Angela James

The applicant, a police constable, sought judicial review of decisions extending the time to bring disciplinary charges against him, suspending him without pay, and refusing to recuse the Hearing Officer.

The Divisional Court found the extension decision reasonable but held that applying amended suspension provisions mid-proceeding was unfair, reinstating his pay.

The court also removed the Hearing Officer due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the protracted procedural history.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to limit damages to $200,000 and continue the action under the simplified procedure (Rule 76).

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the amendment would result in non-compensable prejudice due to the loss of their substantive right to a jury trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the striking of a jury notice alone, without specific evidence of non-compensable prejudice, is insufficient to deny an amendment.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend, and the defendant's jury notice was struck.

This decision concerns a judicial interim release hearing for Christopher Manning, 19, who faces charges of assault with a weapon, assault, and obstruct police.

These alleged offences occurred while he was on release for two prior sets of charges, placing the burden on him to show cause for release under s. 515(6)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The defence proposed release with conditions, arguing that further detention was contrary to the interests of justice given the likelihood of a time-served sentence upon conviction and highlighting the accused's status as a member of a visible minority and potential mental health challenges under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court, while acknowledging the importance of considering systemic factors for vulnerable populations, found the proposed release plan insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk of re-offence, particularly due to a history of non-compliance and a lack of detailed information regarding the accused's background and effective community supports.

Consequently, the accused failed to meet the burden for release and was detained.

The defendants appealed a motions judge's decision refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution on a summary judgment motion.

The claims arose after the plaintiff was acquitted of sexual assault charges, with the trial judge finding the complainant lacked credibility on collateral issues.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred in equating the trial judge's adverse credibility findings on collateral issues with 'overwhelming evidence' that would vitiate the police's reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and prosecution.

The remaining claims were dismissed.

The defendants moved to strike out several paragraphs of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b), 25.06, and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action involved an alleged breach of contract regarding the operation and sale of a pizza franchise.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the claim asserted a well-recognized cause of action for breach of contract and was not frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to compel documentary production was also dismissed as premature.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants, Kingston General Hospital and Paladin Security Group Ltd., moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action alleging excessive force by security staff.

The plaintiff, an adult male with schizophrenia, sustained an elbow fracture while being restrained by security staff at the hospital.

The court reviewed contemporaneous security notes and discovery evidence, finding that the security staff acted in accordance with their training and that the force used was reasonable given the plaintiff's aggressive and non-compliant behaviour.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action against all defendants.

Following the dismissal of their appeals from decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal regarding wind farm approvals, the appellant landowners argued they should not pay costs because the litigation was in the public interest.

The Divisional Court held that while the appeals were not public interest litigation that would merit no costs, they did contain a strong public interest component regarding the constitutionality of the legislative regime.

Taking this into account, along with the lack of particularity in the respondents' bills of costs and the lower scale of costs typically awarded on appeals to the Divisional Court, the court awarded reduced partial indemnity costs to the successful respondents totaling $67,000.

The appellants, residents living near three proposed wind turbine farms, appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) that confirmed the Director's issuance of Renewable Energy Approvals (REAs) for the projects.

The appellants argued that the statutory test requiring them to prove the projects would cause 'serious harm to human health' violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statutory test aligned with the jurisprudential threshold for section 7 claims and did not depart from the consensus scientific view on wind turbines.

The Court also upheld the ERT's treatment of lay witness evidence, its finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Director's REA issuance process for Charter compliance, and its discretionary decisions denying adjournments.