Lemon

The offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing death after attempting to pass a vehicle on a hill, resulting in a head-on collision that killed the oncoming driver.

The offender absconded to India prior to sentencing, and the court proceeded in absentia.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to two years in custody and a 10-year driving prohibition.

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce cell tower evidence showing the accused's phone was turned off or disconnected on several dates prior to the shooting, matching the pattern on the day of the murder.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was speculative.

The court held that the evidence was not admissible to prove the identity of the shooter, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value for that purpose.

However, the court ruled the evidence was admissible as circumstantial evidence of planning and deliberation, provided the jury first found the accused was the shooter.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion seeking standing to challenge the search and seizure of electronic data (GPS tracklogs and a phone contact list) extracted from a rental vehicle's infotainment system.

The Crown argued the accused lacked standing because the vehicle was obtained under false pretenses and the phone belonged to a third party.

The court applied the Marakah framework and found that the accused had a direct interest and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data, as it had the potential to reveal intimate biographical details.

The accused was granted standing to argue the Section 8 Charter breach.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude Crown evidence due to alleged s. 8 Charter breaches.

In response to an affidavit filed by the investigating officer, the applicant sought disclosure of all recorded communications between the officer and the Crown Attorney regarding a warrant.

The Crown did not object to providing the materials to the judge for review.

The court ordered the Crown to provide the requested information for the judge's review pursuant to R. v. Dixon and R. v. Chu.

The applicant, facing charges related to a serious motor vehicle collision, brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging his s. 8 rights were violated when a police officer smelled his breath while he was receiving medical treatment in a hospital.

He sought to excise this observation and his admission of 'drinking' from the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for his blood samples, and to exclude the blood evidence under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the application, finding no s. 8 breach occurred in the hospital setting.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the impugned evidence were excised, the remaining facts in the ITO—including excessive speed, the nature of the collision, and the presence of intoxicants at the scene—provided ample grounds to issue the warrant.

The applicant's motion for an interim order to sell a jointly owned home was previously dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $9,166, while the applicant argued no costs should be payable.

Applying the costs framework under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court found the respondent was successful and entitled to costs.

The court fixed the costs at $5,000, noting the applicant's motion was not unreasonable and the respondent's bill included work unrelated to the motion.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that police lacked lawful authority to search cell phones and intercept conversations.

The court dismissed the application, with written reasons to follow, to allow counsel to prepare for the upcoming trial.

The applicant accused brought an application for the production of occurrence reports.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was not satisfied that the requested records should be produced, with written reasons to follow.

The moving party brought a motion to change a 2012 spousal support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The moving party's income had significantly decreased from an imputed $50,000 to approximately $10,900, while the responding party's income was nearly three times higher.

The court found a material change in circumstances and provisionally varied the order, terminating spousal support and fixing arrears at $5,000 payable at $200 per month, subject to confirmation by a Massachusetts court.

The applicant, convicted of tax evasion and fined $687,000, applied for a ten-year extension to pay the outstanding fine.

The Crown consented to a two-year extension but sought an order for monthly payments.

The court granted the two-year extension without mandating monthly payments, noting the applicant's lack of financial disclosure and failure to seek employment, but finding that a monthly payment order would prioritize form over substance.

The plaintiff, a former employee of the Royal Bank of Canada in British Columbia, moved to Ontario and sought employment at an Ontario branch.

She alleged that a British Columbia-based employee defamed her to Ontario employees, resulting in the withdrawal of an employment offer and constructive dismissal.

The defendants moved to stay the action, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction and that British Columbia was the more convenient forum.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a presumptive connection to Ontario based on the tort of defamation occurring there, and held that the defendants failed to establish that British Columbia was a clearly more appropriate forum.

The applicant sought a declaration that four of his properties, rented to groups of university students, were not being used as 'Lodging House Type 1' under the municipality's zoning by-law.

The municipality argued that because the properties were rented to five or more individuals sharing kitchen and bathroom facilities, they constituted lodging houses.

The court found that the properties functioned as single housekeeping units rented to cohesive groups under single leases, rather than individual lodging units.

The court granted the declaration and further ordered the municipality to remove unsubstantiated references to the properties as 'Possible Lodging Houses' from its public website, criticizing the municipality's use of the website to pressure landowners.

The applicant appealed an order to comply issued by a city building inspector requiring a building permit for interior renovations completed before the applicant purchased the property.

The court held that current owners are responsible for prior unpermitted construction and that the city's inspection was conducted with valid consent.

However, the court rescinded the order, finding that the minor interior renovations (adding non-load-bearing walls and basement laundry plumbing) did not constitute 'material alterations' requiring a building permit under the Building Code Act.

The moving party wife brought a motion to compel the responding party husband to produce outstanding financial disclosure, including records from a corporation owned by his son.

The husband had previously agreed to a consent order for disclosure but failed to comply.

The court ordered the husband to produce the outstanding personal financial documents.

Regarding the corporate records, the court found them relevant to spousal support and property division, noting the husband had recently disposed of his interest in the company.

The court ordered the husband to request the records from his son and, if refused, to bring a motion to compel their production from the non-party corporation.

The court issued a consent timetable for the delivery of materials regarding costs and damages, following a suggestion by the Court of Appeal.

A conference call was scheduled to determine the subsequent process.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought a motion to exclude his videotaped statement to police, alleging breaches of his s. 10(b) and s. 7 Charter rights.

Although the accused spoke briefly with Duty Counsel, he expressed confusion during the subsequent police interview and indicated he wanted to speak to a lawyer of his own choosing.

The interviewing officer interrupted the accused's attempt to find a lawyer in the phone book and continued questioning him.

The court found that the officer failed to facilitate the accused's right to counsel, resulting in a serious breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter following the death of a 14-month-old child in her care.

The child suffered a severe skull fracture and subdural hematoma.

The court found that the accused momentarily lost her patience and intentionally assaulted the child, causing the fatal injuries.

Alternatively, the court found that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of life by delaying calling 911 for over an hour after observing the child was unresponsive and limp, which significantly contributed to the child's death.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter after a 14-month-old child in her care died.

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to police officers.

The court found the accused was detained by the first responding officer without being advised of her rights, rendering subsequent statements to that officer inadmissible.

Statements made during a videotaped interview and a walk-through with a detective were found voluntary and admissible, except for a phone call to her husband which breached her right to privacy in seeking counsel.

Statements made to a third officer after the child's death were excluded as involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics, including ignoring repeated assertions of the right to silence, denying adequate warmth, and exploiting the accused's emotional distress.

The defendants moved to set aside ex-parte certificates of pending litigation and an injunction previously granted to the plaintiffs regarding three properties.

The plaintiffs claimed the properties were transferred to the defendants in trust, but failed to disclose to the ex-parte judge that they were in mortgage arrears prior to the transfers and that the defendants had assumed nearly $1.2 million in mortgages.

The court found this failure to make full and fair disclosure shocking and sufficient to discharge the CPLs and the injunction.

The defendants' requests for immediate eviction and forfeiture of a $50,000 deposit were dismissed pending further evidence.

The moving defendants sought leave to amend their statement of defence and cross-claim to add a claim for damages against a co-defendant.

The co-defendant opposed the amendment, arguing the two-year limitation period had expired.

The court found there was a triable issue regarding when the moving defendants knew or ought to have known of the co-defendant's alleged negligence in loading the cargo.

The court granted leave to amend, with the co-defendant permitted to plead a limitations defence.