Kristen Normandin

The parties returned to court to address temporary parenting arrangements and the appointment of a section 30 assessor.

The father and paternal grandparents sought expanded, in-person parenting time during the summer, while the mother opposed in-person visits and requested that the assessment be conducted entirely virtually.

The court found that virtual visits had been positive and ordered the mother to travel to Ottawa with the children for the summer to facilitate graduated in-person visits.

The court also appointed the father's proposed assessor, requiring in-person observation visits due to the complex family dynamics and allegations of domestic violence.

The moving party father brought a motion under the Hague Convention for the return of his two children to Scotland, alleging the responding party mother wrongfully removed them to Ontario.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determine habitual residence, finding that the older child was habitually resident in Canada and the mother was the focal point of the infant child's life.

The court also considered the exceptions under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, finding that while the father exercised custody rights and did not consent to the removal, there was no grave risk of harm.

The motion for the return of the children was dismissed.

The parties, who previously shared week-about parenting of their four-year-old daughter, brought competing motions for temporary primary residence and school enrolment as the child was starting junior kindergarten.

The mother sought primary residence in Bowmanville, while the father sought primary residence in Scarborough.

Applying the best interests of the child factors under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court granted temporary primary residence to the mother in Bowmanville, noting she had been the more directly involved parent.

The court ordered a parenting schedule for the father including alternate weekends, one mid-week overnight, and shared holidays to maintain his close relationship with the child.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking an updated section 30 parenting assessment prior to trial.

The applicant father opposed the motion, arguing that the conflict between the parties had not changed and that the assessor could provide updated opinions via oral evidence at trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no significant change in circumstances to justify a further intrusive assessment and noting that the trial judge could adequately determine the issues with the original report and viva voce evidence.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the responding father.

This decision addresses the allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities following the Court of Appeal's allowance of an appeal in a family law matter.

The court was asked to determine the specific terms of a parallel parenting arrangement between separated parents regarding their six-year-old child.

The court rejected the mother's request for fresh evidence, finding sufficient information from the appeal record.

The court adopted a modified parenting schedule that balances the child's need for meaningful contact with both parents while minimizing school commuting time during the week.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision that had set aside an arbitrator's award regarding parenting and custody.

The arbitrator had conducted an eight-day hearing on a parenting plan review and awarded custody to the mother, permitting her to relocate the children from Toronto to Guelph to attend a specialized school.

The appeal judge found the arbitration process was fundamentally unfair because the father did not receive adequate notice of the mother's intent to move.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the arbitrator's award, finding that the proceedings were fair, the father acquiesced in the notice by not objecting during the hearing, and the best interests of the children in crisis outweighed procedural concerns raised only on appeal.

The father appealed a trial judge's order granting the maternal uncle monthly weekend access to the children following the mother's death.

The trial judge had awarded sole custody to the father but ordered that the uncle have access one weekend per month, including overnight visits.

The father argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not occur without a court order, that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for disbelieving his evidence that he would voluntarily provide access, and that the trial judge failed to consider potential psychological harm to the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was properly driven by the children's best interests and entitled to deference.

The applicant mother brought a motion to dispense with the respondent father's consent for international travel to New Zealand with their children for a funeral.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion seeking conditions for the travel and an order for their eldest child to continue at Mildenhall Montessori School, with tuition costs to be considered a section 7 expense.

The court granted the mother's motion to dispense with consent without conditions, dismissing the father's requested terms.

The court ordered the eldest child to continue at Mildenhall for the 2019/20 academic year, with the father solely responsible for the tuition, and adjourned the determination of whether tuition is a section 7 expense to trial.

The case was designated for case management by Justice Gilmore due to high conflict.

On appeal from a trial decision regarding custody and access of a six-year-old child, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the "maximum contact" principle under section 16(10) of the Divorce Act.

The trial judge had ordered that the child's primary residence remain with the mother, with the father receiving only one overnight per week and alternating weekends, and had granted joint custody in name only by giving the mother ultimate decision-making authority.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the orders respecting parenting time and decision-making, requiring the parties to provide written submissions on the allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities in a parallel parenting model.

The respondent brought a motion seeking extensive financial disclosure from the applicant in a family law proceeding, prior to the applicant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the respondent's corollary claims for spousal and child support, which were based on a separation agreement.

The applicant argued that the disclosure motion constituted an abuse of process and was premature.

The court found no abuse of process, but limited the scope of the disclosure.

It ordered the applicant to produce specific financial documents related to his financial worth and income as of the date of the separation agreement (June 25, 2015), deferring requests for post-agreement disclosure until the summary judgment motion on the agreement's validity is determined.

The appellant husband appealed an interlocutory order requiring disclosure of income tax returns and a sworn financial statement in the context of a motion to set aside a 2015 separation agreement that capped his income for support calculations at $1 million per year and included a non-disclosure clause.

The respondent wife moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the substantive issue of the separation agreement's enforceability, but rather was a procedural disclosure order.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant father sought partition and sale of the matrimonial home, while the respondent mother opposed, citing the child's well-being and her financial situation, and also brought a motion to strike parts of the father's affidavit.

The court granted the father's motion for partition and sale, finding that the mother had not demonstrated prejudice to her rights or the child's needs sufficient to deny the prima facie right to sale.

The mother's motion to strike evidence was dismissed.

The court heard multiple interim motions in a family law dispute between unmarried parents concerning temporary child support, spousal support, section 7 expenses, school selection, parenting time, and a request for a custody assessment.

The court fixed child support based on the father's estimated 2013 income and ordered interim spousal support within the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range, while allocating section 7 expenses proportionately.

The court permitted the child to attend the school selected by the mother and ordered a modest increase in the father’s parenting time consistent with recommendations from the parties’ mediator.

The father's motion for a custody assessment under s. 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act was dismissed, as the parties had already agreed to obtain expert input from their mediator if necessary.

Costs were denied on the basis that success on the motions was divided.

A separated father sought an order that the child reside primarily with him after the mother relocated from Toronto to Sutton without prior discussion, contrary to the cooperative expectations in a joint parenting arrangement under a separation agreement.

The agreement required both parties to reside within the "GTA" but did not define that term.

Applying the mobility analysis from Gordon v. Goertz as modified in Berry v. Berry for cases involving two custodial parents, the court assessed the child’s best interests, including the existing parenting arrangement, maximizing contact with both parents, and potential disruption to the child.

Although the court criticized the mother’s failure to communicate the relocation decision, it concluded that parental conduct did not demonstrate an inability to meet the child’s needs.

Considering continuity of care and the impending transition to school, the court determined that the child’s best interests slightly favoured residing primarily with the mother in Sutton with expanded parenting time for the father.