L.A. Pattillo J.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order that denied the tenant's motion to set aside an eviction order.

The tenant had failed to attend the Board hearing and alleged improper service as the ground for appeal.

The Divisional Court found no merit to the tenant's allegations of improper service, noting the Board's finding that notice was properly served.

The court concluded the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit, quashed the appeal, lifted the stay of eviction, and awarded costs to the landlord.

The landlord brought a motion to dismiss the tenants' application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The tenants had a history of failing to pay rent, breaching a consent order, and commencing multiple proceedings to delay eviction without appearing at hearings.

The court found the application was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the Divisional Court lacks jurisdiction to judicially review an order of a Superior Court Judge or the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were ordered.

The applicant, a self-represented lawyer, brought a motion within his application for judicial review regarding adoption disclosure.

He sought orders requiring the respondent Children's Aid Society to file a proper response to a Request to Admit, file a complete Record of Proceedings, permit him to file his own affidavit, and permit a 45-page factum.

The court dismissed the motion except for allowing the applicant to file his own affidavit, finding the respondent's 'not relevant' responses to the Request to Admit were proper and the Record of Proceedings was complete.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to attend an examination in aid of execution, arguing the Master erred because she had filed for bankruptcy two days prior, triggering an automatic stay under s. 69.3(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent argued the underlying default judgment declared the debt survived bankruptcy under s. 178(1).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that s. 178(1) applies to discharge, not the automatic stay, and the Master erred in granting the order while the stay was in effect.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

She was terminated during her six-month probationary period for failing to comply with a scent-free policy and altering patent applications contrary to instructions.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient to explain that the employer acted in good faith, and there was no palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence.

The appellant law firm appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim against the respondent.

The appellant had sued the respondent for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation (later characterized as defamation) over a disputed document report the respondent authored under a pseudonym, which the appellant's former client allegedly used to accuse the appellant of forgery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of a causal connection between the report and the former client's actions.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his $25,000 claim for damages arising from a condominium water leak.

At trial, the appellant attempted to introduce a new expert report on mould on the final day of trial, which the trial judge refused to admit due to late notice and unfairness to the respondents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's discretionary decision to exclude the late evidence under Rule 18.02(1) was not clearly wrong and did not amount to an injustice.

Furthermore, the trial judge correctly found that the appellant had sued the wrong parties.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his application for judicial review for delay.

The underlying application sought to review an interlocutory order of the Small Claims Court regarding amendments to pleadings and an adjournment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the Registrar correctly dismissed the application because no record was required for an interlocutory proceeding, and the applicant failed to perfect it in time.

Furthermore, the court noted the application lacked merit as judicial review of interlocutory Small Claims Court orders is restricted to jurisdictional issues, which were not present here.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his Charter application for delay.

The application challenged the Toronto Police Service's practice of 'carding' or 'street checks'.

The court found that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, noting that counsel being too busy is not a sufficient excuse.

The court also found a lack of bona fide intention to meet the time limits and presumed prejudice to the respondents.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant law firm appealed an order of a Small Claims Court Deputy Judge who dismissed the appellant's claim for unpaid legal fees, vacated a writ of seizure and sale, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant had previously obtained default judgment against the respondent.

The respondent moved to set aside the default judgment, but the Deputy Judge instead struck the claim based on the Solicitors Act and the Limitations Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Deputy Judge had no jurisdiction to dismiss the claim while the default judgment stood, effectively acting as an appellate court over a fellow judge.

Furthermore, the respondent failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in moving to set aside the default judgment.

The appeal was allowed, and the Deputy Judge's order was set aside.

The moving party corporation sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to set aside or stay an interim payment order requiring it to advance legal fees to a former officer facing criminal charges in the United States.

The moving party argued that a recent jury verdict of guilty in the US constituted sufficient evidence of mala fides to overcome the indemnification obligation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, as the US verdict had not yet been entered as a final judgment and the risk of non-repayment did not constitute irreparable harm.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order for non-payment of rent.

The tenant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because his name was misspelled on the application.

The Divisional Court held that the misnomer was a procedural matter, not a question of law, and that the appeal was devoid of merit.

The court quashed the appeal, lifted the automatic stay, and directed the sheriff to enforce the eviction order.

The tenant brought an urgent motion for a stay of enforcement of an eviction order issued by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

His previous appeal of the Board's order had been quashed for being devoid of merit.

The tenant sought a stay pending a motion to vary the order quashing his appeal.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found the tenant failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured him, noting he had not paid rent since September 2015.

The motion for a stay was dismissed with costs awarded to the landlord.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff, a foster parent, alleged the defendants failed to disclose material information about a foster child who subsequently assaulted her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that it was not plain and obvious the claims would fail.

The Law Society brought a conduct application against the respondent lawyer.

The respondent moved to strike a particular based on a limitation period defence, which the Hearing Panel dismissed.

The respondent appealed to the Appeal Division, which quashed the appeal on the basis that the Hearing Panel's order was not final.

The respondent then appealed to the Divisional Court and sought a stay.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that mid-hearing rulings in regulatory conduct proceedings are not final orders under the Law Society Act, distinguishing the civil jurisprudence on final versus interlocutory orders.

The motion for a stay was dismissed as moot.