LeBel J.

The appellants, arm's length taxpayers, sought to deduct over $10 million in losses against their own incomes through a series of transactions involving partnerships.

The original losses belonged to an insolvent trust company, which transferred a portfolio of mortgages with unrealized losses to a non-arm's length partnership.

The trust company then sold its interest in the partnership to an arm's length party, and the appellants subsequently joined a new partnership to claim their proportionate shares of the losses.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the appellants and applied the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to disallow the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that allowing the appellants to claim the losses would defeat the purposes of s. 18(13) and the partnership provisions of the Income Tax Act, thereby constituting abusive tax avoidance.

The appellants, permanent residents ordered deported for serious criminality, appealed their removal orders under the former Immigration Act, triggering automatic stays.

Before their appeals were heard, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) came into force.

Section 196 of the IRPA discontinued pending appeals for serious criminals unless they had been 'granted a stay'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'granted a stay' refers only to actively ordered stays, not automatic statutory stays.

Applying principles of bilingual statutory interpretation, the Court found the narrower English version aligned with Parliament's intent to expedite the removal of serious criminals.

The Court also dismissed arguments that the retroactive removal of the appeal right violated section 7 of the Charter, concluding that deportation does not inherently implicate section 7 interests and the transitional scheme did not breach principles of fundamental justice.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident with the deceased.

Unaware that the deceased had died of unrelated causes, the respondent issued a statement of claim within the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, but outside the shorter limitation period under the Survival of Actions Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that neither the discoverability rule nor the confirmation provisions of the Limitations Act applied to extend the Survival of Actions Act limitation period.

Furthermore, the Court established the test for estoppel by convention and found that the requirements were not met, as there was no shared assumption or detrimental reliance.

The appeal was allowed and the statement of claim was struck out.

The appellants challenged the validity of provisions in Quebec's Health Insurance Act and Hospital Insurance Act that prohibit residents from purchasing private health insurance for services covered by the public health care plan.

They argued that waiting times in the public system deprived them of access to timely care, violating their rights under the Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal.

A majority found that the prohibition violates the right to life and personal inviolability under s. 1 of the Quebec Charter and is not justified under s. 9.1.

Three of the judges also found that the prohibition violates s. 7 of the Canadian Charter because it arbitrarily deprives individuals of life and security of the person by forcing them to endure unreasonable waiting times without the option of seeking private care.

The appellant sued the federal government for sexual battery committed by an employee at a student residence 20 years earlier.

The trial judge awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, finding the abuse caused the appellant's alcoholism and subsequent loss of earnings.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the pecuniary damages, applying a 'rehearing' standard of review to substitute its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the standard of review for findings of fact in Saskatchewan is 'palpable and overriding error', consistent with the rest of Canada.

The Court restored the past loss of earnings award but ordered it reduced for time spent in prison and social assistance received, and upheld the dismissal of the future loss of earnings award.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for his role in luring the victim to a car lot where he was shot.

At trial, the Crown introduced double hearsay evidence from a co-conspirator and wiretap evidence of a three-way phone call.

The appellant appealed, arguing the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule should be revisited under the principled approach to hearsay, and that the wiretap evidence exceeded the authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Carter rule for co-conspirator hearsay meets the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled approach.

The Court also upheld the admission of the wiretap evidence, finding the named target never ceased to be a party to the conversation.

The infant respondents suffer from autism and sought funding from the Province of British Columbia for applied behavioural analysis (ABA) or intensive behavioural intervention (IBI) therapy.

The Province refused to fund the therapy, arguing it was an emergent and controversial treatment and citing financial constraints.

The respondents argued this refusal violated their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislative scheme does not promise funding for all medically required treatment, but only for core services provided by medical practitioners.

Since ABA/IBI therapy is a non-core service and the Province had not designated its providers as health care practitioners, the benefit claimed was not provided by law.

The Court concluded there was no discrimination and allowed the Province's appeal.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused, finding no evidence of non-consent, despite the complainant's testimony that he did not want to engage in the activity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the direct evidence of lack of consent, and thus exceeded his jurisdiction.

The Haida Nation claimed title to Haida Gwaii and objected to the Province of British Columbia's replacement and transfer of a Tree Farm Licence to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown has a legal duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests prior to making decisions that might adversely affect their as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims.

This duty is grounded in the honour of the Crown and applies to both federal and provincial governments.

However, the Court found that third parties, such as Weyerhaeuser, do not owe an independent duty to consult or accommodate.

The respondent sought a survivor's pension under the Canada Pension Plan after her former common law partner died.

She had ended the relationship permanently prior to his death.

Her application was denied because she did not meet the definition of 'spouse', which required common law partners to be cohabiting at the time of death.

She argued this violated her equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter based on marital status, comparing herself to separated married spouses.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the correct comparator group was divorced spouses, not separated married spouses.

Since former common law spouses and former married spouses are both denied survivor's pensions, there was no discrimination.

The respondent collective society sought to impose copyright liability on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for music downloaded in Canada from foreign countries.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that ISPs acting merely as conduits for information communicated by others are protected from liability under s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act.

The Court also ruled that the creation of temporary 'cache' copies for technical reasons of economy and efficiency falls within this protection.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the Copyright Act applies to international Internet transmissions that have a real and substantial connection to Canada, rejecting the view that a communication only occurs in Canada if it originates from a server located within the country.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.

The respondents hold a patent for genetically modified genes and cells that confer resistance to glyphosate herbicides.

The appellants, commercial canola farmers, saved and planted seed that they knew or ought to have known contained the patented genes and cells, without obtaining a licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the patent was valid, as it claimed the genes and cells rather than the unpatentable plant itself.

The Court further held that the appellants infringed the patent by 'using' the invention, as their cultivation of the crop deprived the respondents of the full enjoyment of their monopoly.

However, the Court set aside the award for an accounting of profits, finding that the appellants earned no profit causally attributable to the invention.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee for unsatisfactory work performance (non-culpable incompetence).

The arbitration board found the dismissal was without just cause because the employer failed to follow the Re Edith Cavell criteria.

The board awarded damages in lieu of reinstatement under s. 142(2) of the Labour Relations Code, finding reinstatement inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal set aside the board's decision, holding that s. 142(2) did not apply to non-culpable dismissals and ordering reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for both the board's interpretation of s. 142(2) and its remedial award was reasonableness.

The Court found the board's broad interpretation of s. 142(2) to include non-culpable dismissals was reasonable, and its decision to award damages in lieu of reinstatement due to exceptional circumstances (the breakdown of the employment relationship) was also reasonable.

The appellant episcopal corporation appealed a finding of direct liability for sexual assaults committed by a parish priest over two decades.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the corporation was also vicariously liable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming the corporation was directly liable because the bishop's failure to properly direct and discipline the priest constituted negligence by the corporation.

The Court also held the corporation vicariously liable, finding a sufficiently close relationship between the diocesan enterprise and the priest, and a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful acts.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

During a strike by its unionized stage technicians, the Société de la Place des Arts de Montréal (SPA) decided to cease providing technical services to its tenants, requiring the tenants to hire their own technicians.

The union obtained an injunction from the Superior Court, upheld by the Court of Appeal, preventing the SPA from allowing tenants to use their own technicians, on the basis that this violated the anti-strikebreaking provisions of s. 109.1(b) of the Labour Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and vacated the injunction, holding that the SPA had genuinely abandoned the technical services part of its business and was not 'utilizing' the services of persons employed by another employer within the meaning of the Code.

The appellant, acting as curator for an elderly woman, sought indemnification from the Chambre des notaires du Québec after her notary fraudulently acquired her home for one dollar and sold it for $550,000.

The Chambre's Administrative Committee rejected the claim, concluding the notary acted in a personal rather than professional capacity.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this decision was patently unreasonable, as the notary was acting as a legal adviser and owed a professional duty of impartiality.

The Court ordered the Chambre to pay the remaining maximum indemnity of $187,464.04, plus interest and an additional indemnity, finding that the statutory cap on indemnities does not preclude awards for interest or delay.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

Duguay later pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a new trial was ordered.

A public inquiry subsequently revealed that the Crown and police failed to disclose significant relevant evidence to the defence at the original trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown's failure to disclose this evidence infringed the appellants' right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court clarified the test from Dixon for assessing the impact of non-disclosure on the verdict and trial fairness, and adapted it for cases involving guilty pleas.

Taillefer's conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

Duguay was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, and a stay of proceedings was entered due to the significant time he had already served.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.

The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.