Kitely

The applicants, physicians under investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, brought applications for judicial review challenging the scope of investigators' powers under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

They argued that investigators could not compel them to submit to interviews or allow observation of their surgical practices.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that the statutory power to 'inquire into and examine the practice' includes the power to observe surgeries, and the incorporation of the Public Inquiries Act grants investigators the power to compel interviews.

The court also dismissed as premature the challenge to the Registrar's decision that there were reasonable and probable grounds to initiate the investigations.

The appellants, an investment management firm and minority shareholder, appealed the dismissal of their oppression application against the respondent corporation and its directors.

The application judge had found that the challenged related-party transactions were within the reasonable expectations of shareholders and protected by the business judgment rule.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The court upheld the award of substantial indemnity costs due to the appellants' unfounded allegations of misconduct and misuse of the court process, but allowed the costs appeal in part to deduct pre-application costs.

The Law Society of Upper Canada appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel restoring the membership of a former judge who had resigned following findings of serious sexual misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Appeal Panel's findings that the Hearing Panel erred in applying the enhanced 'Bernstein' standard of proof and in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on a restored licence.

The Court confirmed that the standard of proof for restoration is a simple balance of probabilities, the burden of proof lies on the applicant, and the Law Society has broad jurisdiction to impose conditions on a restored licence to protect the public interest.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action alleging vertical price-fixing conspiracies in the sale of engineering resins.

The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking to expand the class definition to include Tier 1 manufacturers.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary, fact-driven conclusions regarding the class definition and the common issues of loss and liability.

The appellant defendants appealed an order dismissing their motion to compel the corporate plaintiffs to post security for costs.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that the defendants had filed a counterclaim closely related to the main action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that while a counterclaim may be relevant when seeking security for costs against a plaintiff by counterclaim, it does not insulate an initiating plaintiff in the main action from posting security for costs.

The corporate plaintiffs were ordered to post $20,000 in security for costs.

The complainant alleged that a funeral home lost his late wife's diamond earrings.

The Complaints Committee of the Board of Funeral Services declined to refer the matter to discipline and stated it lacked jurisdiction to order compensation.

On appeal, the Licence Appeal Tribunal ordered the funeral home to pay $4,800 in compensation.

The Registrar appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that neither the Complaints Committee nor the Tribunal had statutory authority under the Funeral Directors and Establishments Act to award monetary compensation to a complainant.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal confirming the Superintendent's consent to merge two pension plans following a corporate amalgamation.

The appellant argued the merger and subsequent use of the actuarial surplus from one plan to fund contribution holidays for the merged plan constituted a revocation of trust.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and correct.

The court held that the plan documents permitted the merger and that using actuarial surplus to fund contribution holidays while a plan is ongoing does not constitute a revocation of trust.