Leonard Hochberg

The defendant was previously found in civil contempt for dishonesty, concealing assets, and breaching a Mareva injunction.

Having already served a 90-day sentence for a prior contempt finding, the court considered the appropriate sanction for this subsequent contempt.

Emphasizing that civil contempt aims at coercion rather than punishment, and noting the defendant's expressed remorse and ongoing counselling, the court declined to impose further immediate incarceration.

Instead, the court ordered the defendant to continue weekly counselling for two months and pay a $10,000 fine within 60 days, failing which a 90-day term of imprisonment would be imposed.

The defendant, Tang Hien Quanh, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from his arrest and subsequent searches of his person and a Toyota RAV4.

The defendant argued violations of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention) and s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) Charter rights.

The court found no s. 9 or s. 8 Charter breaches, concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the searches were lawful, including the RAV4 search conducted under a valid warrant.

Even if breaches occurred, the court determined that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the defendant's rights, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The Crown applied for a bail review of a release order for the respondent, who was charged with trafficking significant quantities of cocaine and fentanyl.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace failed to properly consider the tertiary ground for detention under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the Justice of the Peace failed to explain why detention was not required given the extremely strong Crown case, the gravity of the offences, and the public safety risks associated with fentanyl.

The application was allowed, the release order was vacated, and the respondent was ordered detained in custody.

The appellant appealed a decision granting summary judgment in favour of the respondent, arguing the motion judge erred in denying a second adjournment.

The motion had previously been adjourned and marked peremptory to the appellant, with instructions to either retain counsel or seek leave for a director to represent the corporation.

On the return date, the appellant had not retained counsel and provided no evidence to contradict the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to deny the adjournment and grant summary judgment.

The appellant, a third party claiming an interest in forfeited property, appealed a forfeiture order made under section 16 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that section 16(3) expressly limits the right of appeal to the person convicted or the Attorney General, and grants no right of appeal to third parties.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana, crack cocaine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered the drugs in a locked briefcase during a vehicle search following arrest for possession of a marijuana cigarette.

The accused sought exclusion of the drugs under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the police unlawfully searched a locked briefcase without a warrant.

The court found the officers credible and accepted their evidence that a strong odour of fresh marijuana emanated from the vehicle and the briefcase, giving them a reasonable basis to search it as an incident to arrest.

Relying on authorities such as Cloutier v. Langlois, R. v. Caslake, and R. v. Zucatti, the court held that common law powers of search incident to arrest extend to forcibly opening a locked briefcase where the search is reasonably connected to the arrest.

No Charter breach occurred and the drug evidence was admitted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for participating in three fraudulent schemes, arguing the trial judge's conclusions were unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding substantial evidence that the appellant deliberately participated in the schemes.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to appeal his convictions for cocaine trafficking, which were entered upon guilty pleas.

He argued that while he knew he would face deportation to the United States, he did not realize he would subsequently face deportation from the United States to Guyana.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, noting the guilty pleas were informed and unequivocal, there was no evidence regarding his lack of knowledge of U.S. immigration law, and he had no defence on the merits.

The applicant sought judicial review of a municipal licensing committee's decision to refuse the renewal of her body rub parlour licence due to by-law violations.

The applicant argued that the hearing lacked natural justice because the committee consisted solely of elected officials and relied on uncorroborated evidence from police and by-law officers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory framework explicitly confided the decision to the municipality itself, the hearing was procedurally fair, and the committee's reliance on uncontradicted eyewitness evidence was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits.

In a previous decision, the arbitrator found that the applicant knew he was operating an uninsured vehicle and ordered him to repay income replacement benefits.

Both parties sought expenses for the arbitration proceeding.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's evidence regarding his knowledge of the lack of insurance was untruthful and fraudulent.

Consequently, the applicant was denied his expenses, and the insurer was awarded its reasonable expenses of $2,712.50 plus $59 in disbursements.