Charles Lugosi

The appellant, a school board trustee, appealed the dismissal of his judicial review application challenging sanctions imposed by the Toronto Catholic District School Board for breaching its code of conduct.

The trustee had made inflammatory remarks equating LGBTQ+ individuals with criminals during a public meeting.

The appeal court upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the Board had the authority to reconsider its initial decision (which had not found a breach), that re-litigation doctrines did not apply to the administrative process, and that the Board's decisions reasonably balanced the trustee's Charter rights with its statutory mandate to promote an inclusive school climate.

The applicant, a former flight attendant, challenged the loss of nine years of seniority resulting from an arbitration award that integrated seniority lists following the merger of Air Canada and Canadian Airlines.

He argued that the devaluation of his seniority violated his rights to liberty and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter, and his equality rights under section 15.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that seniority is a product of collective bargaining and does not engage the liberty or security interests protected by section 7.

Furthermore, the court found no violation of section 15, as seniority ranking is not an enumerated or analogous ground of discrimination.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action for civil conspiracy, defamation, and intentional infliction of mental distress against the defendants for distributing alleged hate speech pamphlets at a Pride Parade.

The lead defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions and as an abuse of process, and alternatively to strike the claim.

The plaintiffs moved for a Norwich Order to identify the anonymous co-defendants.

The court held that the defendant was estopped from denying the pamphlets were hate speech based on a prior Supreme Court decision, and thus the anti-SLAPP motion failed.

However, the court struck the class action because the torts pleaded are individual in nature and cannot be brought on behalf of a collective group.

The court granted leave to amend the claim to an opt-in joinder action and granted the Norwich Order on terms.

The appellant, an anti-abortion activist, appealed her convictions for mischief and breach of probation arising from her attendance at an abortion clinic.

She argued that a foetus is a human being and sought to challenge the constitutionality of section 223 of the Criminal Code, asserting defences of defence of others, necessity, and mistake of fact.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to decline a full evidentiary hearing on the biological status of a foetus, as binding appellate jurisprudence establishes that a foetus does not possess legal personhood or Charter rights.

The court also affirmed that the appellant's proposed defences were unavailable in law and that her probation conditions were reasonable.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at an abortion clinic where she allegedly offered roses and pamphlets to patients to discourage them from having abortions.

Wagner brought an application seeking production of all medical records, counselling records, identities, and contact information for the fifteen clinic patients and staff.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requested information failed both branches of the O'Connor test: the information was not likely relevant to any material issue at trial, and even if it were, the privacy and dignity interests of the patients and employees outweighed any benefit to the defence.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at a Toronto abortion clinic, where she attempted to intercede with patients by offering roses and pamphlets.

The trial focused not on whether the Crown could prove the acts alleged, but on whether Wagner was justified in her conduct based on defences of self-defence of others and necessity.

Wagner argued that a foetus has the status of a human being and that she was duty-bound to intervene to protect unborn lives.

The court rejected all of Wagner's constitutional and legal defences, finding her guilty on all counts.

The judgment provides extensive analysis of the legal status of the foetus under Canadian law, the scope of self-defence provisions, the doctrine of necessity, and the rule of law.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, rape, and indecent assault to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the issues before them, except for the indivisibility of the Crown, which it found unnecessary to address.

The Court concluded there was no violation of the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The Crown applied for a rehearing on the issue of whether there should be a transition period for the operation of the Court's prior judgment requiring a warrant to effect an arrest in a dwelling.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the application and stayed the operation of that aspect of the judgment for six months from May 22, 1997, with national effect, though it did not apply to the disposition of the present case.

The appellant challenged a murder conviction arising from a warrantless police entry into his dwelling, subsequent detention, questioning, seizure of clothing, later warrant search, and fingerprinting.

The majority held that the officers lacked both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to arrest before entering and that, absent hot pursuit or other exceptional circumstances, police must obtain prior judicial authorization to enter a dwelling to make an arrest.

The court further held that the appellant’s right to counsel was breached from the moment of detention because he was not properly informed or given a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel before questioning.

Applying the Collins and Stillman frameworks, the majority excluded the impugned statements, fingerprints, and real evidence, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for several sexual offences to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, and brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the motion to adduce fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court endorsed the lower court's remarks regarding the impropriety of the Crown's conduct in the proceedings.

The appellant, charged with murder in Canada, fled to the United States where he was arrested by American police on an extradition warrant.

The American police obtained a statement from the appellant without advising him of his right to counsel forthwith, as required by the Charter, though they complied with American law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to foreign police gathering evidence in their own jurisdiction.

Consequently, there was no Charter breach, and the evidence could not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.