprives individuals of life and security of the person by forcing them to endure unreasonable waiting times without the option of seeking private care.

The former chauffeur to the Speaker of the House of Commons filed discrimination and harassment complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission after his position was declared surplus.

The Speaker and the House of Commons challenged the Commission's jurisdiction, claiming parliamentary privilege over the management of employees.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants failed to establish a broad parliamentary privilege immunizing all employee relations from external review.

However, the Court ruled that the employee was required to pursue his complaints through the grievance procedure established under the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, which ousted the jurisdiction of the Canadian Human Rights Commission for this dispute.

The appellant sued the federal government for sexual battery committed by an employee at a student residence 20 years earlier.

The trial judge awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, finding the abuse caused the appellant's alcoholism and subsequent loss of earnings.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the pecuniary damages, applying a 'rehearing' standard of review to substitute its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the standard of review for findings of fact in Saskatchewan is 'palpable and overriding error', consistent with the rest of Canada.

The Court restored the past loss of earnings award but ordered it reduced for time spent in prison and social assistance received, and upheld the dismissal of the future loss of earnings award.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for his role in luring the victim to a car lot where he was shot.

At trial, the Crown introduced double hearsay evidence from a co-conspirator and wiretap evidence of a three-way phone call.

The appellant appealed, arguing the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule should be revisited under the principled approach to hearsay, and that the wiretap evidence exceeded the authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Carter rule for co-conspirator hearsay meets the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled approach.

The Court also upheld the admission of the wiretap evidence, finding the named target never ceased to be a party to the conversation.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on intercepted telephone conversations.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the wiretap evidence should have been excluded because he was a 'known' person not named in the initial authorizations, and that the trial judge erred in denying his application for severance to compel a co-accused to testify.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not a 'known' person when the initial authorizations were obtained and that the denial of severance did not result in a miscarriage of justice as the co-accused's proposed evidence was of marginal probative value.

The appellant challenged the denial of a certificate of eligibility for her children to attend English-language public schools in Quebec.

The denial was based on the children not having completed the 'major part' of their instruction in English as required by s. 73(2) of the Charter of the French language.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 73(2) is constitutional if interpreted to require a qualitative, rather than strictly quantitative, assessment of the child's educational experience to determine genuine commitment to a minority language education.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the appellant's children were found eligible for English education.

The insured appellants left their property vacant for a period before a tenant moved in.

The property was later destroyed by fire.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on the basis that the earlier vacancy was a material change to the risk under Statutory Condition 4 of the Insurance Act, which the insured failed to report.

The trial judge granted relief under s. 171 of the Act, finding the condition unjust or unreasonable in these circumstances since the vacancy was rectified before the fire.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding s. 171 did not apply to statutory conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, concluding that s. 171 applies to statutory conditions that are unjust or unreasonable in their application, and restored the trial judge's decision.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused, finding no evidence of non-consent, despite the complainant's testimony that he did not want to engage in the activity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the direct evidence of lack of consent, and thus exceeded his jurisdiction.

The infant respondents suffer from autism and sought funding from the Province of British Columbia for applied behavioural analysis (ABA) or intensive behavioural intervention (IBI) therapy.

The Province refused to fund the therapy, arguing it was an emergent and controversial treatment and citing financial constraints.

The respondents argued this refusal violated their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislative scheme does not promise funding for all medically required treatment, but only for core services provided by medical practitioners.

Since ABA/IBI therapy is a non-core service and the Province had not designated its providers as health care practitioners, the benefit claimed was not provided by law.

The Court concluded there was no discrimination and allowed the Province's appeal.

The Province of British Columbia granted a project approval certificate to a mining company to reopen a mine, which included building an access road through the traditional territory of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation (TRTFN).

The TRTFN objected, arguing their unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims were not adequately accommodated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a duty to consult and, where indicated, accommodate Aboriginal peoples prior to proof of rights or title claims, grounded in the honour of the Crown.

However, the Court found that the environmental assessment process engaged in by the Province fulfilled this duty, as the TRTFN was consulted and its concerns were reasonably accommodated in the project approval conditions.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence by assuming the complainant's DNA was found on the inside of the appellant's trousers, a finding unsupported by the record.

As this misapprehension was central to the trial judge's finding of guilt, the appeal was allowed, the conviction vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent sought a survivor's pension under the Canada Pension Plan after her former common law partner died.

She had ended the relationship permanently prior to his death.

Her application was denied because she did not meet the definition of 'spouse', which required common law partners to be cohabiting at the time of death.

She argued this violated her equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter based on marital status, comparing herself to separated married spouses.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the correct comparator group was divorced spouses, not separated married spouses.

Since former common law spouses and former married spouses are both denied survivor's pensions, there was no discrimination.

The appellant acquired shares in a company and became a director and secretary, agreeing to stand surety for the company's debts to the respondent.

He later resigned and transferred his shares.

The respondent subsequently demanded the appellant discharge the company's debts.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under art. 2363 of the Civil Code of Québec, a suretyship attached to the performance of special duties terminates upon cessation of those duties.

The Court found the appellant's suretyship was contracted in connection with his duties, discharging him from debts arising after January 1, 1994, when the new Code came into force, but remitted the matter to determine if any debts existed prior to that date.