Robert MacRae

The defendant, Central-McKinlay International Ltd., brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs, Raymond Lacroix and R & L Lacroix Transportation Inc., under Rule 56.01(1)(c) due to an unpaid Divisional Court cost order of $8,467.50.

The court found the trigger for security for costs was met and the onus shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that ordering security would be unjust.

Considering the low likelihood of success for the plaintiffs' claims (which largely relied on an unenforceable oral agreement for real property interest due to the Statute of Frauds), their history of intentional delay in prior proceedings, and questionable financial decisions, the court determined that ordering security for costs was just.

The defendant Fladgate brought a motion to strike or dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against it for conversion, detinue, and negligence regarding certain drill cores.

The plaintiffs did not respond to the motion.

The court found that the Statement of Claim failed to plead material facts supporting the intentional torts or a duty of care.

Furthermore, the claims were statute-barred as they related to consulting reports delivered in 2008 and 2011, well beyond the two-year limitation period.

The action against Fladgate was dismissed with costs fixed at $9,000.

The applicants brought an application to set aside a 2011 will made by their brother/uncle, who suffers from Alzheimer's disease.

The application was converted into an action, and the issue on this motion was who should be appointed as the incapable person's litigation guardian.

The applicant nephew sought to be appointed, offering to abandon his claim in the action.

The respondent opposed the appointment, arguing the nephew had a conflict of interest because his father stood to benefit if the will was set aside.

The court agreed, finding that the nephew could instruct counsel in a way that unfairly prejudiced the respondent, and dismissed the request to appoint the nephew as litigation guardian.

This decision addresses costs following a partially successful summary judgment motion brought by the defendant.

The defendant sought full summary judgment, but the court dismissed only the negligence claims, allowing nuisance and strict liability claims to proceed to trial.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found the defendant's success limited and the plaintiff successfully defended the motion on other issues.

The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in responding to a request to admit.

Exercising its discretion, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, finding the requested amount reasonable.

The accused, a professional engineer, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following the partial collapse of the Algo Centre Mall roof parking deck, which killed two people and injured another.

The Crown alleged the accused failed to properly inspect the mall and identify severe corrosion of the steel structure caused by decades of water infiltration.

The court found the accused's engineering work was shoddy and inadequate, but concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable engineer, given expert evidence that other professionals had also missed the severity of the corrosion.

The accused was acquitted.

The plaintiff, a former bank manager, sued his financial advisors for negligence, misrepresentation, and undue influence after his commuted pension investments depleted faster than anticipated.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of his losses and the defendants' alleged role by 2010 at the latest, but did not commence his action until 2014.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the limitation period defence.

The court-appointed receiver brought a motion to approve its Fourth Report, its fees and disbursements, and to amend the Receivership Order to increase the receiver's charge from $300,000 to $700,000.

The secured creditor supported the motion, and the respondent opposed it but made no submissions.

The court granted the motion, noting that the receiver's costs had increased significantly due to the respondent's opposition to a previous sale and approval motion.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a receivership application, specifically motions to approve an asset purchase agreement and a cross-motion to postpone the sale.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Receiver due to unfounded allegations impugning its integrity.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the Secured Creditor and Legacy Hill Resources Ltd. The court declined to hold Mr. Wetelainen, a principal of the respondent, personally liable for costs, finding no evidence of fraud or abuse of the bankruptcy process for a wrongful collateral purpose, despite his breach of a prior order and the respondent's inability to pay.

The moving party, a debtor company in receivership, sought leave to appeal an order approving the sale of its assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The moving party argued that the receiver acted unfairly, that the debtor's management retained the right to negotiate a restructuring, and that the receiver failed to consult with affected Aboriginal communities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the debtor's parallel negotiations contravened the receivership order, the receiver had exclusive authority to market the assets, and the Aboriginal consultation issue was raised too late and lacked an adequate evidentiary record.

The Receiver brought a motion for directions to determine whether the debtor required leave to appeal an Approval and Vesting Order that transferred the debtor's property to a purchaser.

The debtor argued it had an automatic right of appeal under sections 193(a), (b), and (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the order did not involve future rights, would not affect other cases of a similar nature in the proceeding, and did not involve property exceeding $10,000 in value within the meaning of the Act.

The motion was granted, the debtor's notice of appeal was quashed, and a timetable was set for a leave to appeal motion.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to change a 2003 family law order and a motion to change venue.

The court dismissed the venue motion because the alleged concerns related to judges who regularly sat in Sault Ste.

Marie and no apprehension of bias was alleged against the motion judge.

The court held that the motion to change the order was barred by res judicata because an earlier motion involving the same parties, issue, and evidence had already been dismissed.

The court further observed that, even absent res judicata, the supporting affidavits were outdated and largely bald allegations.

Costs were not fixed in the decision, with further written submissions invited.

The appellants, non-band aboriginal communities, challenged their exclusion from the proceeds of Ontario's first reserve-based commercial casino (the First Nations Fund).

The province had restricted the distribution of the fund to First Nations communities registered as bands under the Indian Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exclusion did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, as the casino project was a targeted ameliorative program designed to support the self-reliance and self-government of First Nations bands, and the exclusion did not demean the appellants' human dignity.

The Court also held that the province did not act ultra vires its jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as it was simply exercising its spending power.

The appellant sought a declaration of professional competence and an order requiring a bank to place him on its list of lawyers qualified to act for it.

The court held there was no evidentiary foundation on the summary judgment record to connect the bank's internal competence manual to a by-law under s.158(2) of the Bank Act, and no other basis to compel the bank to retain the appellant.

The court further held it had no jurisdiction to grant a declaration respecting the appellant's competence as a lawyer.

The dismissal of the action on summary judgment was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs.