Ian S. Wright

The applicant sought a declaration that her late father was incapable of granting a 2012 power of attorney for property to her brother, and an order requiring her brother to pass accounts.

The court found that while there were questions about the father's capacity, the applicant failed to rebut the presumption of capacity with clear evidence.

However, the court ordered the brother to pass his accounts from 2012 to 2025, finding cogent evidence of potential mismanagement and significant personal withdrawals from the father's bank account.

The deceased died intestate, leaving a common-law spouse of over twenty years and an adult daughter from a previous relationship.

The spouse brought an application for dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act, which was granted by the application judge who awarded the entirety of the estate to the spouse.

The daughter's estate appealed, arguing the application judge erred in his treatment of the daughter's residual legal entitlement, the moral duty owed to the grandchildren, and the paramountcy of the spouse's claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge made no errors in principle, properly balanced the competing claims, and reasonably exercised his discretion in prioritizing the spouse's needs given the shortfall in the estate.

The moving party, the Estate Trustee Without a Will, brought a motion for leave to appeal the costs orders of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court held that the impugned order was solely in respect to costs, requiring leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted leave to appeal the denial of costs to the Estate Trustee During Litigation payable by any of the parties or from the Estate.

This case concerns an application for dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act by a common-law spouse against the intestate estate of her deceased partner.

The deceased's adult daughter had died after him, and her estate trustee claimed the estate under intestacy rules to support the daughter's three young children.

The court determined that the common-law spouse was the sole dependant under the Act, as the adult daughter did not meet the criteria for dependency.

Finding that the deceased had not made adequate provision for the spouse's support, the court held that her legal and moral claims took precedence over the daughter's intestacy claim.

The common-law spouse was awarded the entire remaining balance of the estate.

The applicant sought to prove the deceased's 2020 Will and inter vivos transfers, while the respondent filed a Notice of Objection alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence regarding both the 2016 and 2020 Wills, as well as the transfers.

The court reviewed the evidence, applying the minimal evidentiary threshold test for suspicious circumstances.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet this threshold for any of her grounds, and the applicant successfully addressed any potential concerns.

The respondent's Notice of Objection was struck.

The appellant tenants, who own homes on land leased from the respondent, challenged occupancy limitations in their long-term leases.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applied and that the limitations were a substantial interference.

The Divisional Court reversed, holding that s. 22 of the Act did not invalidate agreed-upon provisions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, finding that the occupancy limitations were inconsistent with the Act's scheme of security of tenure and were therefore void under s. 4, regardless of the parties' agreement.

The applicant sought an order for directions and his appointment as Estate Trustee under a 2020 Will.

The respondent objected, alleging the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to alcoholism and was subject to undue influence.

The respondent sought widespread production of the deceased's medical, legal, and financial records.

The court found that the respondent had not met the minimal evidentiary threshold required by Neuberger Estate v. York to compel proof in solemn form or order extensive productions at this stage.

The court adopted the applicant's proposed order for directions, allowing the respondent to file further evidence before determining if the threshold is met.

The tenants, who owned permanent homes on a residential complex, had a lease with the landlord that restricted their occupancy during winter months.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found that the Residential Tenancies Act applied and that the lease provision restricting access was void because it substantially interfered with the tenants' reasonable enjoyment under s. 22 of the Act.

The landlord appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 22 does not prohibit parties from mutually agreeing to limit occupancy during certain periods, and that such a voluntary agreement does not constitute substantial interference by the landlord.

The moving party sought to prove the 2017 Will of her late father, which left the estate entirely to her and disinherited her two brothers.

The respondent brothers challenged the Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, failure to know and appreciate the contents, and undue influence by the moving party.

The court found that the drafting solicitor's evidence substantially answered the concerns regarding capacity and knowledge.

However, the court found a minimal evidentiary basis existed regarding undue influence due to the potential for domination in the parent-child relationship and conflicting evidence.

The court ordered the production of solicitor and financial records and adjourned the motion for directions.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages for breach of a verbal contract regarding the extraction of aggregate from their gravel pit.

The defendants argued the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and the doctrine of laches, asserting a 30-day payment term triggered the limitation period years prior.

The court rejected this defence, finding the agreement was for payment 'when paid,' creating a running balance.

The court granted judgment for the unpaid extractions against the corporate defendant but refused to pierce the corporate veil to hold the individual director personally liable.

A small set-off was granted for the defendants' counterclaim.

The defendants moved to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (COPL) registered against a property after the plaintiff corporation had been voluntarily dissolved.

The plaintiffs alleged the property had been fraudulently transferred prior to dissolution and sought to maintain the COPL, arguing that shareholders retained a beneficial interest or that the court should preserve the certificate on a nunc pro tunc basis pending revival of the corporation.

The court held that a dissolved corporation lacks capacity to commence or maintain proceedings and therefore cannot sustain a COPL.

Shareholders of a dissolved corporation also cannot assert personal claims for wrongs done to the corporation or step into its position to maintain the certificate.

The court declined to exercise nunc pro tunc discretion, finding that the alleged fraud and potential revival of the corporation were matters for trial and did not justify maintaining the encumbrance.

A law firm brought motions in two related civil actions seeking to be removed as solicitors of record for their former clients and requesting costs personally against another lawyer under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving firm alleged that the other lawyer had undertaken to file notices of change of lawyer and failed to do so, thereby forcing the motions.

The court found that no undertaking had been given regarding one of the actions and that the undertaking in the other action was conditional upon file review and further information.

The court held that the evidence did not establish that the lawyer caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or through undue delay or negligence.

Applying the caution required before ordering costs personally against counsel, the court declined to impose personal liability.

A housing co‑operative applied under s.171.13 of the Co‑operative Corporations Act for a declaration that the respondents’ membership and occupancy rights were terminated and for a writ of possession.

The termination followed a confrontation between one respondent and another co‑op member, which the board and general membership concluded justified eviction.

The court held that the co‑op failed to comply with principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, including inadequate notice, expansion of allegations beyond the notice, denial of the respondents’ opportunity to respond to prejudicial allegations, and restricting voting options during the membership appeal contrary to the statute.

The court further found no reasonable basis to terminate the second respondent’s membership and occupancy rights.

Because the termination decisions were procedurally unfair and unsupported as to one respondent, the requested declaration and writ of possession were refused.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar’s dismissal of a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rule 48.14(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the contextual approach to the Reid factors governing relief from dismissal for delay, including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although there had been a period of more than three years with no steps taken to advance the litigation, the delay resulted from counsel’s inattentiveness and the failure to receive the Registrar’s status notice.

The motion was brought promptly once the dismissal was discovered, and the court found insufficient evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant.

The dismissal order was therefore set aside subject to conditions including suspension of pre‑judgment interest during the delay period, a litigation timetable, and costs payable to the defendant.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging her employment was terminated because of her intention to take maternity leave.

The respondent requested the Tribunal defer the application because an Employment Standards claim regarding the same allegations was ongoing before the Ministry of Labour.

The Tribunal found that the factual circumstances and remedial claims in both proceedings overlapped significantly.

To avoid the risk of inconsistent findings of fact, the Tribunal ordered the deferral of the human rights application pending the conclusion of the Employment Standards process.

The appellants failed to appear, in person or by counsel, for the hearing of their appeal despite receiving notice.

At the request of the respondent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The insurer brought a motion to compel the applicant, an 11-year-old boy whose mother was killed in a motor vehicle accident, to attend an insurer's medical examination with a psychologist and to compel production of his treating psychologist's clinical notes and records.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for payment of a psychological report.

The parties resolved the examination and production issues on consent.

The arbitrator dismissed the applicant's motion for payment of the report as premature, noting that the invoice had not yet been submitted to the insurer.

The applicant, a minor whose mother was killed in a motor vehicle accident, sought statutory accident benefits from the insurer.

The parties engaged in settlement discussions and purportedly reached an agreement.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce the settlement, seeking an order for the insurer to pay a lump sum.

The insurer argued there was no binding settlement due to a lack of consensus ad idem regarding the scope of the release.

The arbitrator found he had jurisdiction to determine the existence of a settlement but concluded that no binding agreement was reached due to mutual mistake regarding the scope of the claims and the temporal scope of the settlement.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The insurer brought a motion seeking an order to compel a third-party psychologist to produce his rough clinical notes and other materials relied upon in his psychological assessment of the applicant.

The applicant did not oppose the motion and provided authorization for the release.

The third party did not attend the hearing.

The arbitrator found the materials relevant and ordered the third party to release all records pertaining to the applicant to the applicant's counsel.