stunt driving

This decision addresses a stunt driving charge under subsection 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, focusing on the reliability of radar speed readings and the credibility of evidence from both the police officer and the accused.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v S. (W.D.) to assess credibility and reasonable doubt.

The officer's evidence regarding radar speed readings was found inconsistent and unreliable, particularly due to the deletion of elevated speed readings when switching radar modes and lack of corroborating visual observations.

The accused's evidence about operating a vehicle with a built-in radar detector and dash camera recordings was accepted as credible.

The prosecution failed to prove the essential element of elevated speed beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant, Olavo Williams-Cordeiro, was charged with careless driving causing death and stunt driving following a high-speed incident on Highway 403.

The court found that the defendant, along with a motorcyclist and another car, were engaged in a joint enterprise of racing, driving at speeds significantly exceeding the limit (up to 193 km/hr for the defendant's vehicle).

The motorcyclist collided with a vehicle lacking rear lights and died.

The court determined that the defendant's driving behaviour, characterized by excessive speed, tandem driving, and dangerous lane changes in the dark, fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, constituting careless driving.

The court rejected the defence argument that the collision occurred through no fault of the defendant, emphasizing that the dangerous activity of racing created a foreseeable risk, and the presence of a vehicle without lights was a foreseeable highway hazard.

The defendant was found guilty of both charges, with the Kienapple principle to be considered for sentencing.

The court considered a non-suit motion in a stunt driving case under the Highway Traffic Act, where the alleged offence occurred in a private parking lot.

The central issue was whether the stunt driving provision (s. 172(1) H.T.A.), which explicitly refers to "highway," applies to private property.

The court reviewed the common law "general rule" that H.T.A. provisions are limited to highways unless otherwise specified.

However, it found that s. 1.1 of the H.T.A. empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council to extend H.T.A. provisions to non-highways via regulation.

Specifically, O. Reg. 455/07, as amended by O. Reg. 598/21 (effective September 12, 2021), explicitly states that s. 172 applies to "specified places," including public and private parking lots.

Applying the principle of legislative paramountcy, the regulation supersedes the common law "general rule." The court ruled that the stunt driving offence under s. 172(1) H.T.A. applies to private parking lots, effectively denying the non-suit motion.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial proceeded by judge alone.

A Charter motion challenging the search incident to arrest was abandoned.

The court found the accused not guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime due to reasonable doubt, but guilty of the lesser included offence of simple possession of heroin.

The accused was also found guilty of possession of a prohibited weapon.

The court considered circumstantial evidence and the accused's testimony as a functioning addict.

The defendant, Matthew Tyityan, was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for speeding 154 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone.

The defence challenged the police officer's credibility regarding the use of notes to refresh memory, the timing of radar device testing, and potential interference from other vehicles.

The court found the officer's testimony credible and consistent, accepting his observations and the radar reading.

The defence's arguments were deemed speculative, and the prosecution was found to have proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction.

The defendant was convicted of stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown sought imprisonment of 30 days and a 30-day licence suspension, or alternatively a fine of $8,000-$10,000 with a 6-month suspension.

The defence sought the minimum fine of $2,000.

The court imposed a fine of $2,500 with 240 days to pay and no licence suspension, considering the defendant's personal circumstances, the absence of actual harm, the novelty of the conviction, and the essential role of truck drivers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant was charged with driving a commercial motor vehicle on Highway 401 without due care and attention by driving in a manner indicating an intention to drive as close as possible to another vehicle, contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and Ontario Regulation 455/07.

The Crown presented evidence from three police officers, including aerial surveillance footage showing the defendant's tractor-trailer following another commercial vehicle at dangerously close distances (as little as 3 metres) over approximately 5 kilometres while traveling at 102 km/hr.

The defendant challenged the identity of the driver and argued the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent and that the distance was not "as close as possible." The court found the defendant guilty, holding that the manner of driving indicated the requisite intention and that the Crown had proven all elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess alcohol, dangerous driving, speeding, and stunt driving following a high-speed pursuit at 113 km/h in a 50 km/h zone at 01:01 hours.

The Crown established reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on excessive speed, observed unsteadiness, blurry eyes, and odour of alcohol.

The court found no Charter breach regarding the delay between arrest and rights advisement, and found that while there was a technical breach of the right to counsel of choice, the breach was largely technical and the evidence was admissible.

Breath test results showed 177 mg/100 ml at 02:21 and 168 mg/100 ml at 02:44, with toxicologist opinion placing blood alcohol at minimum 160 mg/100 ml at time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol, impaired driving, dangerous driving, and stunt driving.

The defendant was charged with stunt driving under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for driving 150 km/h in an 80 km/h zone on Highway 6.

The Crown proved the defendant was clocked by radar at 150 km/h.

The defendant raised three defences: due diligence (based on his Attention Deficit Disorder causing hyper-focus), necessity, and automatism.

The court rejected all three defences, finding that the defendant failed to provide expert medical evidence to support his claims and that reasonable legal alternatives existed.

The court convicted the defendant.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for stunt driving and his sentence following a retrial.

The appellant was originally charged in September 2011 with driving 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, allegedly racing with another vehicle.

After a lengthy procedural history, the retrial commenced in March 2017.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal regarding jurisdiction, alleged non-disclosure of dispatch recordings, and Charter violations related to a second officer's attendance at the scene.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal against conviction, finding no evidentiary foundation for the appellant's assertions and noting the appellant's own failure to diligently pursue available remedies.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge made an error in principle by failing to consider that the appellant had already served 12 days incarceration and three months of a driving prohibition for the same offence.

The conviction was upheld but the sentence was varied.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidential breath sampling results.

The defendant argued that the arresting officer lacked subjective grounds to believe the defendant was impaired by alcohol, and alternatively, that there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and evidential breath demand.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest based on the defendant's dangerous driving, poor judgment, incoherent speech, bloodshot eyes, strong odour of alcohol, wet pants, and an open beer can in the vehicle.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for stunt driving under section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, challenging the reliability of LIDAR speed measurement evidence.

The Crown's case rested solely on the testimony of OPP Constable Tihor, who used a LIDAR device to measure the appellant's vehicle speed at 180 km/h on a highway with a 100 km/h speed limit.

The appellant argued that the constable's qualifications to operate the LIDAR device and the device's proper functioning raised reasonable doubt.

The trial justice found the officer qualified and credible, and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding that the officer's training, testing protocols, and device reliability were adequately established to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with Operation Over 80 and Stunt Driving under the Highway Traffic Act after being stopped for speeding at 157 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The officer detected signs of impairment and administered a roadside screening device test, which registered a fail.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples at the police detachment.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the roadside screening device result on the basis that the device's calibration status was uncertain, and argued that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had an objectively reasonable basis for believing the device was in proper working order based on the recent accuracy check and the device's operational indicators, and that the breath tests were taken within a reasonably prompt time under the circumstances.

Manuel Pereira appealed his sentence for dangerous driving and stunt driving, specifically challenging a 24-month driving prohibition.

The appellant argued that the sentencing Justice failed to provide sufficient reasons and did not adequately consider mitigating factors, rendering the driving ban demonstrably unfit.

The Crown sought dismissal of the appeal, asserting the sentence was fair.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a standard of deference to the sentencing judge, dismissed the appeal, finding the driving ban was entirely fit given the appellant's egregious driving record and the severity of the current offences, distinguishing his case from those of first-time offenders.

The defendant was tried on two informations: one containing four counts (care and control while impaired by alcohol or drug, care and control with blood alcohol exceeding legal limit, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana), and a second alleging stunt driving.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found a violation of section 10(b) but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The defendant was found guilty of over 80, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and stunt driving, but acquitted on the impaired charge.

The defendant appealed his conviction for stunt driving under s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, having been found guilty of operating a motor vehicle at 112 km/h in a 60 km/h zone.

The defendant raised arguments challenging the jurisdiction of the legislature to regulate motor vehicle operation, the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace to hear the matter, and the constitutional validity of the stunt driving provisions.

The court rejected all arguments and dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

The defendant pleaded guilty to stunt driving contrary to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after being detected driving 212 kph in a posted 90 kph zone on Highway 17.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $3,000 fine and 30-day licence suspension.

The court rejected the joint submission as markedly out of line with public expectations and contrary to the public interest, finding the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court imposed a $7,000 fine and a maximum two-year driving suspension, emphasizing the egregious nature of the speeding (122 kph over the limit) on a dangerous two-lane highway and the need for general and specific deterrence.

The defendant was charged with four offences arising from driving a red Mustang at 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401 while fleeing from individuals in a green Audi: performing a stunt, racing, driving with a suspended licence, and operating a motor vehicle with open liquor readily available.

The defendant claimed the defence of necessity, asserting he feared the occupants of the Audi would shoot him and his cousin.

The court found all elements of the offences proven beyond a reasonable doubt but rejected the necessity defence on a modified objective standard, finding reasonable legal alternatives were available.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to preclude dual convictions for performing a stunt and racing, staying the racing charge.

The defendant was convicted of performing a stunt, driving with a suspended licence, and operating a motor vehicle with open liquor.

Two defendants were charged with operating motor vehicles on Highway 401 while performing a stunt (speeding 80 km/h over the limit), racing, and careless driving.

The Crown's evidence established that the defendants were paced by a police officer at 180 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The defendants claimed they were travelling at 120-140 km/h and invoked the defence of necessity, arguing they accelerated to create distance from a vehicle following closely behind.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and reliable, rejected the necessity defence as failing the modified objective test, and applied the Kienapple principle to stay the careless driving and racing charges, resulting in convictions for performing a stunt.

The accused was charged with stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for speeding 173 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone.

The defence brought a section 7 Charter application seeking disclosure of the full operational manual for the radar device used and GPS records from the officer's vehicle.

The Crown and OPP argued these were third-party records not in their possession or control.

The court determined the records were third-party records subject to the O'Connor disclosure regime and dismissed the application, finding the defence failed to establish that the requested records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial.