James H. Cooke

The moving party brought a motion for directions concerning a February 21, 2025 order of Justice Rady, seeking clarification on whether the order was final or interlocutory and the proper route of appeal.

The moving party contended the order was final and that jurisdiction lay with the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The responding parties agreed with this position.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement, but that where jurisdiction is not contested, the appeal should proceed in the normal course without requiring an advance motion for a positive finding on jurisdiction.

The Court noted that jurisdiction is ultimately a matter for the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment based on a limitation period defence.

The Divisional Court noted that although the motion judge made findings about the limitation period defence, there was no order in that regard, making the order interlocutory.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The Normal Farm Practices Protection Board issued a procedural order setting out the rules and requirements for an upcoming video conference hearing via Zoom.

The order details the obligations of the parties regarding witness participation, document disclosure, and technical requirements for the electronic hearing.

The Board issued a procedural order adding the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers as a Third Party to the application.

Pursuant to subsection 9.1(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the Board also ordered that the application be heard at the same time as nine other related applications brought by various greenhouse farms against the Municipality of Leamington.

The Normal Farm Practices Protection Board issued a procedural order on consent adding the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers as a Third Party.

The Board also ordered that the applicant's case be heard at the same time as eight other related applications against the Municipality of Leamington, and set out a schedule for the hearing, disclosure, and procedural planning.

A pre-hearing conference was held regarding an application challenging a municipal by-law restricting normal farm practices.

On consent, the Board ordered that the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers be added as a third party and that the application be heard at the same time as six other related applications challenging the same by-law.

Procedural directions were given for disclosure and the conduct of the joint hearing.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages arising from the flooding of their greenhouse, alleging the defendants negligently altered their adjacent property and caused the flood.

The parties had previously entered into Minutes of Settlement regarding the dispute, which the defendants subsequently breached by failing to construct a berm.

The court held that the plaintiffs could not rescind the settlement to resurrect their tort claim, as they had contracted it away.

Furthermore, the court found the plaintiffs failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendants caused the flooding.

However, the court granted a declaration that the defendants breached the Minutes of Settlement, entitling the plaintiffs to damages for that breach.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitration award regarding a real estate commission dispute on the basis that the arbitration committee provided no reasons for its decision.

The court found that the total absence of reasons violated section 38 of the Arbitration Act and common law requirements.

Because there was no record of the arbitration proceedings and no assurance the committee members could recall their reasoning, the court declined to remit the matter back to the committee and instead set aside the award.

The licensee, a standardbred racehorse trainer, appealed a Proposed Order by the Director of the Ontario Racing Commission alleging he participated in racing while his licence was suspended.

The Commission found that despite transferring his horses to another trainer, the licensee maintained significant involvement in their care, banking, and sale, and had extensive contact with the new stable staff.

The Commission concluded the licensee participated directly or indirectly in racing while suspended, violating Rule 6.10.01.

The Director's application was granted, and the licensee was suspended for over nine months and fined $5,000.

The appellant, a court-appointed receiver, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to approve the full amount of legal fees requested on behalf of its counsel.

The motion judge had reduced the fees, finding them disproportionate to the size and complexity of the receivership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the court must ensure compensation is fair and reasonable, focusing on the value provided rather than just the mathematical calculation of hours multiplied by hourly rates.

The motion judge's assessment of the fees as excessive was upheld.

The Director of the Ontario Racing Commission applied for a declaration that the licensee participated in racing while his licence was under suspension.

The panel granted the application, finding a violation of Rule 6.10.01 of the Rules of Standardbred Racing.

The licensee was suspended for nine months and five days and fined $5,000.

The appellant, a standardbred licensee, sought a stay of an Order of Immediate Suspension pending the disposition of his appeal.

The Ontario Racing Commission denied the request for a stay, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate extraordinary or mitigating circumstances through clear, cogent, and compelling evidence to overcome the Commission's no-stay policy.

The appeal was ordered to be heard expeditiously.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal in the area of housing.

The applicant alleged that the respondent tenants association moved his bicycle without permission, which exacerbated his disability, and that this action was a reprisal for his advocacy work educating tenants on their rights.

The respondent requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to communicate any disability-related needs to the respondent and could not establish how moving the bicycle resulted in a disadvantage based on disability.

The Tribunal also found the reprisal allegations to be highly speculative and insufficient to establish that moving the bicycle was intended retaliation for asserting human rights.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

The appellant, a licensed driver/trainer/owner, appealed against rulings imposing a fine, suspension, and probation after a horse he trained tested positive for codeine and morphine.

The parties reached an agreed statement of facts and a joint submission on disposition.

The appeals against the rulings were withdrawn, and the penalty was varied on consent to a 12-month suspension (6 months stayed), a $10,000 fine ($5,000 stayed), and two years of probation with conditions.

The licensee brought a motion by electronic mail for an adjournment of a hearing scheduled for April 22, 2013.

The Vice Chair of the Ontario Racing Commission granted the adjournment and ordered that the stay of penalty previously granted continue upon the same conditions until the completion of the hearing or further order.

The licensee, a standardbred trainer, appealed a penalty imposed after a horse he trained tested positive for codeine and morphine.

The licensee brought a motion for third-party disclosure from the Canadian Pari-Mutuel Agency regarding the urine collection procedures and records of the Chief Test Inspector.

The Ontario Racing Commission granted the motion, finding a reasonable possibility that the requested information was relevant to advancing a defence or meeting the Administration's case.

The appellant rented a truck to transport a machine, which was damaged in a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant sought compensation from the truck lessor's insurer.

The insurer denied coverage, and the motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the policy excluded coverage for property carried in the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the direct compensation for property damage provisions under s. 263 of the Insurance Act applied, treating the lessee as a third party.

The court further held that exclusions in the rental agreement and any misrepresentation of the cargo did not limit the appellant's right to recover under the statutory scheme.

The applicant filed a complaint regarding noise, odour, vibration, drainage, and fly infestation disturbances allegedly emanating from the respondents' property.

The Board commenced a bifurcated hearing to first determine whether it had jurisdiction over the respondents' operation as an 'agricultural operation' under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998.

During the hearing, the parties reached a settlement and the applicant withdrew the complaint.

The Board ordered the application withdrawn with prejudice.

The applicant filed a complaint regarding noise, odor, vibration, drainage, and fly disturbances allegedly emanating from the respondents' property.

After mediation failed, a hearing commenced before the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board.

During the hearing, the parties reached a settlement.

The Board declined to approve the settlement details as being beyond its jurisdiction, but ordered the application withdrawn with prejudice on consent of all parties.

The appellant sought to be appointed as her mother's guardian and applied to rescind a Power of Attorney for personal care made in favour of her brother.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the mother had capacity, and also dismissed the appellant's motion for an adjournment to file further material and cross-examine an affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the application judge's discretionary refusal of the adjournment, as the appellant had sufficient time to serve responding material and provided no explanation for why an adjournment was required.