Anjali Rajan

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, made unsupported credibility findings, and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework to exculpatory evidence from the complainant's mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, made credibility findings supported by the evidence, and adequately explained his reasons for accepting the complainant's testimony over the appellant's and the mother's.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence of motive to fabricate and by engaging in improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons regarding motive to fabricate, deeming them adequate when read against the record.

The court also rejected the claim of improper propensity reasoning, clarifying that the trial judge used evidence of controlling behaviour as a contextual factor to assess competing narratives, not as proof of propensity to commit the assaults.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Oleksandr Ostashkov, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to breaking and entering and possession of stolen property.

He sought to strike his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to parental pressure.

He also appealed his sentence, claiming it was unduly harsh, particularly the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's finding that the plea was voluntary, noting that while parental pressure was a factor, it did not negate his volitional decision, which was also influenced by new incriminating evidence.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed, determining it was neither demonstrably unfit nor based on an error in principle, and upheld the restitution order.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his continued detention.

The appellant argued the Board erred in assessing his risk of harm, in not ordering a conditional discharge as the least onerous disposition, and in its application of Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the Board's conclusions regarding the appellant's significant risk due to treatment-resistant psychosis and substance use, the lack of suitable community supports for a conditional discharge, and that Gladue principles were appropriately considered by the Board in its analysis, even if they did not lead to a different disposition.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence of the respondent's prior U.S. bank fraud conviction at his trial for fraud, theft, and obtaining accounts by false pretences.

The court applied the R. v. Handy and R. v. L.B. tests, finding the evidence relevant to establish mens rea and negative innocent explanations.

Despite the time gap and some dissimilarities, the strong nexus between the schemes (circumventing high-risk business barriers in credit card processing) and the significant probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, which could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The application was granted.

The 17-year-old offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder and aggravated assault following a series of gang-related shootings.

The Crown applied to have the young person sentenced as an adult.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, noting the youth's cognitive limitations, mental health issues, substance abuse, and vulnerability to older criminal peers.

The court also found that a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold the offender accountable.

The young person was sentenced to the maximum youth sentence of seven years for second degree murder, comprising four years in secure custody and three years of community supervision.

This criminal trial concerned a sexual assault charge against Diego Doncel, where the central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant, R.W., a cognitively disabled individual.

The court addressed the assessment of evidence from witnesses with cognitive deficits, the use of a communication intermediary, and the admissibility of spontaneous utterances.

Despite finding the complainant truthful, the court identified significant inconsistencies in her testimony, particularly during cross-examination, which could not be resolved due to her cognitive limitations.

The spontaneous utterances to her father were deemed inadmissible hearsay.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

Sentencing following a jury trial in which one offender was convicted of manslaughter arising from a fatal street shooting and the other was convicted of accessory after the fact to manslaughter.

The court applied the post-jury-verdict sentencing framework to find that the shooter did not intend to kill, acted in response to a threat or use of force, but used unreasonable excessive force by intentionally firing a loaded handgun.

In fixing sentence, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for urban gun violence, prior weapons prohibitions, drug trafficking activity, post-offence flight, and the devastating victim impact, while also giving weight to youth, remorse, support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The principal offender received 9 years less 49 months' credit, and the accessory received 2 years less 19.5 months' credit, together with DNA orders and weapons prohibitions.

This decision addresses a capacity inquiry under section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act regarding a complainant with a severe mental disability in a sexual assault trial.

The defence challenged the complainant's capacity to testify.

The court found that while the complainant did not understand the nature of an oath or solemn affirmation, she was able to communicate the evidence and was therefore competent to testify on promising to tell the truth.

The ruling emphasizes that deficiencies in perception and recollection are matters of weight for the trier of fact, not competence, provided a basic ability to perceive, remember, and communicate exists.

R.A. was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his 11-year-old stepdaughter, C.A. The court considered aggravating factors, including the breach of trust and multiple incidents, and mitigating factors, such as R.A.'s pro-social life and lack of criminal record.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual offences.

Despite the defence's request for a conditional sentence and potential deportation consequences, the court found a non-custodial sentence would be insufficient.

R.A. was sentenced to two years in penitentiary on the more serious count, concurrent to six months on the other, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

The accused, Diego Doncel, charged with sexual assault, applied under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of third-party records relating to the complainant, R.W. The application was opposed by the Crown and complainant.

Following a two-stage Mills regime analysis, the court ordered a specific 2010 psychological assessment report from Surrey Place to be disclosed to the defence, finding it relevant to the complainant's capacity to testify and credibility/reliability.

Disclosure was subject to redactions and a non-disclosure condition.

Other requested records from CAMH and Toronto Western Hospital were deemed not relevant or too dated and were not disclosed.

The accused, Diego Doncel, applied under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of various third-party records relating to the complainant, R.W., in a sexual assault case.

R.W. has a severe mental disability.

The court ordered a narrow subset of records (formal assessments or diagnostic evaluations of R.W.'s cognitive functioning) to be produced for judicial review, finding them likely relevant to R.W.'s testimonial competence and credibility/reliability at trial.

The application for broader medical/therapeutic records and records related to an unrelated prior criminal charge involving R.W. (from police and Crown) was denied, as these did not meet the "likely relevant" threshold or were deemed speculative.

The court also declined to order disclosure of identifying details from the unrelated charge to facilitate public record searches.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual interference involving an 11-year-old complainant: one count for sexual touching and one count arising from two kissing incidents.

The court granted the Crown's cross-count similar fact application, holding the evidence on each count was probative of the other and provided context for the complainant's conduct.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and relying heavily on the complainant's immediate disclosure to her mother as a spontaneous utterance, the court rejected the accused's denial and found that inconsistencies in peripheral details did not undermine the core allegations.

The court also rejected the defence theory of fabrication based on family conflict and motive.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Tyrone Matthews was charged with unlawful confinement, dangerous operation, and failing to stop for police.

The complainant, Kylee Jordan-Kalina, recanted her initial statements implicating Matthews at trial, claiming she was the driver.

The Crown successfully admitted her out-of-court statements.

The court dismissed the unlawful confinement charge but found Matthews guilty of dangerous operation and failing to stop for police, rejecting the complainant's trial testimony as contrived and accepting her out-of-court statements and other corroborating evidence.

The Crown applied to admit three out-of-court statements made by the complainant, Kylee Jordan-Kalina, as spontaneous utterances in a criminal trial for unlawful confinement, dangerous operation, and failing to stop for police.

The complainant had recanted her initial statement at trial.

The court applied the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, which requires the statement to be made under stress or pressure such that the possibility of concoction is safely discounted.

The court admitted one statement (a phone call recorded by an in-car camera) due to the complainant's evident distress and the ongoing stressful events.

The other two statements (one to an officer with leading questions and no recording, and another made later at the police station) were excluded for lacking spontaneity and reliability.