Kosta Kalogiros

The defendant brought a motion at a status hearing to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay.

The action was commenced in 2000 and the statement of defence was filed in 2002, resulting in an 11-year delay before the status notice was issued.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, noting that the test under Rule 48.14 is disjunctive and requires both a reasonable explanation and a lack of non-compensable prejudice.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant construction company appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent residents $14,700 in damages for nuisance, trespass, and negligence arising from noise and odour emitted by a temporary asphalt plant.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of liability in nuisance, concluding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing the severity of the interference or the character of the neighbourhood.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to qualify the respondents' expert witness despite her employment with an environmental advocacy group.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding trespass and negligence, finding that noise and odour are indirect intrusions that do not constitute trespass, and that the respondents suffered no compensable personal injury or property damage to ground a negligence claim.

The damages award remained unchanged.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding it liable in nuisance, trespass, and negligence for noise and odour emanating from its temporary asphalt plant.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the finding of liability in nuisance, concluding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the severity of the interference or the character of the neighbourhood.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to qualify an expert witness employed by an environmental advocacy group, finding her employment did not automatically disqualify her.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding trespass and negligence, finding that noise and odour are indirect intrusions that do not constitute trespass, and that the respondents suffered no personal injury or property damage compensable in negligence.

The damages award of $14,700 was upheld.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a $50,000 substantial indemnity costs order made after the parties reached a consent resolution on a relief from forfeiture application.

The court found the costs order was interlocutory, as the underlying consent order did not finally dispose of the parties' rights.

Leave to appeal was granted because there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the costs order, particularly regarding the motions judge's reliance on untested affidavit evidence, the characterization of the tenant as the successful party, and the awarding of costs against a corporate officer personally.

The court also found the proposed appeal involved matters of general importance regarding costs awards following settlements.