Mark A. Klaiman

The plaintiff, Kim Lemyre, sought costs for her successful wrongful dismissal action.

The defendants opposed, arguing excessive time spent by counsel, prior costs paid, and that the plaintiff's net recovery after tax was less than her offer to settle.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments, finding the time spent reasonable, the prior costs already accounted for, and that Rule 49 focuses on damages won, not tax consequences.

The court emphasized the importance of incentivizing employers to settle valid claims.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant, a former student, reported to her guidance counsellor and police that she had been sexually assaulted by the plaintiff, her former piano teacher.

The police investigated and charged the plaintiff, but the charges were later stayed.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for malicious prosecution.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1) and, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest, the malicious prosecution claim lacked substantial merit because the police (not the defendant) initiated the proceedings, and the public interest in protecting the reporting of sexual assaults outweighed the harm to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs, representing a faction of a non-profit religious temple, brought a motion seeking the interim appointment of a monitor to manage the temple's financial affairs due to alleged governance and financial irregularities.

The court found that the incumbent directors served on properly constituted governance boards and acted in good faith.

Although the court identified certain irregularities, such as the failure to provide audited financial statements, it concluded that these did not warrant the intrusive appointment of a monitor.

The motion was dismissed, but the court directed the temple to prepare audited financial statements, update its corporate profile, and provide refresher training on donation counting procedures.

The plaintiff contractor purchased topsoil from the defendant supplier for a municipal project.

Due to project delays, the plaintiff waived its right to test the soil before delivery and signed a contract containing an exclusionary clause stating the defendant would not be responsible for the quality of the material once it left the facility.

The delivered soil did not drain properly and had to be replaced.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, relying on the implied condition under s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act that goods must correspond with their description.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the exclusionary clause was clear and unambiguous, and that the plaintiff had knowingly assumed the risk by waiving the testing to avoid further project delays.

Following a failed asset purchase agreement, the plaintiff by counterclaim (TNS) sought damages for the defendant by counterclaim's (MAS) failure to return chattels and the late return of other chattels.

The court determined that damages should be based on the fair market value of the unreturned chattels as of the date they ought to have been returned, and the diminished fair market value for the late-returned chattels.

Relying on an appraisal report, the court awarded TNS $13,167 in damages, inclusive of pre-judgment interest, to be paid out of the original purchase deposit held in trust.

The plaintiff purchaser failed to close a real estate transaction on the scheduled closing date.

The defendant vendor offered an extension conditional on the payment of an administration fee by a specific deadline.

Due to a banking error, the fee was not deposited in time, and the vendor terminated the agreement and retained the $40,000 deposit.

The purchaser sued for return of the deposit and damages.

The vendor brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the purchaser breached the agreement and was not entitled to relief from forfeiture, as the deposit was not a penalty and the vendor's conduct was not unconscionable.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking relief from forfeiture of a deposit totaling approximately 28% of the purchase price for a condominium, arguing it would be unconscionable for the vendor to retain the full amount.

The court applied the two-part test for relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, requiring the forfeited sum to be out of proportion to damages and its retention to be unconscionable.

While the deposit percentage was higher than the vendor's usual 20% and the upper range of 25% found in some case law, the court found no indicia of unconscionability, such as inequality of bargaining power, an unfair bargain, or unsophistication on the plaintiff's part.

The vendor's conduct, including crediting a previous deposit and offering extensions, weighed against a finding of unconscionability.

The motion was dismissed, and the vendor was entitled to retain the full deposit.

This is a ruling on a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The corporate defendants challenged whether their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the trial delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that while certain discrete exceptional events could be deducted from the total delay, the remaining delay still exceeded the ceiling and could not be justified by the complexity of the case.

Accordingly, the charges against all corporate defendants were stayed.

The Landlord sought summary judgment for unpaid rent and repair costs after the Tenant vacated the leased premises early.

The Tenant argued a verbal agreement reduced rent and denied causing damage.

The court dismissed the claim for repair damages due to insufficient pleading and evidence.

It found a genuine issue requiring a mini-trial regarding the verbally agreed-upon monthly rent, acknowledging that parties can waive "entire agreement" clauses by conduct.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interim interlocutory injunction to stay the election of the Board of Directors of the defendant religious temple pending the adjudication of a broader motion.

The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' standing, arguing they were not members of the temple.

The court found that at least one plaintiff had standing based on uncontradicted evidence of her long-standing devotion and the denial of membership application forms.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm from the potential loss of the right to vote, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The appellants, Showcase Woodycrest Inc. and 2442459 Ontario Inc., appealed a Master's decision that refused to discharge a certificate of pending litigation on one of two properties involved in an agreement of purchase and sale.

The appeal raised issues concerning contractual ambiguity in notice provisions, the uniqueness of the property for specific performance, and the quantifiability of damages.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's interpretation of the agreement or the exercise of discretion in maintaining the certificate on the Brock Street property.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority sought to amend charges against a corporate defendant relating to alleged interference with a wetland and watercourse.

The prosecution moved to expand the time frame of 30 charges from August 28, 2012 to September 26, 2012, to May 1, 2011 to September 26, 2012, and to add particulars regarding destruction of vegetation to three counts.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence of the defendant's farming activities supported the amendments, the circumstances were serious environmental protection matters, the defendant was not prejudiced, and the limitation period had not expired.

The appellant, a collision repair and storage facility, appealed the dismissal of its application to have an initial certificate issued by Intact Insurance under section 24(5) of the Repair and Storage Liens Act declared null and void.

The dispute arose over storage charges for a motor vehicle.

The appellant argued that Intact was not entitled to obtain the certificate because it had not yet paid the vehicle owner for the loss.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that Intact, having assumed liability under the insurance contract, was subrogated to the rights of its insured under section 278 of the Insurance Act and was therefore a person lawfully entitled to the vehicle under the RSLA.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to Intact.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision denying probate of a 2012 will and dismissing the probate application.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will, determined that the appellant failed to prove the testator's testamentary capacity, and held that the appellant failed to establish the testator's knowledge and approval of the will's contents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision on all grounds, finding that the suspicious circumstances displaced the presumption of testamentary capacity, placing the burden on the appellant to prove capacity.

The court also rejected the appellant's application to admit fresh evidence on appeal, finding the due diligence requirement was not met.

The defendants brought a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed due to unreasonable delay in consolidated provincial offence proceedings involving 39 defendants and 812 charges under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The court applied the analytical framework established in Regina v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, distinguishing between individual defendants and corporate defendants.

The court found that the individual defendants' rights had been infringed and stayed their charges, while the corporate defendants' applications were dismissed based on the principle that prejudice to fair trial rights cannot be inferred for corporations and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court judgment awarding them a reduced amount for motor vehicle storage charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review cannot be used as a surrogate right of appeal where the legislature has expressly restricted appeal rights for Small Claims Court decisions under $2,500 pursuant to section 31 of the Courts of Justice Act.

A ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Approximate Regulation Limit (A.R.L.) maps created by the Halton Region Conservation Authority.

The prosecution sought to admit these maps as evidence to establish the regulatory jurisdiction of the Authority over properties at 7459 Auburn Road, Milton, Ontario.

The defendants challenged admissibility on hearsay grounds.

The court determined that the A.R.L. maps, created pursuant to Ontario Regulation 162/06, constitute part of the regulation itself and are therefore admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act as copies of regulations.

The plaintiffs, Amber Lighting Limited and Alka Bhargava, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Rosa Petrozza and Vito Petrozza, seeking $123,500 plus interest.

The dispute arose from a mortgage default, with the core issue being whether the defendants were entitled to these additional funds in priority to the plaintiffs' third mortgage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a prior default judgment by Gray J. had already determined the amount owing under the second mortgage, including the additional funds.

The plaintiffs' attempt to dispute this was deemed a collateral attack on that judgment, which they had not moved to set aside despite being given the opportunity.

The plaintiff purchased 50% of the shares in the corporate defendant for $400,000.

Following the purchase, the individual defendant denied the plaintiff access to banking records, paid illegal kickbacks to suppliers, and misappropriated corporate funds and assets.

The plaintiff brought an action for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The court found that the defendant's conduct was oppressive and unfairly disregarded the plaintiff's reasonable expectations from the outset.

The court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $400,000, representing the original purchase price of the shares.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment to enforce a personal guarantee executed by the defendants in connection with a share purchase agreement (SPA) for solar energy companies.

The defendants' holding company, Lavender Glen, failed to make required payments, and despite subsequent amending agreements and acknowledgments of debt, the outstanding amount remained unpaid.

The defendants alleged pre-contractual misrepresentations as a defense.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants' misrepresentation claims were deemed vague, self-serving, and contradicted by the SPA's entire agreement clause and a later acknowledgment of debt.

Arguments of unconscionability and unpleaded fraudulent misrepresentation were also rejected.