Decision and Reasons
DATE: June 12, 2025
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
Central West Region
His Majesty the King
-and-
Conor Dooney
Decision and Reasons issued June 12, 2025
Justice of the Peace A.G. Summers
Appearances:
Wade Poziomka — Municipal Prosecutor for Norfolk County
Peter Karsten — Counsel for the Accused Conor Dooney
Statutes Considered or Cited:
Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, as amended
Cases Considered or Cited:
- R. v S. (W.D.), 1994 SCC 1
- R. v. Hammond, 2005 BCPC 111
- R. v. Hawkins, 2009 ONCJ 101
- R. v. Lising, 2000 BCSC 1003
- R. v. Odish, 2016 ONCJ 118
- R. v. Safdar, 2018 ONSC 7066
Note: no related radar detector precedent identified
Justice of the Peace A.G. Summers - Decision of the Court:
The accused, Conor Dooney (“Conor”), has been charged that, on July 16th, 2024, he “Drove Motor Vehicle - Perform Stunt – Excessive Speed” pursuant to subsection 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, which reads as follows:
172(1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway in a race or contest, on a bet or wager or while performing a stunt.“Stunt” is defined in O. Reg. 455/07, Races, Contests and Stunts as, amongst other things, as follows:
3. 7. Driving a motor vehicle at a rate of speed that is 40 kilometres per hour or more over the speed limit, if the speed limit is less than 80 kilometres per hour.
To which he has pled not guilty.I have considered the evidence and written submissions before me. The essential elements of the charge before the court must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution if the Accused is to be found guilty as charged, and until then there is a presumption of innocence.
The issues not in dispute include municipality/jurisdiction, identity, date and time of offence, and location/place where incident occurred. Also not in dispute is that the Accused was operating a motor vehicle on the date and place specified in the charge. Additionally, not in dispute is that the Accused was travelling above the posted 80 km/hr speed limit and the Accused’s vehicle had a dash and rear camera in operation that captured the incident before the court.
What is in dispute is whether the officer initiated the cruiser's radar device capturing an elevated speed supporting an allegation of stunt driving. I will focus my analysis of the evidence on the issue in dispute.
Here we have a situation where I am faced with two versions of the same event. The overarching question is whether, on the whole of the evidence, a trial judge is left with a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused. In every case, the Crown bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to assure an innocent accused is not convicted. This burden is fundamental in our justice system and applies to a case, like this one, where credibility is the main issue. To assist a trial judge in this task, the Supreme Court of Canada provided a three-part test found in R. v S.(W.D.) to determine whether the Crown has satisfied their burden in a case that turns on the issue of credibility.
First, if I believe the Accused's evidence that the Accused did not commit the offence as charged, I must find not guilty and acquit. Second, even if I do not believe the Accused’s evidence, if the evidence leaves me with a reasonable doubt about guilt, or about an essential element of the offence charged, I must find not guilty of that offence and acquit. Third, even if the evidence does not leave me with a reasonable doubt of the Accused's guilt, or about an essential element of the offence charged, I may convict only if the remainder of the evidence I do accept proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is not, however, a contest of credibility. A trial judge cannot simply choose between the evidence of the Crown witnesses and the evidence of the defence witnesses. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is at the heart of a R. v. S.(W.D.) analysis. The standard is not to choose between the Accused or prosecution evidence, or which account I prefer.
Officer Rooney’s Evidence
Officer Rooney's evidence in chief is that he observed a vehicle approaching southbound on Hillcrest Road in Simcoe, Norfolk County, at a speed that grabbed his attention. In response to passing the Accused's vehicle, he then initiated the cruiser's speed measuring device and locked two speed readings. The first was a locked reading of 128 km/h and another locked reading of 131 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone. The speed measuring device would have been invisible to a radar detector until the point he depressed the activation button on the device.
He began his 6:00 p.m. – 6:00 a.m. shift on July 16, 2024, and did not test his speed measuring device at the onset of his shift. He testified to conducting the radar unit function check at 11:06 p.m. pursuant to manufacturer's instructions. I took judicial notice this function check was 11 minutes prior to passing the Accused's southbound vehicle, and five hours and 11 minutes after commencing the shift. Officer Rooney was a qualified radar device operator since 2002 and renewed in June 2021 with qualifications covering the next five-year period.
In examination in chief, Officer Rooney testified he had read, then recorded, these two elevated speeds before undertaking a U-turn to follow the Accused's vehicle southbound on Hillcrest. He testified he was 100% certain he turned on his radar transmitter after passing the Accused's vehicle on Hillcrest Road just past Evergreen Road. No direct evidence was offered as to whether the officer had lost sight of the Accused's vehicle. However, he testified there were no other vehicles in proximity of 8th Street West because he had just passed through there. He also testified to slowing and looking down intersecting roads in an effort to locate the target vehicle, after completing a U-turn.
Following the U-turn, remaining on Hillcrest Road now southbound and passing by 8th Street West, the officer then observed brake lights come on for a couple of seconds or a little bit longer than he would normally suspect or observe brake lights to come on. The brake lights then went off and then another, sort of, semi-extended brake period occurred. This caused the officer to wonder if the driver saw the officer's headlight come into view after the cruiser turned around, and subsequently was now braking from a high speed down to a more manageable speed. The vehicle then made a third brake application, shorter in duration, and made the right turn onto 7th Street West, travelling in a westbound direction.
On cross-examination, the officer testified the Accused "had braked some distance before the actual turn occurred, there were three brake light observations. One slightly extended. A short time span between the second. That one was then slightly extended. And then a shorter one simply right before the turn, as if somebody were slowing to make the actual turn... the first two, he suspected, were slowing down from the speed that he believed the vehicle to be travelling at well before that turn occurring. So, they appeared to him to be completely independent from the vehicle just braking to slow down to a speed to make an actual turn."
I took judicial notice the officer offered no direct evidence of observing the Accused's vehicle travelling at a high rate of speed immediately prior to taking a third radar speed reading. The officer testified that he then activated his front-facing antenna on 7th Street after he and the Accused navigated a right-hand turn and recorded a much lower speed of 70 km/h in a posted 80 km/h zone, and the Accused was travelling under the speed limit. He further testified he did not know why the Accused's radar detector did not alert audibly on the dash camera video, that he could only speculate the Accused's device was not working. On cross-examination, the officer did refer to his notes and testified it was a much lower speed and the Accused was travelling 70 km/h in an 80 km/h zone.
The officer testified to catching up to the vehicle that had made that same turn onto 7th Street West and approximately one kilometre down 7th Street West, did engage a traffic stop. The officer indicated he informed the Accused the readings were not available to be shown. The officer testified that when he made a U-turn and engaged his now front-facing radar speed recording device, the act of switching from a rear-facing to a front-facing unit deleted the two elevated speeds of 128 and 131 that were recorded from the rear-facing direction. The officer testified in chief that ordinarily his standard practice is not to advise the driver of the reason for a roadside stop until actually obtaining identifying documents. After confirming identity, the officer testified on cross-examination, he engaged in conversation regarding the alleged travelling speed and advised the Accused of the purpose of the roadside stop.
When asked about the Accused's radar detecting device receiving a radar signal, the officer testified he was unable to know what was inside the Accused's car or whether the device was functioning, and these devices were not legal. The officer acknowledged watching the video from the Accused's dash camera and denied confirming the audible beeps he heard after turning right on 7th Street were associated with the Accused's radar detector. The officer denied hearing audible beeps on the dash cam recording that supported his evidence that he initiated his rear-facing antenna identifying a 128 and 131 locked speed reading. The officer admitted to hearing an audible beep on the dash camera video which coincided with his testimony that he took a third reading after following the Accused's car after it slowed, made a right-hand turn onto 7th Street, then proceeded down 7th Street and registered 70 km/h in an 80 km/h zone.
The officer testified he had no locked speed or time of recording evidence other than his verbal evidence. On cross-examination, the officer testified he did write down the locked speed of 128. He also testified that radar cannot print out tracked speeds and he was not required to show an Accused evidence of tracked speeds pursuant to the operators manual.
Officer Rooney's Evidence Related to Showing Recorded Speeds
During cross-examination, the officer testified that at the roadside the Accused did request to see the speed readings but could not be 100% sure. The defence asked if the officer needed to refer to his notes to refresh his memory at all. The officer's response was that he didn't recall off the top of his head whether he made annotation of that or not. He might have. He could not say. He stated he didn't know, adding "I mean, I could look through my notes. I don't want to pause the court unnecessarily to look for that." Nevertheless, he testified he wasn't able to show it to the Accused due to the fact that the convenience memory reading of the locked feature was no longer there to show him, if he did request it. As to writing the locked speed, the officer testified on cross-examination that he did write down the 128 reading.
The officer testified that he would gladly show it to somebody if it's available to do so. However, under the circumstances here, the way that this particular radar functions, the officer was not able to do so once he changed the mode over from opposite [rear facing] to a same [forward] direction.
Officer Rooney's Evidence Related to a Speed Reading on a Slow Vehicle
During examination in chief, the officer testified the first time he had heard the Accused had a radar detecting device was during the trial. The officer testified during examination in chief, and I quote"he is trained to not activate a radar device until he actually first observes, as part of our tracking history, to observe a vehicle and the operation [of the radar], actually observe it is travelling at a high rate of speed, and then really activate the radar unit to basically corroborate or confirm our visual operations of that vehicle."
He further testified that after turning onto 7th Street West and closing the distance on the Accused's vehicle, he then obtained further radar readings of the vehicle. The result of that further radar reading was 70 km/h in an 80 km/h zone, and he testified on cross-examination that the Accused's vehicle was travelling much slower. The officer also testified previously that he is trained to not engage the radar device unless the target vehicle is visually travelling at a high rate of speed.
Conor Dooney’s Evidence
The Accused testified that between 11:00 p.m. and midnight on July 16, 2024, he left a car wash and drove at a speed between 15-25 km/h beyond the posted 60 km/h zone in an attempt to dry his car. He operated a 2017 Volkswagen Golf inherited in January 2024 from his father with a hard-wired radar detector built in which turned on and off with minimal delay when the engine started. When the car turns off, it turns off. He testified the dash camera video alerts with a beeping sound, and that night the detector turned off when the engine turned off. He acknowledged the device was illegal and it no longer was installed on the vehicle.
The Accused testified the hard-wired radar detector was a Valentine 1 Gen II model which produces a deep signal in quick succession depending on the strength of the radar beam the device is registering. The device was mounted to the front left windshield by suction cups which followed the curve of the windshield but remained positioned horizontally. The device was on a default setting that recognized radar within a 3 km radius. The beeping alert becomes louder and more constant with a detected stronger signal. He testified he was aware the device had not been altered and that his radar device was on during the entirety of the dash camera video that was recorded and presented in evidence.
The Accused further testified his car was equipped with a front and rear facing dash camera and the recording of the incident before this court was recorded and presented into evidence as Exhibit 1. The video recorded a beeping sound which was alleged to be emitted from the hard-wired radar detector. The beeping sound occurred closer to the end of the video and did not occur on Hillcrest Road which was a posted 60 km/h zone. He testified the radar beep was audible after he made a right-hand turn from the direction of Hillcrest, and well past when the officer testified to observing his vehicle pass at a high rate of speed.
The Accused testified in chief that during the roadside stop the officer did not explain the reason he was pulled over until after the officer asked for licence, registration, and insurance. The Accused testified he asked the officer at first to see his radar and the speed and the officer responded, and I quote"yes, I can show you. And he never really ended up showing me." The Accused further testified in chief that when the car was being towed, he again asked the officer to see it and he said that it reset, and he only had proof on paper. The Accused denied being shown the proof on paper.
Further on cross-examination, the Accused testified the detecting device was a 12-volt install and was on sensor mode "A" which does not filter any signals and grabs them all. It has to be plugged in and the unit has two volume controls so you can hear the audible tone. The Accused testified he did not test the unit pursuant to manufacturer's specifications prior to getting on the road and leaving the car wash, and afterwards after the officer issued the ticket.
On cross-examination, the Accused agreed the remaining car wash water on the windshield would reasonably be more on his vehicle when he passed the officer than when pulled over. The Accused denied the car wash water on the windshield was the reason his detector may not have detected the officer's radar beam when the officer first passed his vehicle. When reading from the manual, the Accused disagreed that rain, moisture, or dust in the air can shorten a radar range and this was a reason for a weak alert.
During cross-examination, the Accused testified his vehicle did not have wipers engaged at any point and his windows were tinted. The prosecution read from the manual that some windshields have a dark tint band across the top and to avoid mounting behind that band. The Accused denied that his windshield had a metal band across the top edge which otherwise could have interfered with the detector's functions. He denied having a thumbnail setting and his particular unit could not mute and so it could not be made to not make an audible sound.
On cross-examination, the Accused denied believing the officer lied about the first use of the radar device based upon an assumption that his radar detecting device didn't make a sound. He testified he based his belief on the officer's notes and what the officer said that he said he accidentally reset the speed in his notes. The Accused denied the officer didn't show him the speed on his radar device because he was making up what he says the speed was locked at. The Accused believed the officer reset the device, that according to the officer he reset and cleared the speed that he locked in on his radar device. The Accused testified it was a possibility the officer intentionally didn't create a radar reading, then lied about the speed, and then said he cleared it when asked to see the speed.
On redirect, the Accused testified he believed his windshield water or water in or around the radar detector was cleared off by the time the Accused passed the officer. I took judicial notice the alleged two high speed readings were taken from behind the Accused's vehicle and not directly through the front left side of the windshield where the radar detector was mounted. When asked about a tinted band on the front of the windshield, the Accused agreed there is a small one and if the tint was infused with metal it could inhibit the radar detector. The Accused further testified the tint on his vehicle was dyed film without metal in it.
Findings
I found the evidence of the Accused reliable and credible and accept his evidence that he was operating his inherited motor vehicle that had a built-in radar detecting device that turned off and on with the start of the engine, and the device would not significantly delay and functioned with an ability to alert continuously while the engine ran.
I accept the Accused's evidence that he did request to see the elevated readings, that the officer indicated they would be shown, and they were written, and the speeds were not shown during the roadside stop. I accept the Accused's testimony that he was travelling above 80 km/h in a 60 km/h zone.
I accept the officer's testimony that the Accused had passed him at an elevated speed. I question why the officer would take a further speed reading on a vehicle he was observing depressing their brake lights multiple times to decelerate and was not observed to be travelling at an elevated speed when an alleged third speed reading was taken. It makes reasonable sense that a car depressing brake lights multiple times would be travelling at a rate reduced from the 128 and 131, and with those brake lights illuminating on the Accused's vehicle, the target vehicle would not physically be able to accelerate beyond the 128 and 131 after thrice slowing and navigating a right-hand turn – without the officer observing the target vehicle pulling away from him at a high rate of speed. The officer testified pursuant to tracking history requirements he is trained not to activate the speed measuring device unless an elevated speed is visually observed to corroborate the alleged readings. As to consistency, R. v. Safdar, found where an inconsistency of a witness involves a material matter central to the elements of the alleged offences and about which common sense dictates that an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken, the inconsistency can demonstrate carelessness with the truth that may undermine the whole of a witness’ testimony.
Persuasively the finding in R. v. Hammond, which distinguished R. v. Lising, both from the British Columbia Supreme Court, provides guidance as to proof of radar speed. In Lising, evidence of visual assessment was insufficient to find conviction, the trial judge did not view radar reading as merely corroborating the officer’s visual observation that the accused was speeding. The trial judge was permitted to base the conviction on radar evidence if it was found reliable and was not rebutted or weakened. As to weighting, R. v. Odish found when an officer tracks a vehicle first with his or her own eyes and makes a determination, based on experience, that a vehicle is travelling well over the speed limit, then the radar is activated and the radar reading corroborates the officer’s own observation, it bolsters the strength of the radar reading element. It then makes reasonable sense, when an officer does not first track a vehicle visually and make an experienced determination that the vehicle is travelling well over the speed limit, the radar reading evidence is weakened.
As to tracking history, R. v. Hawkins in reviewing a Genesis radar unit’s manual, at section 6.4 in relevant part:
For each enforcement action taken by the police with respect to a speeding offence arising out of the use of this radar unit a tracking history must occur. The tracking history shall consist of 1) a visual observation of an approaching or receding Motor Vehicle that appears to be in excess of the posted speed limit in the area and an estimation by the officer of the speed that the motor vehicle is travelling; 2) having made the visual observation and estimate of the rate of speed, the radar unit will be placed in the operational mode; and 3) Note, that the target displayed on the radar unit is consistent and confirms the officers initial observations and estimate, and that the audio tracking tone emitted by the radar unit is consistent with the visual observations and the target speed displayed; and 4) absence of any one of the above tracking history components and NO ENFORCEMENT ACTION [emphasis not added] shall be undertaken.
Here, the officer testified in chief being bound by a similar tracking history requirement.I considered why the officer waited until the Accused had made a right-hand turn onto 7th Street from Hillcrest southbound, to engage his front-facing speed detection antenna. There was no evidence offered the Accused's vehicle was travelling at a high rate of speed after slowing to make a 45-degree turn onto 7th Street. As a trained radar operator, the officer would reasonably know that evidence of alleged rear facing recorded speeds of 128 and 131 would delete if he took a front-facing reading. Knowing this, and while the target vehicle was substantially slowed or at a minimum not substantially accelerating away after completing a right-hand turn without corroborating officer testimony of a visual observation of a motor vehicle appearing in excess of the posted speed limit in the area, why would an experienced certified radar officer choose to take an action that deleted elevated readings, take a reading that reasonably would not satisfy a standard tracking history component, particularly when further readings were not necessary to substantiate the charge.
I considered whether the radar readings were automatically deleted, accidentally deleted, were offered to be shown and were represented to be written, though I do not question the readings were not shown to the Accused at the roadside and the Officer’s evidence did evade the answer on point.
Radar Detection Devices
It is illegal to operate a radar detection device. I believe the spirit of the legislation is to disallow these devices because it encourages drivers to exceed posted speed limits. The Accused admitted to driving over the speed limit and it is a reasonable inference he was assured in not being detected driving over the speed limit as it was his practice to drive with a radar detector engaged and operating in his vehicle during the entire time his engine is running.
It is common knowledge that a functional radar detection device would beep when it is engaged by a speed recording device's radar beam. The decision today in no way is a precedent that radar detectors are legal. The Accused is not charged with having and operating an illegal radar detecting device, and the evidence was not considered as to whether the Accused would be convicted of having an illegal speed detecting device.
The decision today does not condone the use of illegal speed detecting devices, nor does it intend to send a message to the general public that the use of a speed detecting device is a viability when defending a stunt driving charge.
Dash Cameras
- Dash cameras and body cameras are standard and acceptable evidentiary elements that are regularly offered to corroborate evidence. The case before the court has a civilian producing dash and rear camera evidence that challenges the officer's viva voce evidence and is not taken to be less credible because it is produced by a civilian. The elevated speed recorded on the dash camera was further supported by the Accused's vehicle being accelerated aggressively after the engine shifted into 4th gear, and I took judicial notice no evidence was led to establish the speed the Accused's vehicle could reasonably be travelling based solely on the dash camera video. The dash camera corroboration of the Accused's evidence was weighed in totality of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Speed Measuring Devices
As to precedent, this case illustrates the importance of an officer's ability to produce a reading of a speed measuring device in writing as part of disclosure when the evidence supports a writing was undertaken when the evidence is rebutted. This case illustrates the importance of documenting speed recording device readings especially when considering the significant consequences of stunt driving convictions.
As to equating the Accused's qualification and training to operate a radar detection device to an officer's qualification and training to operate an in-cruiser speed measuring device, I find these are not one and the same. A civilian Accused does not use the detection as evidence of supporting a charge. However, an officer's measuring evidence is used to support a charge against a civilian and accordingly, the standard is high to secure a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. I disagree with the prosecution that the Accused's evidence related to the radar detection device and proper function is to be rejected in its entirety.
The Accused responded to the prosecution's questions regarding the user's manual with a lay-person's acceptable responses as a general user. The Accused was persuasive in a general knowledge of the unit, was knowledgeable regarding its function and his routine manner of checking operational capacity, and corrected the prosecution when the prosecution questioned on specifications that did not apply to the Accused's unit. I did not find the argument that water on the Accused's windshield after washing the car would or would not prevent the radar detector from alerting in this circumstance persuasively. The prosecution is tasked to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that water on the windshield did cause the detector to fault, and I am not satisfied on the totality of evidence on this point.
Perjury
- The prosecution put the Officer to questions in response to anticipated assertions by the defense the officer has perjured his testimony and did not take elevated speed radar readings. To these assertions the officer did testify being 100% certain he took two elevated speed readings prior to taking a non-elevated speed reading. In this case, certainty and speed-reading evidence was weighted on a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. A charge of perjury is not before this court, however, any inconsistency or tenets of perjured testimony that could be inferred from the officer’s testimony on the whole of the evidence, those considerations including weighing dash and rear camera evidence as it relates to an absence of radar detection alerts, and any associated Charter Rights implications, are left to a higher court or appropriate tribunal or administrative body.
Ruling
The issue here is not whether the Accused exceeded the posted 80 speed limit, the question is how much above the posted 80 speed limit did the Accused travel. After applying the three-prong test of R. v S. (W.D.) and after weighing all of the evidence I do accept, and even if I don't believe the Accused’s evidence, if I am left in reasonable doubt about guilt, I must find not guilty.
I found the evidence of the Accused Conor Dooney consistent, forthright, and credible. He satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated his motor vehicle above the posted 60 km speed limit. He also satisfied me that he was operating an unlawful radar detecting device while operating his motor vehicle above the posted 60 km speed limit, however an associated radar detecting device charge is not before this court.
I found the evidence of Officer Rooney not reliable, was rebutted and was weakened. This highly experienced and trained officer took a reading of a slowing and slow vehicle, and while the same slowed vehicle did not visually travel at a high rate of speed prior to the alleged third speed reading. The officer testified he had registered speeds of 128 km/h and 131 km/h. Despite these elevated readings the officer contraindicated his testimony and mandated training requirements that he not take a radar speed reading on a vehicle that was not visually travelling at a high rate of speed. This highly trained and skilled radar operator would know that the rear facing antenna elevated speeds would delete when a subsequent front facing antenna speed reading was taken on the Accused’s vehicle that was visually not travelling at a high rate of speed and consequentially not needed to make out this charge.
I found the evidence of Officer Rooney unreliable on the whole of the evidence, and do not accept beyond a reasonable doubt that he recorded rear directional speeds of 128 km/h and 131 km/h while the Accused's vehicle was travelling southbound on Hillcrest within a 60 km/hour zone. The officer was inconsistent in his testimony, and it is a reasonable inference he did deviate from the requirements of speed tracking as required by a certified radar operator. The officer was evasive in his evidence regarding whether the Accused had asked to see the readings, and assertedly avoided referencing his notes to clarify his testimony on this point.
Further, there was inconsistency in the Officer’s testimony in relation to the provision of the speed reading to the Accused and whether a representation was made it would be shown at roadside because it was available and written, or whether it was known it was deleted, resulting in an alleged contraindication to the officer notes. As to any consideration of a lesser or included charge, in my view, it would be in error in law to impose a lesser charge conviction on evidence by an officer that I found unreliable, rebutted, and weakened. Had the officer produced the alleged written reading notations he testified to have existed, or had not been inconsistent in testimony as to whether he had or did not write down the readings, as to whether he had or did not take elevated speed recordings, whether he did or did not tell the Accused he would show him the readings, and whether he told the Accused he made a mistake and deleted the readings. This point was further complicated by the Accused's testimony the officer notes were inconsistent to the officer's testimony, which was not sufficiently counter-argued by the prosecution.
These issues do not turn on whether the officer was mandated by the unit’s manual to show the readings, this turns on the inconsistencies in testimony raising a reasonable doubt. A device’s manual guides the court as to necessary steps and when undertaken can satisfy the court an alleged speed measuring capacity indicates the unit was in full working order at the time of the readings. A device manual’s contents regarding disclosure of readings to an accused do not bind this court as precedent.
The prosecution is tasked to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not establish the essential element of elevated speed required to make out a stunt driving or speeding charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Accused's admission to driving in a range above the speed limit in this instance will not produce an included charge conviction.
Considering the totality of the evidence on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard it is my decision that the prosecution has not proven the charge of stunt driving, and an included charge conviction is not warranted in this circumstance, and I find you Mr. Dooney, not guilty.
This court finds that where speed measuring evidence lacks reliability due to successful rebuttal, an officer's viva voce testimony may nonetheless satisfy the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard when corroborated by speed readings that are: (1) disclosed to the accused, and/or (2) supported by electronic recordings or other reliable documentary evidence.
The court further finds this ruling establishes stare decisis precedent with binding common law effect, subject to the superior binding authority of a higher court.
Decision Released June 12, 2025, in Norfolk County.