A. Fabio Longo

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to approve a settlement for a minor injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident.

The minor sustained minimal injuries with no ongoing complaints or treatment.

The court approved the $10,000 all-inclusive settlement, finding it reasonable and in the minor's best interests given the significant risk of no recovery at trial.

The court also approved the contingency fee and ordered the net settlement funds to be paid to the minor's mother to hold until the minor turns 18.

The moving party insurer sought an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review of a 2020 Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision regarding income replacement benefits.

The moving party relied on the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Yatar to explain the delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion on terms, noting that while finality is a central principle, the prejudice to the respondent was diluted by the fact that an appeal regarding the same benefits was still outstanding at the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that found she was not catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal breached procedural fairness in three ways: relying on the untested evidence of the respondent's expert who did not re-attend for cross-examination, deciding the issue of causation without notice when it was not in dispute, and relying on documents not in evidence that the appellant had no opportunity to address.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously released its decision and invited written submissions on costs.

Considering the appellant's partial success on one issue and the dismissal of the balance of the appeal, the court fixed costs of the appeal at $20,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable by the appellant to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion to add two snow removal contractors as defendants after the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued misnomer and discoverability.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's findings that the statement of claim did not point the 'litigation finger' at the sidewalk contractor, as it only alleged injuries from a fall on the roadway.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence to identify the contractors within the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Landlord appealed a trial judgment concerning a commercial lease, challenging conclusions regarding rent for a shed area and mezzanine, and the tenant's option to extend the lease, as well as the costs award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only to correct the limitation period for arrears of "non-lease-based rent" for the shed area from two to six years, finding it fell under the Real Property Limitations Act.

All other grounds of appeal, including the mezzanine rent, the validity of the lease extension, and the costs award, were dismissed.

The insurer appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding that the insured's claim for income replacement benefits was not statute-barred, as the termination letter was not clear and unequivocal.

The insured cross-appealed the dismissal of her claim for post-104 week income replacement benefits, arguing the adjudicator failed to consider whether alternative employment was comparable in status and reward.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, holding that the limitation issue was a question of mixed fact and law not subject to appeal, and that the post-104 test under the Schedule does not require alternative employment to be comparable in status and reward.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her motion to add a private snow removal contractor as a defendant in a slip and fall action against the City of Toronto.

The motion judge had found the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence by not inquiring about a contractor earlier.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that without a specific trigger or reason to be put on notice, a plaintiff has no free-standing duty to inquire whether a municipality contracted out its snow removal.

The claim against the contractor was not discoverable until the City disclosed its involvement, and therefore was not statute-barred.

The moving party sought leave to appeal three orders of the motion judge regarding venue, surveillance, and costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

This costs endorsement addresses several pre-trial and mid-trial motions, as well as costs thrown away, following a mistrial declared due to the plaintiff's health crisis.

The court considered motions regarding venue transfer, exclusion of surveillance evidence, expert and non-party expert witnesses, and two motions for mistrial.

The court applied principles of costs following the event and the factors under Rule 57.01(1), and specifically addressed "costs thrown away" in the context of a mistrial not caused by fault but by the responsibility of a party due to an unforeseen health event.

The plaintiff was awarded costs for the surveillance and expert witness motions, while the defendant was awarded costs for their mistrial motion and substantial indemnity for costs thrown away.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed its jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order granting vacant possession.

Despite arguments from the parties, the court determined that the order fell under s. 78(1) of the Commercial Tenancies Act, which directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal transferred the appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, declining to hear the merits.

No costs were ordered.

On the eve of a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident claim, the plaintiff brought a motion to exclude late-served video surveillance reports or, alternatively, for an adjournment.

The court found that the recent surveillance was not substantially different from previously disclosed surveillance and did not unfairly surprise the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion to exclude the evidence, granting the defendant leave to use the reports for substantive purposes subject to a mid-trial voir dire.

A short adjournment was granted to allow the plaintiff to review the new surveillance.

The appellant appealed orders dismissing her action and denying her motion to set aside the dismissal.

The lower court judge dismissed the action for failure to file notice of appointment of counsel or intention to act in person within 30 days of an order removing her former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found the dismissal order deficient because it failed to include the required text of the applicable rules, the appellant had not been properly served with the motion, and no reasons were given for the draconian remedy.

The appeal court set aside both lower court orders and imposed a 14-day deadline for the appellant to file notice of appointment of counsel.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a dismissal order from the trial court.

The dismissal was granted after the moving party failed to appoint new counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person following her previous counsel's removal from the record.

The moving party had instead attempted to set aside the dismissal order on the basis it was made without notice, which motion was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal considered the applicable principles for extending time to appeal and granted the extension on terms, finding the proposed appeal raised arguable issues and that the justice of the case favoured granting the extension despite the moving party's lack of diligence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing a motor vehicle negligence claim.

The motion judge found that the appellant made a left-hand turn facing a yellow light in front of an oncoming truck driven by the respondent, who did not run a red light as alleged.

The motion judge concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the respondent's responsibility for the accident.

The appellant argued the motion judge reversed the evidentiary burden and erred in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the motion judge correctly applied the burden of proof and the appellant failed to meet the onus that shifted to her to demonstrate contributory negligence.