Philip Alexiu

Appeal from a conviction under section 139(1) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act for failing to yield to oncoming traffic from a driveway.

The appellant exited a private driveway onto a roadway and collided with a motorcycle.

The trial judge found the Crown proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt but rejected the appellant's due diligence defence.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred by: (1) failing to consider the totality of evidence, including surveillance video corroborating the appellant's testimony; (2) engaging in an improper credibility contest rather than applying the W.(D.) test; and (3) allowing the consequences of the accident to influence her assessment of the appellant's manner of driving.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was registered.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two charges: operating a tow truck without a license contrary to City of Mississauga By-Law 521-04, and obstructing a mobile licensing inspector contrary to s. 426 of the Municipal Act.

The appeal was heard on the grounds that the appellant had not received the summons and that the trial justice's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent conceded the appeal on the service issue.

The court found that the trial justice's comments throughout the proceedings—including sarcastic remarks, derisive characterizations, and statements indicating a predetermined outcome—created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Two defendants were charged with operating motor vehicles on Highway 401 while performing a stunt (speeding 80 km/h over the limit), racing, and careless driving.

The Crown's evidence established that the defendants were paced by a police officer at 180 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The defendants claimed they were travelling at 120-140 km/h and invoked the defence of necessity, arguing they accelerated to create distance from a vehicle following closely behind.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and reliable, rejected the necessity defence as failing the modified objective test, and applied the Kienapple principle to stay the careless driving and racing charges, resulting in convictions for performing a stunt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown alleged the appellant was travelling at 153 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 407, as measured by a Laser Atlanta speed detection device.

The appellant claimed he was travelling at 100 km/h and that his company vehicle was equipped with a speed limiter preventing speeds above 120 km/h.

The trial justice accepted the investigating officer's evidence and rejected the appellant's testimony.

On appeal, the court dismissed three grounds of appeal: alleged interference with full answer and defence regarding cross-examination of the speed measuring device; alleged bias arising from the justice's reference to amending the charge upward; and alleged misapplication of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle at 149 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 407.

During trial, the Justice of the Peace amended the charge to reflect 153 km/h based on evidence presented.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: alleged interference by the trier of fact preventing full answer and defence, bias arising from the amendment of the speed charge, and misapplication of the R. v. W.(D.) credibility assessment principles.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error occurred at trial.