Kyle Gossen

Gemterra Developments Corporation sought a refund of $408,400 from the City of Toronto, alleging overpayment of park levies.

The central issue was the interpretation of "development site" under the City's Park Levy By-law, specifically whether Gemterra's two-phase residential project on a 1.3-hectare parcel constituted one or two development sites.

The levy rate was 10% for sites less than one hectare and 15% for sites between one and five hectares.

Gemterra argued that each phase, for which separate building permits were issued, should be treated as a distinct site, qualifying for the lower 10% rate.

The City contended it was a single development site.

The court dismissed Gemterra's application, finding that "development site" is a fact-based determination, and in this case, the two phases comprised a single development site, irrespective of phased construction or separate building permits.

The applicant sought a declaration that four of his properties, rented to groups of university students, were not being used as 'Lodging House Type 1' under the municipality's zoning by-law.

The municipality argued that because the properties were rented to five or more individuals sharing kitchen and bathroom facilities, they constituted lodging houses.

The court found that the properties functioned as single housekeeping units rented to cohesive groups under single leases, rather than individual lodging units.

The court granted the declaration and further ordered the municipality to remove unsubstantiated references to the properties as 'Possible Lodging Houses' from its public website, criticizing the municipality's use of the website to pressure landowners.

The applicant appealed an order to comply issued by a city building inspector requiring a building permit for interior renovations completed before the applicant purchased the property.

The court held that current owners are responsible for prior unpermitted construction and that the city's inspection was conducted with valid consent.

However, the court rescinded the order, finding that the minor interior renovations (adding non-load-bearing walls and basement laundry plumbing) did not constitute 'material alterations' requiring a building permit under the Building Code Act.

Following a successful application confirming user in common rights on a subdivision plan, the applicants sought costs of $51,593.86.

The respondent landowners argued the amount was excessive for a one-day hearing.

The respondent municipality also sought costs against the respondent landowners.

The court awarded the applicants $45,000 in partial indemnity costs, finding the claimed amount excessive despite the complexity of the historical real estate issues.

The municipality was awarded $2,500 in costs for its helpful submissions, though its costs were reduced because it remained adverse in interest to the applicants until the morning of the hearing.

The applicant developer sought a provisional building permit for a townhouse development, which the City refused, demanding an off-site parkland dedication instead of cash in lieu of land.

The applicant appealed the refusal and applied for a declaration interpreting the municipal bylaw.

The court dismissed the appeal as premature because the applicant lacked final planning approval.

However, the court granted the application for a declaration, finding that under the plain language of the bylaw, the City cannot require an off-site parkland dedication without the developer's agreement.

The applicants, owners of lots on a 1950 plan of subdivision, sought a declaration that certain lots designated as an 'area of user common to each property owner' remained subject to those rights.

The respondent owners of the fee simple in those common lots argued the rights had expired under the Registry Act and were extinguished upon conversion to the Land Titles system.

The court held that the dedication created valid, subsisting quasi-public rights and easements that were openly enjoyed and thus saved from expiry under the Registry Act.

The court declared the lands remain subject to the applicants' rights and prohibited the respondents from interfering with them.

The moving party sought to set aside a default judgment arising from an unpaid casino line of credit, arguing prompt action after awareness, inability to understand English, and arguable defences of unconscionability and public policy.

The court found the motion was not brought without delay and that the explanation for the default was inadequate, but accepted that there was at least an arguable defence with an air of reality.

Weighing the interests of justice and prejudice to both sides, the court held the matter should proceed on the merits.

The default judgment was set aside on strict terms, including payment of the judgment amount plus post-judgment interest into court and delivery of a defence and documentary productions.