Brent Arnold

In a proposed class action regarding a data breach, the plaintiffs brought a motion for an injunction to enjoin or supervise communications from the defendants to putative class members.

The defendants intended to send a notice to 51,000 affected individuals offering free credit monitoring.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to intervene as the proposed notice did not affect the integrity of the class proceedings or compromise the putative class members' rights.

The CCAA monitor of Algoma brought an oppression action under the CBCA against Algoma's parent company, Essar Global, regarding a transaction that transferred Algoma's critical port facilities to a related entity.

The court found that the monitor had standing to bring the action on behalf of creditors.

The court held that the port transaction and a change of control clause giving Essar Global a veto over any buyer of Algoma violated the reasonable expectations of creditors and were oppressive.

The court rejected the business judgment rule defence and ordered the deletion of the change of control clause and amended the agreements to allow Algoma to terminate them after a third-party loan is repaid.

The appellant, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for two creditors, appealed the trial judge's partial disallowance of claims advanced in the bankruptcy of a development company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, correcting the quantum of an unsecured claim from $420,000 to $457,600 and ordering interest to be calculated from the date of each individual advance rather than the final advance.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding the disallowance of certain third-party payments, finding the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof.

The court also upheld the application of the Courts of Justice Act for interest on an unjust enrichment claim, but varied the end date for interest accrual to the date of receivership.

A cross-appeal by another creditor was dismissed.

The Trustee in bankruptcy appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside transactions arising from a settlement between an investor and a real estate developer.

The Trustee argued the payments and mortgages were transfers at undervalue, unjust preferences, fraudulent conveyances, oppressive, and an unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the settlement was supported by adequate consideration (forbearance from suit), the parties were at arm's length, and there was no intent to defraud creditors.

The investor's cross-appeal regarding a $471,000 payment found to be a fraudulent conveyance was also dismissed.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed a trial judge's decision allowing the secured claims of a nominee company controlled by the respondent.

The appellant argued that the claims were barred by a full and final mutual release previously executed by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made an extricable error of law by failing to consider the release as a whole.

Properly interpreted, the release captured successor corporations under the respondent's control, including the nominee company, and barred the claims.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding that a termination clause in an Independent Dealer Agreement was void as against the respondent trustee in bankruptcy.

The clause relieved the appellants of their obligation to pay unpaid commissions upon termination of the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, extending the principle from CIBC v. Bramalea to hold that the clause was unenforceable because it provided a windfall to one creditor upon insolvency, violating the public policy of equitable and fair distribution among unsecured creditors.

The appellants brought a motion to stay their own appeal pending the trial judge's determination of several outstanding issues following a complex, multi-party trial involving allegations of fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy.

The respondents opposed the stay, arguing the issues relating to them were discrete and finally disposed of.

The Court of Appeal held that the 'interests of justice' test, rather than the RJR-Macdonald test, applies when a party seeks to stay an appeal pending another body's decision.

Balancing the need for expeditious justice against the benefits of a single appeal, the court granted a 120-day stay of the appeal, on the condition that the appellants immediately order the necessary transcripts.

Following the dismissal of the employees' appeal regarding related employers under the Employment Standards Act, the successful respondents sought costs.

The appellants and the Director of Employment Standards argued against a costs award, citing financial hardship and the public interest nature of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to excuse the appellants on financial grounds and noted the Director could not use its statutory role to shield itself from costs after fully participating as an advocate.

However, because the appeal raised the interpretation of s. 4 of the Employment Standards Act for the first time in the court—a matter of broad public interest—the court ordered no costs.

The appellants, former employees of a bankrupt company, sought severance and termination pay from related companies under s. 4 of the Employment Standards Act.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board found that while the companies were related, the relationship did not have the intent or effect of defeating the purpose of the Act, as the related companies had actually propped up the bankrupt company.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision as reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the standard of review is reasonableness and the Board's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondent bank, as the holder of the appellants' guarantee, was not a 'secured creditor' under section 2 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge, finding that the respondent was not required to give the appellants notice under section 21(1) of the Act before commencing an action on the guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.