Joe Wilkinson

Mr. Stephens, convicted of mischief and failing to comply with a probation order in 2009, sought to reopen his appeal to argue for a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

He had previously been found NCR for unrelated 2011 offences.

His summary conviction appeal of the 2009 convictions was dismissed in 2014, and subsequent motions to reopen were also dismissed.

He brought a new motion relying on a 2024 psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the new report lacked the cogency to establish an NCR defence or to justify reopening the appeal, especially given the applicant's own inconsistent factual account of the events.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to three and a half years, appealed his sentence, questioning the sufficiency of "Downes credit" and seeking a further reduction based on post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal deferred to the trial judge's decision on Downes credit, finding no error in principle, and determined that the post-sentencing rehabilitation, while commendable, did not warrant an additional sentence reduction in this case.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breach of undertaking, sexual assault, and uttering threats against his ex-partner.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on the details of his prior convictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown's cross-examination on the appellant's criminal record was improper, it did not unduly influence the trial judge's credibility assessment or lead to a miscarriage of justice.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding no merit in the allegations.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and leave to appeal the sentence was denied.

The appellant appealed her convictions and sentence for possession of heroin and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of methamphetamine.

The drugs were found during a search of her apartment, which she shared with her boyfriend.

The trial judge found she had knowledge and control of the drugs based on her presence, text messages, and surveillance evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in imposing a two-year sentence.

The applicant sought to re-open ex parte proceedings under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) that resulted in Gathering and Sending Orders.

The applicant alleged material non-disclosure by the Attorney General regarding the legality of search warrants, the need for disclosure in extradition proceedings, warrantless seizure of subscriber information, and the authority to detain seized items.

The court found no material non-disclosure that would have altered the outcome or justified granting the applicant notice and standing at the MLACMA hearings.

The application to re-open was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was wholly inadequate.

At the sentencing hearing, there were critical factual disputes regarding the respondent's intoxication and whether she acted in self-defence, but neither counsel requested a Gardiner hearing to resolve them.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's version of events, including that her capacity was seriously compromised and she acted in self-defence using excessive force.

The Court of Appeal held that in these highly unusual circumstances, the sentence, while at the extreme low end of the range, was not wholly inadequate and did not reflect an error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess stolen motor vehicles and four counts of possession of stolen motor vehicles.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the inference available from recent possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly conflated the issues of possession and guilty knowledge, and mischaracterized the defence's position by suggesting the appellant had offered an explanation for possession when he had denied possession entirely.

The appeal was allowed, the substantive possession and conspiracy convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault involving the gang rape of a 15-year-old girl.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing errors in the Crown's closing argument, jury instructions regarding the application of co-accused evidence, alleged 'Miller' errors in assessing evidence, and the trial judge's handling of a jury request to re-read the complainant's examination-in-chief without the cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no prejudice in the jury instructions or the re-reading of evidence.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the significant penitentiary terms were deemed appropriate for the vicious nature of the offence.