James K. Stewart

The appellant challenged an order for a new trial after exclusion of a co-accused’s prior inconsistent Agreed Statement of Facts tendered for its truth in a murder prosecution.

The majority held threshold reliability was not established because available safeguards did not adequately permit testing of truth and accuracy, particularly given curtailed cross-examination following assertions of solicitor-client privilege.

The Court emphasized deference to trial-level reliability determinations absent error in principle and rejected a request for a new trial based on how the prosecution conducted the voir dire.

It concluded the statement’s surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient substantive reliability where the declarant had incentives to shift blame during plea negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored, with dissenting reasons favouring a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a drug transaction where the victims were shot.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain new counsel, forcing him to self-represent, failing to put an alternative suspect theory to the jury, and leaving speculative evidence of planning and deliberation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment due to the appellant's manipulative delay tactics, and that the jury instructions on the alternative suspect and planning and deliberation were correct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm against his former partner, with whom he was engaged in a custody dispute.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a note written by the complainant, the nature of her injuries, and her motive to fabricate the allegations to gain an advantage in family court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's explanations and reject the defence's hypotheses.

A fresh evidence application regarding post-trial custody proceedings was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize a police officer's testimony regarding the sound of a dry-fired handgun and reversed the onus of proof regarding his intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal regarding the dangerous offender designation was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings on charges of armed robbery due to a breach of the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

It took 52.5 months to bring the case to trial, with significant delay occurring in the provincial court.

The Crown argued the application judge erred in attributing defence counsel's dilatory conduct to the Crown's failure to be proactive.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Crown is not responsible for defence counsel's failings, but ultimately dismissed the appeal because the delay was unconscionable and prejudice could be inferred.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unauthorized possession of a firearm, careless handling of a firearm, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

During the execution of a search warrant at his residence, police observed a firearm being thrown out the window into an adjacent yard.

The trial judge declined to determine the validity of the search warrant, finding instead that the appellant had abandoned the firearm and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that because the firearm was abandoned, section 8 of the Charter was not engaged, and the trial judge was not required to determine the legality of the search.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault with a weapon against his former wife.

Mid-trial, it was discovered that defence counsel had previously consulted with the complainant about the incidents.

After receiving independent legal advice, the appellant waived the conflict and requested the trial continue.

The trial judge allowed the trial to proceed and later dismissed a post-conviction mistrial application.

The appellant appealed his convictions and his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the conflict of interest, as the appellant made an informed waiver and suffered no prejudice.

The court also upheld the sentence, declining to reduce it to avoid immigration consequences.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was manifestly inadequate given the nature of the offences and the respondent's record for violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was extremely lenient, the trial judge had the benefit of a compelling Gladue report and was entitled to give considerable weight to restorative justice principles.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.