Jordan Alexander Stone

The court dismissed Mijanur Rahman's application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The application sought orders reinstating and renewing various financial licenses and waiving renewal costs, but the court found that such relief was not available by application to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court held that the application lacked legal merit, was not properly brought under the cited rules or statutes, and would inevitably fail.

The decision clarifies the robust application of Rule 2.1 to prevent clearly unmeritorious proceedings from consuming judicial resources.

The court considered a motion under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an application as frivolous and vexatious.

The registrar referred the matter to the judge following a request from counsel for FP Canada.

The court ordered that the applicant be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before any dismissal, stayed the application pending the written hearing, and directed the registrar regarding service and filings.

The judge remained seized of the matter.

The appellants, Wesley Moore and St. Jacobs Carpenter House Inc., appealed an order requiring them to cease operating an unlicensed retirement home.

The core issues were whether their facility met the statutory definition of a "retirement home" under the Retirement Homes Act, 2010, specifically regarding the provision of "care services" (meals and drug administration), and whether the application judge erred in finding an abuse of process or in ordering the cessation of operations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, confirming that the facility provided at least two care services, including a broad interpretation of "administration of a drug" to encompass assistance.

The court also rejected the abuse of process argument and affirmed the judge's power to issue a cease and vacate order under the Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority (RHRA) brought an application seeking an order for the respondents to cease illegally operating a retirement home and to wind up their business.

The core issue was whether the respondents' facility met the definition of a retirement home under the Retirement Homes Act, specifically concerning the "administration of a drug or other substance." The court found that the respondents did administer drugs based on the ordinary meaning of the term, their own definition, and a purposive interpretation of the Act, which aims to protect vulnerable individuals.

The court also found other care services were provided.

Given the respondents' history of non-compliance and deliberate attempts to avoid regulation, the court granted the RHRA's request to shut down the premises, ordering it to be vacated within six months, and awarded costs to the applicant.

The Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority (RHRA) brought an urgent application seeking an order for In Touch Retirement Living for Vegetarians/Vegans Inc. and Elaine Lindo (the Respondents) to cease operating as an unlicensed retirement home.

The Respondents filed a cross-application challenging the enforcement of the Retirement Homes Act, 2010 on Charter grounds and requesting consideration for a licence.

The court granted the RHRA's application, finding a continuous breach of the Act and dismissing the cross-application due to procedural deficiencies and lack of legal merit for the Charter claims.

Ancillary relief was also granted to ensure the safe transfer of residents.

The accused was charged with three counts of breach of probation for allegedly contacting his wife and children in violation of probation orders.

The first allegation occurred on July 7, 2014, but the information was not sworn until July 21, 2017.

The accused was arrested on March 11, 2017.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter motion arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the pre-arrest delay qualified as a discrete event attributable to exceptional circumstances, as the police acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the accused.

Additionally, the accused's failure to appear at trial demonstrated he was not genuinely exercising his 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded that the impaired operation charge could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of identification of the driver.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found serious breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights relating to the right to counsel in his first language (Punjabi).

The police failed to advise the accused of the availability of Punjabi-speaking duty counsel despite objective evidence of language difficulties.

Under s. 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample, finding that the serious and well-established Charter breach, combined with the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, outweighed the societal interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.