Kenneth Pedlar

The plaintiff, Pryers Construction Ltd., sought to enforce a construction lien for $34,601.66 against MVMB Holdings Inc., Scott Birnie, and Riverside Ford Sales Limited for renovation work.

Key issues included the applicability of the old Construction Lien Act versus the new Construction Act, the addition of Riverside as a party despite the Limitations Act, and the personal liability of Scott Birnie.

The court found the old Construction Lien Act applied, allowed the addition of Riverside as a party under the doctrine of special circumstances, and determined that both corporate defendants were "owners" under the Act.

However, the court declined to pierce the corporate veil to hold Scott Birnie personally liable.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff against the corporate defendants for the claimed amount.

The Estate of Lois Jean Davey, administered by Geoffrey Craig, brought an application seeking a declaration of beneficial interest in a property owned by Geoffrey and Isabel Craig (his separated wife) based on a constructive trust, related to an in-law suite built by the deceased.

Isabel Craig sought dismissal under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the application frivolous and vexatious, dismissing it because the deceased's will explicitly stated the addition became Geoffrey's sole property and the estate had no claim.

The court held that the application was an improper attempt to bring a matrimonial claim in a different forum and was estopped by the clear terms of the will.

M.B. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed his incapacity to manage property.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in law by misconstruing the purpose of cross-examination of an expert witness and by failing to properly evaluate the evidence against the presumption of capacity.

The court found that the Board considered all evidence holistically, including the extensive cross-examination, and did not err in its assessment.

The Board's finding of incapacity was upheld, based on M.B.'s history of poor financial decisions and persistent delusional beliefs that prevented him from understanding relevant financial information or appreciating the foreseeable consequences of his decisions.

The plaintiffs (Blairs) brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include claims of negligent misrepresentation and bad faith with resultant punitive damages against The Standard Insurance Brokers Ltd. (Standard).

Standard cross-motioned for summary judgment.

The court focused on the motion to amend, considering whether the amendments constituted new causes of action, if they were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, and if they would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court found that it was not plain and obvious that the claims for negligent misrepresentation and bad faith could not succeed at trial, and that the discoverability principle applied, meaning the limitation period did not begin until the expert report was received.

The court granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim.

The defendant, The Standard Insurance Brokers Ltd. (Standard), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' (Blairs') claim.

The Blairs had previously been granted leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages.

The court dismissed Standard's summary judgment motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including significant credibility issues between the Blairs and a co-defendant, and the need for further expert evidence.

The court emphasized that a fair and just adjudication could not be achieved through summary judgment in this case, and awarded costs to the Blairs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a dental malpractice action.

The primary issues were the admissibility of a treating cardiologist's opinion on causation without strict compliance with Rule 53.03 and whether conflicting expert opinions could be resolved at the summary judgment stage.

The court, applying the principles from Westerhof v. Gee Estate, determined that the treating cardiologist was a "participant expert" whose opinion was admissible.

Given the presence of conflicting medical expert opinions on causation and questions surrounding the defendant's missing dental records, the court found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Consequently, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The applicants sought a declaration of substantial interference with their right-of-way for boat launching over the respondents' land, due to the respondents' construction of a dock and placement of boats.

The court applied the test of substantial interference, considering whether the right-of-way could be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently as before.

The application was dismissed as the applicants failed to establish substantial interference, retaining approximately half of the waterfront for boat launching.

The court also commented on the importance of community relationships in neighbourhood disputes.

This application concerned the respondent's claims for an interest in two properties registered solely in the applicant's name, a division of RRSP assets, and spousal support, alongside the applicant's counter-claims for occupancy rent and specific household items.

The court found no evidence of a joint family venture, largely due to the parties' segregation of assets and financial responsibilities.

The respondent's claims for property interest, RRSPs, and spousal support were dismissed, with the court noting his lack of credible evidence, failure to disclose income, and "unclean hands" in attempting to shelter assets from child support obligations.

The applicant was awarded a net monetary sum for occupancy rent and personal property.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child and spousal support, an advance on equalization, and disclosure.

The court imputed additional income to the respondent under sections 18 and 19 of the Child Support Guidelines, finding that his employer paid personal expenses and that he had access to dividend income from a holding company despite an alleged estate freeze.

The court set the respondent's income at $180,000 and ordered interim child support, spousal support, and a $30,000 advance on equalization to allow the applicant to fund the litigation.

The defendants brought a motion under rule 21.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking determination of questions of law before trial.

They argued that the plaintiff farmer’s action for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision was barred under s. 267.6(1) of the Insurance Act because he operated an uninsured all‑terrain vehicle (ATV) on a public road, and that his claim for statutory accident benefits was barred by s. 30(1)(a) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court held that the ATV, used exclusively in farming operations, qualified as a “self‑propelled implement of husbandry” under the Highway Traffic Act.

As such, it was excluded from the definition of motor vehicle and from Ontario’s compulsory automobile insurance regime.

The plaintiff was therefore not barred from suing the negligent driver and his claim for statutory accident benefits was not foreclosed.

The applicant brought a motion to change a prior consent order seeking sole custody of one child and adjustments to child support obligations.

The central dispute concerned the respondent’s income, as he reported minimal earnings while maintaining a lifestyle suggesting significant financial resources and receiving substantial financial support from a family trust and alleged loans from his mother.

The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed within the meaning of s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines due to his voluntary decision to pursue missionary work despite having greater earning capacity.

Income was imputed based on past earning capacity and financial benefits received from family support.

The court attributed an income of $60,000 annually for child support purposes and ordered equal sharing of future section 7 expenses with proper documentation.