Linda Matthews

The defendant insurance company brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay, arguing that the plaintiff's inordinate and inexcusable delay in advancing the litigation created a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to restore the action to the trial list and to compel the defendant to attend examination for discovery.

The court found that while delay was inordinate, it was excusable because the defendant's former counsel was primarily responsible for the delay by failing to serve a sworn affidavit of documents despite three court orders.

The court found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant and restored the action to the trial list.

The plaintiff's motion to compel discovery was dismissed to avoid further delay.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding he did not suffer a catastrophic impairment from a 2016 motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred in its treatment of expert and lay evidence, relied on hearsay, and misapplied the causation test.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal reasonably rejected the appellant's expert evidence after the expert recanted his opinion upon being presented with contradictory medical and benefits records.

The court also held that hearsay evidence is admissible before the Tribunal and the causation test was properly applied.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal from a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying a request to adjourn a scheduled hearing.

The appellant argued the appeal automatically stayed the LAT proceedings under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal pursuant to Rule 2.1, confirming it has no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from the LAT.

The court noted the dismissal was without prejudice to an application for judicial review but declined to grant an interim stay of the LAT hearing.

The plaintiff sued multiple defendants for a serious workplace injury sustained when her arm was caught in a turret winder.

The defendant manufacturer, GN Gear, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and the co-defendants' crossclaims against it, arguing it only manufactured the machine to specifications and had no role in its design.

The court dismissed the motion against the plaintiff, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the interwoven nature of the design and manufacturing process due to reverse engineering, and the risk of inconsistent findings if partial summary judgment were granted.

The unopposed motion to dismiss the crossclaims was granted.

The appellant insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) preliminary decision finding that the respondent was a resident of Ontario at the time of his motor vehicle accident in Alberta, and thus an 'insured person' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The respondent had been living and working in Alberta for more than 60 days prior to the accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LAT reasonably applied a flexible, context-specific test for 'ordinary residence' rather than a strict physical presence test, and that the LAT's weighing of the evidence regarding the respondent's ties to Ontario was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision on a threshold motion in a motor vehicle accident case, which found her injuries did not meet the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's costs award, arguing the threshold decision should have been considered in the costs analysis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the medical evidence.

The court granted the respondent's cross-appeal on costs, applying the recent decision in Saleh v. Nebel, and remitted the costs issue to the trial judge.

The moving party, a used car dealership, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the main action and crossclaim against it arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff was severely injured when a tire exploded while pushing a vehicle purchased from the moving party.

The responding party relied on the implied condition of merchantability under the Sale of Goods Act, alleging the vehicle's electronic traction control system was defective at the time of sale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the operability of the traction control system at the time of sale and the risk of inconsistent findings of fact.

The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a motor vehicle accident following a cottage birthday party where alcohol was consumed.

The plaintiffs alleged the property owners were liable as social hosts and as occupiers of premises, arguing they failed to prevent intoxicated driving and failed to address rocks allegedly obstructing a right-of-way.

The court held the property owners were not social hosts because they neither organized nor participated in the party and did not serve alcohol.

The accident also occurred off their property, and their limited right to use a shared right‑of‑way did not make them occupiers responsible for its condition.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court dismissed the action and cross‑claims against them.

The appellant entered into a contract with the respondent for the storage of vaccines in a temperature-controlled warehouse.

The contract required the appellant to maintain all-risk property insurance.

After the cooling system malfunctioned and destroyed the vaccines, the appellant's insurer brought a subrogated action against the respondent and other contractors involved in the warehouse's operations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the insurance covenant barred the claim against the respondent (except for a $100,000 negligence carve-out) and that the other contractors were third-party beneficiaries of this protection.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle accident action, the jury awarded damages including general damages, future housekeeping costs, and future care.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for general damages and certain future care expenses on the basis that the plaintiff had not proven a permanent serious impairment of an important bodily function as required by Ontario Regulation 381/03.

The court held that the trial judge determines the threshold issue independently of the jury’s verdict and is not bound by the jury’s factual findings.

The plaintiff’s expert evidence was rejected as lacking objectivity and failing to comply with the evidentiary requirements of the Regulation.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory threshold and dismissed the claims for general damages and future medical rehabilitation expenses.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a FSCO Director's Delegate decision upholding an Arbitrator's finding that the respondent suffered a catastrophic impairment.

The respondent had recorded a Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score of 9 several days after a motor vehicle accident, which the insurer argued was confounded by medication and other injuries rather than brain impairment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review is reasonableness and that the SABS regulation uses the GCS score as a proxy measurement without requiring an inquiry into the patient's prognosis or the specific cause of the lowered score.

Following dismissal of a complex multi‑party action on summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of the entire action in addition to agreed costs of the summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff argued that costs submissions should be limited to the motion and that delay in bringing the motion inflated the defendants’ legal fees.

The court held that where summary judgment disposes of the entire action, the court may fix costs of the entire proceeding, treating the motion similarly to a trial judgment.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the defendants’ claimed partial‑indemnity costs by 25% to align with what would have been the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations in a large and technically complex case.

The plaintiff pharmaceutical company stored vaccines with a logistics provider under a master services agreement requiring the plaintiff to obtain all‑risk property insurance covering the stored goods and naming the warehouse operator as an additional insured.

After a refrigeration malfunction allegedly rendered the vaccines unsellable, the plaintiff commenced a subrogated action against the warehouse operator and various contractors responsible for the cooling and monitoring system.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the covenant to insure constituted an allocation of risk whereby the plaintiff assumed the risk of loss to the goods and thereby barred tort claims against the warehouse operator for that loss.

The court further held that the covenant extended to contractors and related parties with an identity of interest in the performance of the contract.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action and all cross‑claims.

The defendant property owner brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging occupiers’ liability following injuries sustained during a horse‑handling incident on a hobby farm.

The plaintiff alleged that the occupier negligently maintained fencing and gating which allegedly contributed to a horse-related accident.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to identify any act or omission by the occupier that breached the statutory duty under the Occupier’s Liability Act or the Negligence Act.

The evidence showed the fencing and gate were common and properly installed, and the alleged incident arose from the actions of the participants rather than any unsafe condition of the premises.

As no genuine issue requiring a trial was established, summary judgment dismissing the claim against the occupier was granted.

The appellant insurer sought indemnification from the respondent insurer under the loss transfer provisions of the Insurance Act for the costs of insurer-generated medical assessments.

The respondent conceded its insured was 100 per cent at fault but refused to indemnify the costs of the medical assessments, arguing they were not payments 'in relation to' statutory benefits paid.

The arbitrator and the Superior Court judge ruled in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the expense of insurer-generated medical assessments is not recoverable under s. 275(1) of the Insurance Act as payments 'in relation to such benefits paid'.

An insurer appealed a private arbitration award concerning a statutory accident benefits loss transfer dispute arising from a multi‑vehicle highway collision.

The arbitrator had found that a heavy commercial truck insured by the appellant caused a chain‑reaction collision and was 100% at fault under Rule 9(4) of the Fault Determination Rules, entitling the respondent insurer to full indemnification for benefits paid to its insured.

The appellant argued the incident constituted a pile‑up governed by Rule 11, which would limit liability to 50%, and challenged the finding of a collision involving its insured vehicle.

The court held the arbitrator’s factual findings were supported by the evidence and that Rule 9(4) was correctly applied because the other vehicles were stationary in the same lane at the time of impact.

The appeal was dismissed and the arbitration award affirmed.

The plaintiff was injured in a boating accident involving two defendants.

Prior to trial, the plaintiff entered into a Mary Carter agreement with one defendant, receiving a settlement of $365,000 for damages.

At trial, the jury assessed total damages at $312,021 and apportioned liability between the plaintiff and both defendants.

The trial judge refused to deduct the settlement amount from the damage award and ordered the non-settling defendant to pay his proportionate share.

The non-settling defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the settlement monies must be deducted from the total damage award to prevent double recovery.

Since the settlement exceeded the total damages assessed, the action against the non-settling defendant was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to extend the time for service of the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by allowing his frustration with plaintiff's counsel to displace the assessment of prejudice to the defendant, and by improperly concluding the plaintiff had no case.

Finding little to no prejudice to the defendant, the Court allowed the appeal and extended the time for service, but awarded no costs due to the conduct of plaintiff's counsel.