Leigh Harrison

The court considered an application under the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act to set aside litigation loan agreements entered into by Chadwick Randy Kelly (by his litigation guardian and attorney for property) with BridgePoint Financial Services Limited Partnership I. The loans, used to purchase and retrofit a home after a catastrophic injury, had grown to over $1.1 million due to compounding interest.

The applicants argued the loans were excessive, harsh, and unconscionable.

The court found that, given the risk profile, the lack of alternative financing, and the terms of the agreements, the loans were not excessive or unconscionable under the Act.

The application was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought a motion for further particulars regarding her 2020 wrongful termination claim.

The defendant sought extensive particulars, arguing they were necessary to plead.

The court largely denied the defendant's requests, finding many particulars were already provided, evident from the claim, or not within the plaintiff's current knowledge due to lack of access to work files.

The court ordered the plaintiff to particularize an allegation of discrimination based on ethnicity, confirm timelines, and identify specific sections of statutes relied upon.

The defendant was ordered to deliver a defence within 20 days of compliance.

The applicant, a party under disability who suffered catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident, sought court approval of a $900,000 settlement for statutory accident benefits.

The court approved the settlement quantum as reasonable and in the applicant's best interests.

However, the court declined to approve the proposed distribution, which included a structured settlement and payments to a former solicitor and a litigation loan company, citing a lack of updated medical evidence and concerns over the loan and former solicitor's actions.

The matter was referred to the Public Guardian and Trustee for a report and recommendations.

The applicant sought a determination that she sustained a catastrophic impairment due to a mental or behavioural disorder following an ATV accident.

The central issue was whether she suffered a marked impairment in the domain of adaptation.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's psychological impairments, including autism spectrum disorder and depression, were pre-existing and not caused by the accident under the 'but for' test.

Furthermore, the Tribunal preferred the respondent's psychiatric evidence, concluding that the applicant's level of function was compatible with a mild impairment rather than a marked one.

The application was dismissed, and claims for an award and interest were denied.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike a jury notice due to court availability issues in Kingston, while the defendant brought a motion to adjourn the trial so it could be heard together with a separate action arising from a subsequent 2018 motor vehicle accident.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, noting that criminal trials take priority and a civil jury trial was unlikely to proceed as scheduled.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion to adjourn, finding that delaying a 2012 accident claim by several more years to allow the 2018 action to catch up would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiffs.

Following a personal injury trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages but found 25% contributorily negligent, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought over $817,000 in costs and disbursements, arguing for substantial indemnity costs from the date of a Rule 49 offer.

The defendants argued for an award of $380,000 inclusive of disbursements.

The court rejected the application of substantial indemnity costs, finding the trial result was not a 'near miss' to the plaintiff's offer.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $500,000 all-inclusive on a partial indemnity scale.

During a hearing to determine if the applicant was catastrophically impaired, the respondent objected to the applicant's expert witness testifying to matters beyond her original report, specifically a late-served rebuttal report.

The Tribunal ruled that the expert could testify to all relevant matters, including the new report.

The Tribunal found that under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, it has broad discretion to admit relevant evidence, and the probative value of the testimony outweighed any prejudice to the respondent, which could be cured by allowing cross-examination and reply evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to disqualify the law firm Adair Goldblatt Bieber LLP (AGB) from representing the defendants in a legal malpractice action.

The plaintiffs argued that their counsel had previously consulted with a partner at AGB about potentially acting as an expert witness for the plaintiffs, during which confidential information was allegedly shared.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the discussion was brief, general in nature, and did not involve the disclosure of confidential information attributable to a solicitor-client relationship that could prejudice the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff suffered a severe quadriceps rupture after slipping and falling on a poorly lit, defectively designed stairway at a Sandals resort in Saint Lucia.

The court applied Saint Lucian law to determine liability, finding the resort breached its duty of care as an occupier.

The plaintiff was found 25% contributorily negligent for descending the stairs in the dark.

Applying Ontario law for the quantification of damages, the court awarded general damages, future care costs, and special damages, rejecting the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff's pre-existing osteoarthritis or a subsequent re-injury broke the chain of causation.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to bring the motion and an order to strike the Defendants' jury notice, seeking to proceed with a judge-alone trial due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Defendants opposed, arguing their right to a jury trial is substantive and it was premature to strike the notice.

The court granted the Plaintiffs' motion, finding that the pandemic constituted a substantial and unexpected change of circumstances, and that the indeterminate delay in securing a jury trial date prejudiced the Plaintiffs, particularly regarding their income loss claim under the Insurance Act.

The court emphasized the need for timely and affordable access to justice, especially during the unprecedented crisis facing the civil justice system.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice due to significant delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that the ongoing adjournments were causing prejudice, including the erosion of her claim for past income loss.

The defendants opposed, asserting the right to a jury trial and advocating for a "wait and see" approach.

The court granted the motion, finding that the current and anticipated delays in civil jury trials in the Central East Region, coupled with the possibility of an earlier judge-alone trial, justified striking the jury notice.

The court emphasized that delay in obtaining a civil jury trial date can, by itself, constitute prejudice, aligning with recent Court of Appeal guidance.