Jaye Hooper

The Estate Trustee sought directions from the court regarding the interpretation and distribution of two estates following the murder of the testators by their adopted son.

The central issue was the application of the criminal forfeiture rule (slayer rule) and whether the estates should be held in trust for the murderer's potential unborn children or accelerated to alternate beneficiaries.

The court applied the implied intention approach, ruling that the murderer was disentitled from any benefit.

It further determined that the gifts to the murderer's unborn issue should also fail due to public policy and the absence of living issue at the time of disentitlement, thereby accelerating the distribution of the estates to the next lineal beneficiaries (the testatrix's brothers), subject to specific annuity provisions.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her Superior Court action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant's original Small Claims Court action had been dismissed after a seven-day trial.

She sought to appeal to the Divisional Court but was out of time, and her motion for an extension of time was refused.

The Court of Appeal found that the new Superior Court action was an attempt to relitigate the same issues previously determined and that the respondent had standing to bring the Rule 2.1 motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a Small Claims Court judgment dismissing her defamation claim.

The motion was brought 14 months after the merits decision was released, following a separate costs decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the moving party failed to establish a bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time period and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, amounting to a collateral attack on the trial judge's findings.

The moving party, a defendant in multiple actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims against him.

The collision occurred when the respondent lost control of his vehicle while attempting to pass and crossed into the moving party's lane.

The moving party relied on expert evidence suggesting his reaction time was within normal limits, while the respondents relied on expert evidence arguing he braked late.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the conflicting expert evidence and its admissibility required a full trial with viva voce evidence and cross-examination to justly determine liability.

The applicant Employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reclassified the Employment Relations Officer position to a higher level.

The Employer argued it was denied procedural fairness because the arbitrator failed to bifurcate the hearing, depriving it of the opportunity to lead evidence on the proper classification level.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Employer should have known classification was in issue given the evidence and submissions presented at the hearing without objection.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action seeking findings that he was wrongfully dismissed, the determination of a reasonable notice period, and damages for pay in lieu of notice.

The defendant employer argued that the dismissal was for just cause and that multiple factual disputes required a trial.

The court reviewed the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance from Hryniak v. Mauldin regarding fair and proportionate adjudication.

The court held that genuine issues requiring trial existed, including disputes regarding workplace misconduct, warnings, after-acquired cause, and mitigation.

Because resolution would require credibility findings and testimony from multiple witnesses, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The Member pleaded guilty to professional misconduct stemming from a 1984 criminal conviction for the sexual assault of a student.

The Discipline Committee accepted the guilty plea and the joint submission on penalty, ordering the immediate revocation of the Member's Certificate of Qualification and Registration.

The parties disputed whether the Member's name should be published in the College's official publication.

The Committee ordered publication with the Member's name, emphasizing the College's public interest mandate, transparency, and the need for general deterrence, despite the misconduct having occurred over 30 years prior and the Member having retired in 2003.

The Appellant appealed a proposal by the Registrar to revoke his registration as a real estate salesperson.

The Registrar cited the Appellant's history of bankruptcy, outstanding judgments, multiple disciplinary findings by RECO for unethical conduct, criminal convictions for violating the Act, and providing false information on renewal applications.

The Tribunal found the Appellant's conduct demonstrated a shocking lack of integrity and financial responsibility.

Applying the Tulloch factors, the Tribunal concluded that conditional registration would not adequately protect the public and directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to revoke the registration.

Following the dismissal of appeals and motions for leave to appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee for an inter vivos trust, the successful parties sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the normal loser-pays regime applied to the appeals, rather than costs being paid out of the estate, as the uncertainty regarding the trust's administration had been resolved by the application judge.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful beneficiaries and full indemnity costs to the trustee, payable jointly and severally by the appellants.

The Children's Lawyer and other appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to appoint an independent trustee for an inter vivos spousal trust.

The appellants alleged that the respondents, who were directors of the corporation wholly owned by the trust, committed a breach of trust by declaring dividends in excess of net income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents' actions as directors were governed by the Business Corporations Act, not the trust agreement, and did not constitute a breach of trust.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence and upheld the application judge's order that costs be paid out of the estate.

Following litigation concerning the resignation of a trustee and the mechanism for appointing replacement trustees under a family trust, the court determined the issue of costs.

Competing groups of beneficiaries had disputed whether the court should appoint an institutional trustee or whether the mechanism set out in the testator’s will should govern.

Although one group succeeded on the substantive issue, the court held the cross-application seeking an independent trustee was reasonably necessary to ensure proper administration of the estate.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing estate litigation costs, the court concluded that fairness and the importance of the issues justified payment of most parties’ costs from the estate.

The court fixed specific amounts payable to each party.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of a personal injury action for delay.

The court reviewed the contextual factors governing reinstatement of dismissed actions, including promptness of the motion, explanation for delay, inadvertence, abandonment of the claim, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the explanations for litigation delay were weak, the court found evidence that the plaintiff continued to pursue the action through efforts to answer undertakings and had not abandoned the claim.

The defendants’ evidence of prejudice, including alleged fading memories, was found to be vague and insufficient to outweigh the interests of justice in determining the matter on its merits.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside and the action permitted to proceed subject to an expedited timetable.

The applicant sought to resign as trustee of a family trust.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a cross-application to appoint a new independent trustee, arguing that the settlor's children, who intended to appoint themselves as trustees pursuant to the trust agreement, had abused their discretion as directors of the trust's holding company.

The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion that would justify interfering under s. 5(1) of the Trustee Act, and held that the executors could appoint the next trustees pursuant to the trust agreement.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed the dismissal of her civil actions against police officers, the police services board, and the Crown for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches.

The claims arose from her arrest for criminal harassment and a peace bond application related to her involvement in a domestic dispute between her romantic partner and his wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's core conclusions—that the police acted reasonably and had abundant admissible evidence to proceed—were supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's disposition, noting the prolonged and largely unexplained delay in bringing the motion for a hearing, as well as the potential prejudice to a third-party purchaser who was not given notice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,500.