Cameron Murkar

The applicant municipality sought a determination regarding the nature of an appeal under s. 15.3(4) of the Building Code Act, 1992 from a property standards committee decision, specifically whether the appeal proceeds as a hearing de novo or as an appeal limited to the record.

The court considered conflicting authorities of the Superior Court addressing the issue.

Preferring earlier precedent, the court held that such appeals are hearings de novo, permitting the parties to introduce new and oral evidence, including evidence arising after the committee hearing.

The court emphasized that under s. 15.3(6) the court possesses the same powers and functions as the committee, including receiving evidence and determining issues on the merits.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to consolidate, or alternatively to have heard sequentially, their appeal of a property standards order under the Building Code Act, 1992 and a separate civil action against the municipality, neighbours, a supplier, and an engineering firm.

The plaintiffs argued that both proceedings arose from the same factual circumstances regarding retaining walls and responsibility for remediation work.

The court held that the appeal was narrowly limited to determining whether the property complied with applicable standards and whether the ordered repairs were required, while the civil action involved broader questions of liability and damages.

Consolidation or a stay would undermine the purpose of the property standards regime by delaying enforcement.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order referring a solicitor's account for assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion, as the motion judge had identified sufficient reasons to establish special circumstances.

The applicants brought an application for judicial review to quash the respondent municipality's issuance of nine new taxicab owner licences to a competitor.

The municipality had used a Request for Proposal (RFP) process to select the recipient, rather than the criteria set out in its taxi by-law.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was correctness.

The court found the issuance was a nullity because the municipal council never actually passed a resolution approving the issuance.

Furthermore, the RFP process was unlawful because it imposed criteria and conditions not authorized by the taxi by-law or the Municipal Act.

The application was granted and the issuance of the licences was quashed.

The Municipality of Clarington appealed a judgment allowing an application by Newcastle Recycling Ltd. and others for a declaration that they had the right to continue operating an auto wrecking, scrapyard, landfill, and garbage collection business on certain property.

Clarington also appealed the dismissal of its counter-application for an injunction.

The respondents cross-appealed the finding that they did not have the right to carry on their business on other portions of the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed Clarington's appeal in part, finding the application judge erred by resolving material credibility issues on affidavit evidence instead of directing a trial of an issue.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, and a permanent injunction was granted in respect of portions of the property.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs award.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant leave, regardless of which test for granting leave applied.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500 on a partial indemnity scale.