Self-represented litigant

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 2018 action for delay, citing the plaintiff's failure to deliver an affidavit of documents since 2021 and non-compliance with a consent order from August 2023.

The self-represented plaintiff attributed the delay to being busy with other priorities, including an immigration consulting practice and other litigation.

The court found the delay inordinate and intentional, leading to a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible due to fading memories and lack of discovery.

The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed with costs to the defendants.

The self-represented plaintiff, Jennifer Scarangella, brought a motion seeking an order to act in a representative capacity on behalf of the estate of her late partner without a lawyer in a medical negligence action.

The defendants opposed, arguing that Rule 15.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires an estate to be represented by a lawyer and that Rule 2.03 should not be applied to dispense with this requirement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not an appropriate case to dispense with the requirement for legal representation, particularly because the issue was raised promptly by the defence and the plaintiff was seeking monetary damages for both herself and the estate, engaging the core rationale of Rule 15.01(1).

The court, acting on a request from the Social Benefits Tribunal under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, referred a motion to consider dismissing the plaintiff's statement of claim as potentially frivolous and vexatious.

The court ordered that notice be given to the plaintiff to make submissions, stayed the action pending the outcome of the written hearing, and restricted further filings by the plaintiff, except for submissions in response to the notice.

The plaintiff's action against the City of Toronto and several individuals was dismissed by the court on its own motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the statement of claim lacked material facts against some defendants, was brought far outside the limitation period for events dating back to 1996-2000, contained serious but unsubstantiated allegations, and represented a re-litigation of matters previously decided against the plaintiff in numerous prior proceedings and appeals.

The City of Toronto sought an order declaring Shane O’Herlihy a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act due to his persistent and abusive conduct during litigation.

This conduct included sending numerous threatening emails and voicemails to opposing counsel and their families, and filing excessive and irrelevant court documents.

The court granted the application, finding O’Herlihy's conduct to be vexatious and an abuse of process, and imposed strict conditions on his future ability to initiate or continue legal proceedings, including requiring leave of the court and representation by a licensed lawyer.

The court also awarded substantial costs against him for the dismissed actions.

The Court-Appointed Receiver sought an administration order, approval of its First Report, a vesting order for the sale of the Debtor's property, and sealing relief for confidential appendices.

The Debtor, through its principal, initially indicated opposition and sought an adjournment to obtain legal advice and present evidence of purported second mortgages.

The court denied the adjournment, finding no evidence of other registered mortgages or a basis to compromise the first mortgage.

The court approved the sale, administration, and sealing orders, concluding the property was widely exposed and the sale was in the best interest of the estate.

The appellant, Domarina Malek, appealed a Superior Court order that enforced a settlement agreement and dismissed her claim, denying her request for an adjournment.

Malek, who became self-represented after her counsel withdrew, argued she was under duress and mentally incapacitated when agreeing to the settlement.

The motion judge denied the adjournment, citing the long-standing litigation and Malek's failure to secure new counsel or provide medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's denial of the adjournment was a reasonable exercise of discretion, given the contextual factors including the duration of the litigation, lack of explanation for not retaining new counsel, absence of medical evidence, and failure to attend a pre-trial.

The court considered dismissing a counterclaim brought by the self-represented defendant by counterclaim, Christopher Tinkasimire, under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The main action had been dismissed on consent.

After reviewing Mr. Tinkasimire's submissions, the court found the counterclaim to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The counterclaim lacked a legal basis, was rambling and difficult to understand, contained rhetorical questions, and Mr. Tinkasimire's submissions were unpersuasive, including an unsubstantiated request to increase damages.

The counterclaim was dismissed without costs.

The Applicant (Mother) sought orders for the immediate sale of the matrimonial home, dispensing with the Respondent's (Father's) consent for the sale process, and vacant possession.

The Respondent consented to the sale and vacating but opposed dispensing with his consent, arguing for repairs and a say in the process.

The court found the Respondent unreasonably withheld consent given his lack of cooperation, financial non-contribution to the home, and precarious financial situation.

The court granted the Applicant's requests, ordering the sale, vacant possession, and dispensing with the Respondent's consent for the sale process.

Net proceeds are to be held in trust, and parties are directed to mediation for distribution.

This endorsement addresses costs following a motion where the respondent mother successfully obtained an order for the sale of the matrimonial home and exclusive possession.

The court found the applicant father's litigation conduct to be in bad faith, characterized by intentional withholding of information, contradictions in sworn evidence, and bizarre, intimidating communications directed at the mother's lawyer.

Despite the father's self-represented status and claims of inability to pay, the court emphasized that impecuniosity does not shield a litigant from costs for unreasonable or bad faith behavior.

The court fixed costs at $8,000.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the father to the mother.

This motion addresses the procedural issue of determining the respondent's litigation capacity.

The applicant, a co-ownership corporation, seeks an order to sell the respondent's interest due to a history of non-compliance, damage awards, and outstanding costs.

The respondent, self-represented, has a documented history of psychiatric conditions.

The court previously ordered a capacity assessment, which faced delays due to the respondent's inability to pay and conflicting information regarding consent and physician availability.

The court ordered an independent capacity assessment, to be paid for by the applicant, with a structured process for assessor selection and medical record release, emphasizing that the assessment is solely for litigation capacity and confidentiality of medical records.

The plaintiff, Ahmad Mohammad, commenced an action against Mohamed Bakr.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered dismissing the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After reviewing the plaintiff's submissions, the court dismissed the action, finding that some allegations were protected by absolute privilege, the claim was rambling and difficult to understand, much of the relief sought was unavailable in a civil action, and the pleading contained rhetorical questions, all hallmarks of a frivolous and vexatious proceeding.

The action also overlapped significantly with a previously dismissed action by the same plaintiff.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the "faint hope" provision (s. 745.6 Criminal Code).

The application required a preliminary judicial screening to determine if it had a "reasonable prospect of success" before a jury could be empanelled.

The applicant also brought a Charter application to quash his conviction, which the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting it was an attempt to relitigate a previously exhausted appeal.

The court found that the applicant fundamentally misunderstood the purpose of the faint hope application, focusing on re-litigating his conviction rather than demonstrating transformative changes in his character or conduct in custody.

Given his lack of responsibility for the offence, history of violence in custody, antisocial personality traits, and lack of future plans, the court concluded there was no reasonable prospect that a jury would unanimously agree to truncate his parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed, with a directive that no new application could be brought for five years.

The accused, facing charges of assault and sexual assault, brought a motion for a Rowbotham order, seeking state-funded counsel.

The court found that Legal Aid had refused his application and that he lacked the financial means to retain counsel, despite earning too much to qualify for Legal Aid.

Crucially, the court determined that representation by counsel was essential for the accused to receive a fair trial, given his limited education, lack of litigation experience, and poor oral communication skills, which would hinder his ability to make full answer and defence in an eight-day jury trial.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings unless the Ministry of the Attorney General arranged for counsel.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action by the minor plaintiffs due to the litigation guardian's failure to appoint new counsel, as required by a previous court order and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The litigation guardian, who was self-represented for his personal claim, had not retained a lawyer for the minor plaintiffs despite over a year passing since the previous lawyers were removed from the record.

The court found insufficient evidence of diligent efforts to find counsel and emphasized the mandatory requirement for a litigation guardian to be represented by a lawyer.

The motion was granted, dismissing the minor plaintiffs' claims.

The Applicant father's motion for contempt was adjourned.

At the outset of the contempt motion, the Respondent mother brought motions for recusal and to vacate eleven prior orders.

The court heard the recusal motion, with reasons to follow separately.

The motion to vacate was granted leave in part, specifically to vacate certain orders but not to strike the Applicant's Application, and was adjourned for the Respondent to prepare a Factum.

The Applicant's contempt motion was also adjourned.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that one plaintiff, Dr. Basmadji, was subject to a vexatious litigant order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and had not obtained leave to institute the action.

The court also inferred that Dr. Basmadji, who is not a lawyer, improperly instituted the action on behalf of both plaintiffs, including Mr. Chevalier, who may be a party under disability.

Consequently, the action was stayed under Rule 2.1.03(1).

The stay was without prejudice to Mr. Chevalier's right to commence a further proceeding, provided he complies with rules regarding representation and disability.

No costs were awarded.

Plaintiff's counsel, Naimark Law Firm, brought a motion to be removed from the record and for a charging order in two related actions.

The plaintiff, Syed Hussaini, resisted the motion and sought an adjournment to file affidavit evidence.

The court found that the solicitor-client relationship had broken down and that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to file responding materials, noting a history of delay tactics.

The motion for removal and a charging order was granted, and costs were awarded to Naimark Law Firm.

The respondent mother sought an order for costs against the applicant father for breaching a prior court order that mandated all communications between the parties be through counsel or a third party, limited to child-related issues, brief, informative, courteous, and free of derogatory comments.

The applicant sent numerous emails and text messages directly to the respondent and her counsel that were derogatory, offensive, and threatening.

The court found the applicant in clear breach of the communication terms, rejected his claims of frustration and misunderstanding, and awarded costs of $5,000 for the breach and $500 for the motion to the respondent.

The Applicant brought a motion seeking temporary child support, partition and sale of the matrimonial home, and disclosure.

The court had previously ordered the sale of the home.

This endorsement addresses the remaining issues: temporary child support, disposition of sale proceeds, and disclosure.

The court imputed an income of $50,000 per year to the Respondent for child support purposes, ordered retroactive child support to be paid from the Respondent's share of the home sale proceeds, and ordered a portion of the proceeds to be held in trust as security.

The Respondent was also ordered to provide extensive financial disclosure.

The court dismissed the Respondent's unpleaded claims for damages and spousal support.