Kristen Normandin

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the court held a focused trial to determine parenting and child support issues for three children.

The court considered whether to release the two younger children from a court-ordered parenting schedule based on their views and preferences.

The court released the 16-year-old child from the schedule effective August 2022 but declined to release the 14-year-old child.

The applicant mother was granted sole decision-making authority.

The court also calculated child support and section 7 expense arrears, ordering the respondent father to pay outstanding amounts.

Ongoing child support was reduced to $1,850 per month to reflect the shared parenting arrangement and the eldest child attending university.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The parties failed to comply with a case management direction requiring them to upload an agreement on costs or costs outlines prior to the hearing.

The responding party requested to submit an offer to settle prior to the costs award.

The court declined to permit further materials on costs, emphasizing that parties cannot disregard case management directions and that it is inefficient for leave panels to reconstitute to consider costs.

The court fixed costs of the motion at $2,500 payable by the moving party to the responding party.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict family law trial regarding decision-making and parenting time for their seven-year-old daughter.

The father sought sole decision-making and the continuation of a 2/2/3 shared parenting schedule, while the mother sought sole decision-making, a reduction in the father's parenting time, and a change to the child's surname.

The court found that neither parent should have sole decision-making due to the risk of marginalizing the other, and instead ordered a parallel parenting regime with divided domains of authority.

The court maintained the 2/2/3 schedule to provide stability and dismissed the mother's request to change the child's surname.

Following a three-week family law trial regarding parenting time and decision-making responsibility, both parties sought costs exceeding $200,000.

The court found that the parties achieved equal success at trial and that both had engaged in unreasonable behaviour that unnecessarily protracted the litigation.

Considering the parties' limited financial means and the best interests of the child, the court ordered that no costs be payable by either party.

The applicant father sought joint decision-making and expanded parenting time, including overnights, for his four-year-old child.

The respondent mother sought sole decision-making and supervised parenting time, raising concerns about the father's alcohol use and unverified allegations of abuse.

The court awarded sole decision-making to the mother due to the parents' high conflict and poor communication.

The court granted the father expanded parenting time, including overnights and summer access, finding it in the child's best interests to have a meaningful relationship with him.

However, the father was ordered to complete an alcohol abuse program and use a breathalyzer device before and during his parenting time until completion.

The Applicant Father sought to exclude private investigator surveillance evidence obtained by the Respondent Mother, arguing she failed to provide complete disclosure of the investigators' files despite multiple court orders.

The Mother sought leave to admit the evidence under Rule 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the Mother's failure to disclose the complete file prejudiced the Father's ability to assess the evidence and prepare for trial.

Given the highly prejudicial nature of the videos, the lack of full disclosure, and the inability to cross-examine the investigators, the court excluded the surveillance evidence in its entirety, including for the purpose of impeachment.

The respondent's motion for the return of the children to Scotland under the Hague Convention was previously dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $99,809.24 on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that both parties engaged in unreasonable behaviour: the respondent filed improper reply evidence and made unfounded reports to child protection services, while the applicant removed the children from Scotland without the respondent's consent under the guise of a sham access arrangement.

Finding no bad faith or applicable offers to settle, the court declined to award full indemnity costs and ordered the respondent to pay costs of $40,000.

The parties returned to court to address temporary parenting arrangements and the appointment of a section 30 assessor.

The father and paternal grandparents sought expanded, in-person parenting time during the summer, while the mother opposed in-person visits and requested that the assessment be conducted entirely virtually.

The court found that virtual visits had been positive and ordered the mother to travel to Ottawa with the children for the summer to facilitate graduated in-person visits.

The court also appointed the father's proposed assessor, requiring in-person observation visits due to the complex family dynamics and allegations of domestic violence.

The moving party father brought a motion under the Hague Convention for the return of his two children to Scotland, alleging the responding party mother wrongfully removed them to Ontario.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determine habitual residence, finding that the older child was habitually resident in Canada and the mother was the focal point of the infant child's life.

The court also considered the exceptions under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, finding that while the father exercised custody rights and did not consent to the removal, there was no grave risk of harm.

The motion for the return of the children was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's final order asserting jurisdiction over the parties' fourth child under the Divorce Act.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its own jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court concluded that because the order appealed from was made under the federal Divorce Act, rather than an Ontario statute, the appeal route lies to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, not the Divisional Court.

Applying the Dunnington test, the court declined to dismiss the appeal and instead transferred it to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the recusal of the case management judge, alleging bias.

The judge had previously found the father engaged in severe parental alienation and ordered reintegration therapy, which the father repeatedly delayed and undermined.

Following a Divisional Court ruling that stayed other contested motions pending the recusal motion, the judge voluntarily withdrew from the case.

The judge issued a lengthy endorsement detailing the father's history of alienation, deception, and manipulation, explaining that his withdrawal was necessary to prevent the father from using the recusal motion to further delay proceedings and harm the children.

The appellant father appealed a case management judge's decision to adjourn a contested motion brought by the Office of the Children's Lawyer until a recusal motion could be heard.

The case management judge had determined the recusal motion was too long to be heard during COVID-19 protocols, resulting in legal paralysis for the family.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the situation inappropriately left the children in limbo, and directed the Regional Senior Judge to appoint a temporary case management judge until the recusal motion is decided.

The parties, who previously shared week-about parenting of their four-year-old daughter, brought competing motions for temporary primary residence and school enrolment as the child was starting junior kindergarten.

The mother sought primary residence in Bowmanville, while the father sought primary residence in Scarborough.

Applying the best interests of the child factors under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court granted temporary primary residence to the mother in Bowmanville, noting she had been the more directly involved parent.

The court ordered a parenting schedule for the father including alternate weekends, one mid-week overnight, and shared holidays to maintain his close relationship with the child.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking an updated section 30 parenting assessment prior to trial.

The applicant father opposed the motion, arguing that the conflict between the parties had not changed and that the assessor could provide updated opinions via oral evidence at trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no significant change in circumstances to justify a further intrusive assessment and noting that the trial judge could adequately determine the issues with the original report and viva voce evidence.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the responding father.

This decision addresses the allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities following the Court of Appeal's allowance of an appeal in a family law matter.

The court was asked to determine the specific terms of a parallel parenting arrangement between separated parents regarding their six-year-old child.

The court rejected the mother's request for fresh evidence, finding sufficient information from the appeal record.

The court adopted a modified parenting schedule that balances the child's need for meaningful contact with both parents while minimizing school commuting time during the week.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision that had set aside an arbitrator's award regarding parenting and custody.

The arbitrator had conducted an eight-day hearing on a parenting plan review and awarded custody to the mother, permitting her to relocate the children from Toronto to Guelph to attend a specialized school.

The appeal judge found the arbitration process was fundamentally unfair because the father did not receive adequate notice of the mother's intent to move.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the arbitrator's award, finding that the proceedings were fair, the father acquiesced in the notice by not objecting during the hearing, and the best interests of the children in crisis outweighed procedural concerns raised only on appeal.

The father appealed a trial judge's order granting the maternal uncle monthly weekend access to the children following the mother's death.

The trial judge had awarded sole custody to the father but ordered that the uncle have access one weekend per month, including overnight visits.

The father argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not occur without a court order, that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for disbelieving his evidence that he would voluntarily provide access, and that the trial judge failed to consider potential psychological harm to the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was properly driven by the children's best interests and entitled to deference.

The applicant mother brought a motion to dispense with the respondent father's consent for international travel to New Zealand with their children for a funeral.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion seeking conditions for the travel and an order for their eldest child to continue at Mildenhall Montessori School, with tuition costs to be considered a section 7 expense.

The court granted the mother's motion to dispense with consent without conditions, dismissing the father's requested terms.

The court ordered the eldest child to continue at Mildenhall for the 2019/20 academic year, with the father solely responsible for the tuition, and adjourned the determination of whether tuition is a section 7 expense to trial.

The case was designated for case management by Justice Gilmore due to high conflict.

On appeal from a trial decision regarding custody and access of a six-year-old child, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the "maximum contact" principle under section 16(10) of the Divorce Act.

The trial judge had ordered that the child's primary residence remain with the mother, with the father receiving only one overnight per week and alternating weekends, and had granted joint custody in name only by giving the mother ultimate decision-making authority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the orders respecting parenting time and decision-making, requiring the parties to provide written submissions on the allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities in a parallel parenting model.

The respondent brought a motion seeking extensive financial disclosure from the applicant in a family law proceeding, prior to the applicant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the respondent's corollary claims for spousal and child support, which were based on a separation agreement.

The applicant argued that the disclosure motion constituted an abuse of process and was premature.

The court found no abuse of process, but limited the scope of the disclosure.

It ordered the applicant to produce specific financial documents related to his financial worth and income as of the date of the separation agreement (June 25, 2015), deferring requests for post-agreement disclosure until the summary judgment motion on the agreement's validity is determined.