Graham T. Clark

The accused, charged with drug offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude drugs seized from his person and residence, as well as his inculpatory statements.

He argued that the warrantless search of his home violated s. 8, his consent was coerced by the unlawful detention of his daughter (s. 9), and his statements were involuntary.

The court found the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful.

The court also held the daughter's detention was based on reasonable grounds and the accused's consent to search his home was voluntary and informed.

The application was dismissed and the evidence admitted.

The appellant appealed his sentence for breaching a court order by making collect calls to the complainant from custody.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge erred in principle by proceeding without hearing submissions from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a conditional discharge with six months' probation, noting the breach was at the less serious end of the spectrum, the appellant had served four months in jail, and he faced deportation if convicted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempt to obstruct justice, break and enter, uttering a threat, and mischief to property, as well as his sentence of nine years' imprisonment and designation as a long-term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on in-dock identification and in failing to disqualify a juror.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate given the context, including that the complainant knew the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that fresh evidence confirmed the appellant remained a high risk to reoffend, justifying the long-term supervision order.

The young person appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as a serious violent offence designation.

In an addendum to a previous endorsement, the Court of Appeal noted the Crown's intention not to proceed on a new trial.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, ordered a new trial, and stayed those charges.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the serious violent offence designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, as the remaining conviction for weapons dangerous could not support it.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appellant relied on s. 34(1), but the trial judge only addressed s. 34(2).

The Court of Appeal found an air of reality to the s. 34(1) defence, noting the trial judge made no finding that the appellant intended to cause grievous bodily harm and the findings did not establish disproportionate force.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judgment that upheld her conviction.

She argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, ignored the requirements of R. v. W.(D.), and improperly relied on prior discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided an adequate analysis of the evidence, applied the proper burden of proof, and did not rely on prior discreditable conduct in his assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict was not unreasonable, as several witnesses identified the appellant.

However, the court admitted the fresh evidence of a new witness, finding it was reasonably capable of belief and could have affected the result given the frailties in the identification procedure.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a first offender of otherwise good character, appealed his sentence for a serious commercial offence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in principle.

The trial judge appropriately prioritized general deterrence given the commercial nature of the offence when rejecting a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving a machete.

The trial judge made several errors regarding self-defence, including reversing the burden of proof.

However, the Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso, finding that the errors did not affect the verdict because the trial judge accepted the Crown's version of events, under which self-defence did not arise.

The appeal from conviction and disposition was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, extortion, assault, and uttering a death threat.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant and co-accused kidnapped the victim, forced him into a car, and assaulted him.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in his jury instructions regarding conceded facts and identity, and in allowing prior consistent statements to enhance a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and noting the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, wearing a disguise, attempted robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all relating to incidents involving fast food deliverymen in an apartment building.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to prove identity and intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding similar fact evidence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the reasoning process for similar fact evidence, provided a deficient explanation of reasonable doubt that failed to comply with Lifchus, and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defence.