Lisa M. Constantine

The self-represented applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by a university professor.

Prior to the hearing, the applicant filed a request to withdraw the application after learning the Tribunal would not contact witnesses on his behalf.

The respondents objected and requested the application be dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case and for abuse of process, citing the applicant's failure to comply with disclosure rules and Tribunal orders regarding an audiotape.

The Tribunal denied the respondents' requests, finding the allegations would establish a prima facie case if true, and that the self-represented applicant's procedural failures did not amount to an abuse of process warranting dismissal.

The Tribunal granted the applicant's request to withdraw.

The appellants brought a motion to a full panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge.

The single judge had quashed their appeal from an interlocutory order of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists refusing production of third party records, and refused to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review.

The full panel upheld the quashing of the appeal, agreeing it was an interlocutory order.

However, the panel set aside the refusal to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review, finding that the appellants raised an arguable point regarding procedural fairness and the need for third party records to effectively cross-examine key witnesses.

The applicant, a doctoral student, sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision finding he violated the student code of conduct due to disruptive behaviour towards his supervisor.

The tribunal imposed restrictions on his contact with the supervisor and access to the laboratory.

The applicant also sought an order of mandamus to compel the university to provide him with a new supervisor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the tribunal accorded the applicant procedural fairness and that the restrictions were within the adjudicator's authority.

The court also declined to issue mandamus, as the applicant had no clear legal right to be provided with a supervisor against a professor's will.

The Medical Advisory Committee (MAC) and Dr. Khan both sought costs following the dismissal of Dr. Khan's motion to stay a hearing of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the Hospital regarding the termination of his hospital privileges.

The court found that the MAC was largely successful on the motion, as the hearing was allowed to proceed with only a delay in the release of the decision.

The court awarded costs to the MAC in the amount of $9,500 on a partial indemnity basis, noting that the motion was not legally or factually complex.

The applicant physician brought a motion to stay a hearing before the hospital's Board of Directors regarding the termination of his hospital privileges, pending an application for judicial review.

The applicant alleged lack of notice and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court found the applicant's case weak on the merits and that he would not suffer irreparable harm if the hearing proceeded.

The balance of convenience favoured continuing the hearing.

The motion for a stay was granted only to the extent that the Board was ordered not to disclose its decision until after the disposition of the judicial review application.

The defendants, eight major financial institutions, successfully defended an appeal of a decision denying certification of a class action regarding mortgage contracts.

The defendants sought their costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded, asserting the proceeding was a test case and involved a matter of public interest under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Divisional Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding the case was not a test case, did not raise a novel point of law, and was not a matter of public interest, but rather involved individual commercial mortgage contracts.

The court awarded the defendants modified partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 per defendant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motions to certify eight separate class proceedings against various financial institutions.

The claims alleged that the respondents incorrectly interpreted mortgage provisions regarding partial prepayment rights and early discharge penalties.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a cause of action as they relied on implied terms not supported by the express language of the mortgages.

The court also agreed that the proposed classes were overly broad, individual issues overwhelmed any common issues, and a class proceeding would be unmanageable and not the preferable procedure.

The applicant, a university student, sought judicial review of the university president's decision to suspend him for three years for participating in unauthorized demonstrations.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application, arguing that a newly scheduled university discipline tribunal hearing provided an adequate alternative remedy.

The applicant brought a cross-motion to stay the tribunal hearing pending the judicial review.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the tribunal was not an adequate alternative remedy due to jurisdictional questions and a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the only appeal would be to the president herself.

The court granted the cross-motion to stay the tribunal hearing, applying the RJR-Macdonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding an enforceable contract for the sale and delivery of shares to the respondent.

The trial judge found the contract was partly written and partly oral, with all essential terms agreed upon, including the provision of $1 million in shares priced at half market value as of the respondent's start date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting there was a clear meeting of the minds and no palpable error.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the assessment of damages was also dismissed, as the trial judge was justified in fixing the assessment as of the notice of termination date.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed with no costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent doctors.

The appellants alleged negligence in the administration of an epidural anaesthetic during childbirth, claiming it caused a dural tear and nerve damage resulting in ongoing pain.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no dural tear or nerve damage, and that the claim was barred by the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and not tainted by palpable and overriding error.