Leo Klug

A real estate brokerage sought payment of commission following the sale of a commercial property after termination of a listing agreement.

The plaintiff argued the listing had not been properly terminated and that the purchaser fell within the referral and holdover provisions of the agreement.

The court found the defendant validly terminated the listing agreement by written notice in accordance with its terms and that no oral rescission occurred.

The purchaser was neither introduced to nor shown the property by the brokerage during the listing period and negotiations began only after the listing had ended.

The court held the brokerage was not entitled to commission and dismissed the claim.

The appellant, a licensed funeral director, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) revoking her licence for professional misconduct.

During her internship to obtain an embalming licence, the appellant falsified six embalming reports and attempted to implicate her employees in the deception.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and holding that the LAT reasonably concluded that the appellant's continued dishonesty and lack of integrity necessitated licence revocation for the protection of the public.

The appellant tenant sought a declaration that it validly exercised its option to renew a commercial lease.

The respondent landlord refused the renewal, citing the tenant's failure to properly insure the premises in accordance with the lease.

Although the tenant eventually corrected the insurance defect, a slip-and-fall injury occurred on the property the day before the insurance was rectified, leading to a lawsuit against both parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the breach was not "spent" but subsisting, as the landlord faced an ongoing cause of action rooted in the tenant's failure to insure.

The appeal was dismissed, and relief from forfeiture was denied.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment interpreting a commercial lease.

The trial judge found the initial term of the lease was 25 years, not 5 years, and ordered the appellant to pay $24,000 for a roof sign rental.

On appeal, the appellant argued judicial bias, misinterpretation of the lease, and unilateral mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias, supporting the trial judge's interpretation of the lease, and agreeing that the true intent of the parties was a 25-year initial term.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that failed to find the individual respondent personally liable for a debt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by treating the case as one of piercing the corporate veil rather than personal contract.

Based on the uncontradicted evidence, including a quotation addressed to the individual and a purchase order signed by him without indicating a corporate capacity, the court concluded the appellant contracted with both the corporate and individual respondents.

The individual respondent was ordered to pay $89,849.94 plus pre-judgment interest.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision refusing to grant a stay of judgment pending the trial of the appellant's counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere as the motion judge appropriately applied the governing rules and leading cases to the facts.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action by a Master.

The Master had dismissed the action due to the appellant's failure to execute unlimited medical authorizations, relying on the appellant's overall conduct in the action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that interlocutory dismissal is a remedy of last resort and the appellant's conduct was not contumelious.

Furthermore, the Master erred by relying on grounds not specified in the responding party's notice of motion, contrary to Rule 37.06.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court Judge, which had struck his appeal from a Master's order on the basis that the Master's order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, confirming that the Master's order was interlocutory and that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal brought to the Divisional Court from an order of a Master.

The Master's order required the appellant to provide legal descriptions of properties for execution of costs judgments.

The court held that the Master's order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the appeal properly lay to a single judge of the Superior Court.

The appeal was struck from the Divisional Court list, with the appellant given 30 days to transfer it to the Superior Court, conditional on paying $500 in costs.

The appellants appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding a motion to set aside a noting of default and default judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no evidence to support a defence for the conceded construction costs of $336,409.34, but found evidence capable of supporting a defence for the remainder of the respondent's claims.

The Court varied the principal amount of the default judgment from $2,536,789.00 to $336,409.34 and allowed the respondent's claim for the additional amounts to proceed, while maintaining the writs of seizure and sale and registered liens pending trial.

The appellants appealed an order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal amended its previous endorsement to permit the appellants to raise the issue of the appropriate interest rate when the respondent's claim for additional amounts proceeds.

The principal amount of the judgment was varied from $2,536,789.00 to $336,409.34, with writs of seizure and sale and registered liens remaining in place pending trial or settlement.

The appellant appealed a finding of contempt for breaching a non-compete clause in a court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant had the requisite knowledge of the order or was wilfully blind to it.

Furthermore, the appellant admitted to breaching the clause after being personally served with the contempt motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment signed by the Registrar for over $2.5 million.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal.

In these dissenting reasons, Matlow J. would have allowed the appeal and set aside the default judgment, finding that the plaintiff's claim for increased construction contract costs was for unliquidated damages, not a liquidated sum, meaning the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to sign the judgment under Rule 19.04(1)(a).

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a noting of default and a default judgment of over $2.5 million in a construction lien action.

The appellants argued the Registrar lacked jurisdiction to sign the default judgment because the claim was not for a liquidated demand.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was for a liquidated demand supported by detailed invoices and a signed change order.

The court also upheld the motions judge's finding that the appellants had no arguable defence on the merits.

The appellants appealed the judgment of Justice Spence of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the lower court's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $3,000 plus disbursements.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding $3,000 plus costs for defamation.

On appeal, the appellant brought a preliminary motion to introduce fresh medical records regarding his psychiatric condition, arguing it should relieve him of liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the Palmer test and finding the evidence could have been adduced at trial and would not have altered the result.

The court found no error in the trial judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding $4,000 in costs to the respondent.