Graham Thomson

The court found for the plaintiff, Hossein Amini-Kouchesfahani, in his civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board for battery and breach of his Charter rights after he was forcibly removed from his taxi and taken to the ground by police.

The court held that the initial stop was lawful, but the subsequent use of force was excessive and unjustified.

The plaintiff was awarded general, aggravated, special, and punitive damages.

The moving party sought a panel review of a single judge's order that dismissed her request for an extension of time to review a previous order denying leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle in the single judge's decision that the moving party failed to provide evidence of intention to review, lacked an explanation for the delay, and that the underlying proposed appeal lacked merit.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board dismissing her application for property tax relief based on sickness or extreme poverty under s. 323 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The applicant sought relief for the 2015 and 2017 taxation years, as well as a refund for all years from 2011 to the present.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board correctly limited its jurisdiction to the years applied for and reasonably concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate an inability to pay, as the taxes had already been paid by her lawyers.

The court also rejected arguments of procedural unfairness and failure to accommodate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement, awarding $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes to the respondent Toronto Police Services Board.

This decision followed an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice judgment.

The appellants, parents whose criminal child abuse charges were withdrawn, sued the Attorney General, police, and a Crown attorney for various torts including malicious prosecution and negligent investigation.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding claims time-barred, reasonable and probable grounds for prosecution, and Crown immunity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the parents' appeal, upholding the summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed the proper application of summary judgment principles, the expiry of limitation periods for claims against police, the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the initial prosecution, and the personal immunity of the Crown prosecutor, with the Attorney General being the proper defendant for such claims.

The appellant appealed a decision finding it in breach of its commercial lease for leaving the building vacant for almost two years and denying it relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the lease or her discretionary decision to deny relief from forfeiture due to a pattern of non-compliance.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's action, alleging it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found the action lacked merit and constituted an abuse of process, as the plaintiff, previously declared a party under disability and subject to an order precluding him from bringing actions without leave, had disregarded court guidance and orders regarding his legal capacity and the involvement of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the claim was stayed.

The self-represented plaintiffs brought a civil action against police officers, the Toronto Police Services Board, a Crown Attorney, and the Attorney General of Ontario, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and negligent investigation arising from child abuse charges that were ultimately withdrawn.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the defendants' motions, finding that the claims against the police were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that both the police and the Crown had reasonable and probable grounds for their actions.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment was dismissed.