Child protection

This is a temporary care hearing under section 94 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to determine placement of a nine-year-old child during adjournment of a child protection application.

The central issue is the effect of a Kinship Services Agreement (KSA) entered into between the mother, maternal grandparents, and the Society in May 2019, which placed the child with the grandparents due to the mother's substance misuse.

The father, who had access rights only under a 2013 custody order, was not notified of the KSA.

The court determined that the KSA was a voluntary safety plan, not a statutory intervention under Part V, and therefore did not crystallize intervention until the protection application was commenced.

The court found the grandparents had charge of the child at the time of formal intervention and ordered the child remain in their temporary care.

In a temporary care hearing under the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined whether three children should remain in the care of the Society or be returned to their mother's care.

The central issue was whether the mother had sole charge of the two younger children prior to intervention, or whether charge was shared with the father.

The court found that the mother's poor judgment in exposing the children to a serious drug trafficking situation, combined with her lack of cooperation with the Society's investigation and her provision of false information, established a reasonable basis to believe the children would suffer harm if returned to her care.

A supervision order was found inadequate to mitigate the risks.

The court ordered the oldest child to remain in the Society's care with the maternal grandmother as kin-in-care placement, and the two younger children to remain with their father subject to supervision.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The respondent mother and father sought costs of $5,819.50 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society following a motion for disclosure of case notes from a meeting between society counsel, society staff, and doctors from the Hospital for Sick Children.

The society initially claimed litigation privilege over the notes but waived privilege prior to the hearing, rendering the motion moot.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding that the society acted reasonably in claiming privilege, provided appropriate disclosure to the parents through a subsequent meeting with medical personnel, and that the parents' counsel became unnecessarily fixated on the privileged meeting and engaged in inappropriate conduct toward society counsel.

A motion by the respondent father (VF) to split a child protection status review application into two separate cases was dismissed.

The application involved three children with two different fathers and a common mother.

VF sought to separate the case involving his child from the case involving the other father's children, citing privacy concerns regarding his criminal history involving child pornography convictions.

The court found that splitting the cases would not result in fairness to all parties, would not protect the interests of all children, and would not save time and expense.

The central issue of VF's criminal convictions, rehabilitation, and ongoing risk to all children required unified proceedings.

A child protection matter under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary child protection order placing an infant in their care with discretionary access to the parents.

The mother sought return of the child to her care under CAS supervision.

The court found that while CAS intervention was justified at the time of removal due to evidence of parental substance abuse, neglect, and unsafe sleeping arrangements, the mother's plan to reside at a women's shelter with CAS supervision was sufficient to mitigate risk.

The court ordered the child returned to the mother's care subject to CAS supervision and specific conditions regarding substance abstinence, random testing, counselling, and residence requirements.

A child protection society brought a motion to place four children in the care of their paternal grandparents, subject to society supervision.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children to her custody.

The court found that the mother had proactively addressed the addiction issues that originally prompted the society's intervention, had completed treatment, and was meaningfully engaged in ongoing services.

The court determined that the protection concerns could be adequately mitigated through a supervision order and that returning the children to the mother's care was consistent with Anishinaabe cultural traditions and the remedial purposes of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The court ordered the children placed in the mother's custody subject to supervision and specific conditions.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning three children.

The Children's Aid Society sought placement of the children with their father, citing protection concerns related to the mother's partner's history of sexual offences against children and the mother's failure to protect the children from this risk.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children to her care.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm and that they could not be adequately protected through supervision orders while in the mother's care.

The court ordered temporary placement with the father, subject to Society supervision, with supervised access to the mother.

The respondent father sought graduated supervised access to his infant child, to be supervised by his mother.

The applicant mother opposed the request and sought temporary custody with supervised access at a designated access centre.

The court found that supervised access was appropriate given the ongoing child protection investigation, the father's admitted substance abuse, and the child's very young age.

However, the court rejected the applicant's request for access to be restricted to a supervised access centre, finding that supervised access at the paternal grandmother's home was in the child's best interests.

The court also dismissed the applicant's motion for temporary custody, finding insufficient evidence to warrant such a restrictive order.

A motion brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking a temporary order placing a 13-year-old child in the society's care pending final adjudication of a Status Review Application.

The child had been returned to the care of her father and step-mother in January 2020 following a protection application.

The society alleged deterioration in the child's circumstances, including concerning behaviours, lack of parental engagement in services, and risk of emotional harm.

The father and step-mother opposed the motion, arguing they were engaged in appropriate services and the child wished to remain in their care.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer also opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding no change in circumstances requiring a temporary change in placement.

A mother sought a motion for the return of her infant son to her care or to the paternal grandparents' care following the Children's Aid Society's temporary suspension of all supervised access and parenting support programs due to COVID-19.

The court dismissed the motion seeking return to parental care and the alternative claim for residence with paternal grandparents, finding insufficient evidence and lack of cooperation with court directions.

The court upheld the Society's temporary suspension of face-to-face access as justified by public health concerns, while acknowledging the importance of physical contact between mother and child under normal circumstances.

This is a temporary care and custody motion under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 regarding a seven-year-old child.

The society sought placement of the child with the father, subject to supervision, after issuing a protection application concerning the mother's mental health and ability to manage the child's behaviour.

The mother opposed placement with the father and sought to retain custody with supervision terms.

The father consented to placement with himself and proposed limited day access for the mother.

The court found that the society met its two-part test: establishing reasonable grounds that the child would likely suffer harm if returned to the mother, and that supervision terms alone were inadequate to protect the child.

The court placed the child in the temporary care of the father on a without prejudice basis, pending further investigation into concerns about the father's domestic violence history.

The court implemented a graduated access schedule for the mother, increasing from day visits to overnight visits as she stabilizes her mental health.

The applicant mother sought temporary sole custody of two young children with the respondent father restricted to supervised access.

The respondent father sought temporary sole custody with the mother's access limited to daytime visits at the paternal grandfather's home.

The court found that the children had resided primarily with the mother since the parties' separation in April 2017 under an informal arrangement.

The father unilaterally retained the children on March 22, 2020, without the mother's consent.

The court held that this unilateral action did not constitute a valid status quo and that the evidence of neglect and safety concerns raised by the father was not sufficiently compelling to justify a drastic change to the established arrangement.

The court ordered that the children remain primarily resident with the mother with frequent and regular access to the father, including three weekends per month and weekly mid-week overnight visits.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 116(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to vary a December 10, 2018 order placing a 12-year-old child in the mother's care.

The society sought to place the child in its temporary care and custody.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to retain custody or alternatively place the child with her sister (the maternal aunt).

The court found that the mother had breached substantially all terms of the supervision order, including failing to maintain stable housing, refusing to sign consents for the society to communicate with medical professionals, and failing to cooperate with the society.

The court determined that the child's best interests required removal from the mother's care and granted the society's motion for temporary custody with access in the society's discretion.

The society was directed to investigate a kinship placement with the maternal aunt.

The Children's Aid Society brought a 14B motion seeking to suspend all in-person access between the mother and child due to COVID-19 pandemic concerns.

The child, aged 18 months, was in the temporary care of the father subject to society supervision, with specified access to the mother.

Both parents opposed the motion, arguing that access is not a procedural matter suitable for 14B determination and that they were adhering to COVID-19 directives.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that a blanket policy suspending access without specific evidence of non-compliance with COVID-19 protocols was inconsistent with a comprehensive analysis of the child's best interests.

This is a costs decision in a child protection case concerning a motion by the mother for expanded access to two children.

The mother was substantially successful in obtaining a court-ordered schedule for expanded and unsupervised access, though the order included provisos allowing the Children's Aid Society to suspend access if safety concerns arose.

The mother sought costs on a full recovery basis against both the Society and the father.

The court declined to award costs against either party, applying the established principles that child protection cases are exceptions to the presumptive entitlement to costs, and that neither the Society nor parents should be penalized for acting in good faith within the statutory framework.

A foster-to-adopt mother sought party status in child protection proceedings concerning a child placed in her care at seven months of age.

The child's biological parents' rights had been terminated, and the child protection society initially supported the foster-to-adopt mother's adoption plan but later changed course to support the paternal aunt's adoption plan.

The motion judge granted the foster-to-adopt mother party status.

The Divisional Court reversed, holding that foster parents should only be added as parties in exceptional circumstances and that the foster-to-adopt mother's existing participatory rights under the legislation were sufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reinstating the motion judge's order granting party status, finding that the paramount consideration of the child's best interests supported the foster-to-adopt mother's involvement as a party.

A mother sought costs against a Children's Aid Society following the withdrawal of a child protection application.

The Society had commenced proceedings seeking supervision of the child, who had Crohn's disease, after the mother sought alternative naturopathic treatment and refused to cooperate with the Society's investigation.

The court dismissed the costs motion, finding that while the mother was a strong advocate for her child, the Society acted reasonably in investigating concerns raised by medical professionals and in seeking a minimally intrusive court order to compel cooperation.

The Society reassessed its position once information was provided and withdrew the application at the third court appearance.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a final order of crown wardship without access for the purposes of adoption of a child born in 2013 to parents with significant histories of drug addiction.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there was a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court found that while the parents had struggled with addiction and the mother had only recently made progress in treatment and recovery, the question of whether the mother had genuinely turned the corner on her addiction was a material fact requiring further evidence.

The court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a mini-trial under the amended Rule 16 to determine whether there was a genuine issue requiring a full trial.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking permission for three children in its care to travel to Jamaica for an extended access visit with their paternal grandmother, with the intention of assessing the viability of a permanent placement arrangement.

The mother supported the motion, but the Office of the Children's Lawyer (representing the oldest child), the biological father of the oldest child, and the maternal grandmother opposed it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed Jamaica plan was not in the best interests of the children.

The court identified numerous obstacles, including concerns about the father's involvement and his relationship with the mother (whom the society deemed unsuitable), the grandmother's limited financial resources and passive demeanor, the absence of meaningful relationships between the children and the proposed caregivers, and significant jurisdictional and enforcement complications arising from placing the children in a foreign country.

This is a motion for summary judgment in a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act.

Native Child and Family Services of Toronto sought an order making two young children (ages 5 and 3) crown wards without access for purposes of adoption.

The mother, who had previously lost four other children to the child protection system, opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The father, with a significant criminal history and mental health issues, also opposed the motion.

The court found that the parents' plan for care was not viable and did not raise a genuine issue for trial.

The court granted summary judgment and made orders for crown wardship without access to either parent, finding that the children required certainty, finality, and permanence.