Margaret A. Hoy

Following a preliminary decision finding that the applicant was not involved in an 'accident' as defined in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, the arbitrator dismissed the remainder of the applicant's claims.

The insurer sought its expenses of the arbitration, claiming approximately $17,000.

The arbitrator found that the case raised novel issues regarding whether repairing a vehicle constitutes a 'use' of the vehicle, and therefore declined to award the insurer its full expenses.

However, the arbitrator ordered the applicant to pay $500 for the unnecessary expense of having the insurer's counsel return for a second day of hearing to accommodate the applicant's request for additional time to prepare closing arguments.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s employment-related claim under the Simplified Procedure, the court determined costs.

The defendant sought costs based on the plaintiff’s litigation conduct, including refusal to consent to a pleading amendment, late service of materials, failure to comply with procedural timelines, and conduct that caused adjournment of the trial.

The court considered the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, along with the parties’ settlement offers under Rule 49.

The court found the plaintiff’s conduct lengthened the proceedings and warranted costs above partial indemnity.

Costs were fixed in favour of the defendant in the amount of $38,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after falling from the hood of a truck while performing body work repairs.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the incident was not an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator held that repairing a vehicle does not constitute a 'use' of the vehicle within the meaning of the Schedule.

Furthermore, the applicant's injuries were not directly caused by the use or operation of the truck.

The preliminary issue was resolved in favour of the insurer, and the claim was dismissed.

The applicant filed human rights applications alleging that his former employer and union discriminated against him on the basis of age by negotiating a severance settlement that excluded him.

The applicant had retired and was receiving an unreduced pension as of the trigger date for the settlement, which disqualified him from receiving severance pay.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the employer because it played no role in selecting the trigger date.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application against the union, finding that the trigger date was chosen for non-discriminatory reasons and the applicant's exclusion was due to his retirement status, not his age.

The appellant appealed an order granting partial summary judgment to the respondent, which dismissed the appellant's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, an accounting, and redemption of shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that there was no fiduciary relationship in the commercial agreement, the claim for an accounting could not stand alone without the fiduciary duty claim, and the appellant had no right to redeem the shares.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant, an adult daughter, was made a joint account holder by her father with a right of survivorship.

Following the father's death, her siblings commenced litigation because she did not include the joint accounts in the distribution of the estate.

The trial judge applied a presumption of resulting trust and found no evidence that the father intended to gift the accounts to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the presumption of resulting trust applied to gratuitous transfers to adult children and that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant, a 61-year-old middle manager with 32 years of service, appealed a trial judgment regarding his wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge had discounted his damages, finding he failed to mitigate by not seeking lower-level employment such as a crossing guard.

The Court of Appeal held this was a reversible error, as the appellant's obligation was to seek comparable employment.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in the notice period, increasing it to the high end of the range at 24 months, plus benefits.

Claims for further augmentation due to bad faith were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding a shareholder's agreement, oppression, and ordering an advance payment of $75,000 along with substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions.

The refusal to acknowledge the respondent as a shareholder constituted oppression under section 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld as a proper exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing he did not have care and control of the vehicle.

The trial judge applied the law from R. v. Toews and found a real risk that the extremely impaired appellant could have woken up and driven the vehicle.

The summary conviction appeal court judge upheld this finding as not unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding the use of property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the continuous use of the property was permissive, noting the trial judge was entitled to consider the nature of the use, the understanding of participants, and the effect on the property.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding two mortgage actions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence from a handwriting expert, failed to adequately assist the unrepresented appellants to ensure trial fairness, and arbitrarily curtailed cross-examination.

Concluding that the appellants did not receive a fair trial, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment in part and ordered a new trial for the mortgage actions.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision setting aside a conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of explanation for near relatives or the finding that the appellant was unable to pay his debts at the relevant time.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal claim against the individual respondent, a corporate officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statement of claim failed to plead material facts giving rise to an independent claim against the officer in his individual capacity.

The allegations of inducing breach of contract and tortious misrepresentation were deemed insufficient to establish personal liability.

The applicant, a minor who sustained a brain injury in a motor vehicle accident, was largely successful in a previous arbitration regarding his entitlement to case management services.

In this subsequent hearing on expenses, the insurer disputed the hourly rate claimed by the applicant's counsel, the expenses related to mediation, and the attendance fees for expert witnesses.

The arbitrator awarded the maximum hourly rate of $150 for the applicant's counsel, noting her skill and expertise in pursuing the complex claim.

The arbitrator also allowed the attendance fees for the expert witnesses but deducted expenses related to mediation.

The total expenses and disbursements were fixed at $18,061.15.