Karey Anne Dhirani

The owner, 2247129 Ontario Inc., brought a motion to declare the construction lien of Clarkway Construction Ltd. expired.

The central issue was whether a subcontractor's lien rights could extend beyond the date the general contractor's contract with the owner ended by abandonment or termination.

The court found that the subcontractor's lien rights did not extend beyond the termination date of the general contract (February 9, 2016, at the latest).

The subcontractor, Clarkway, had a responsibility to stay informed about the project's status.

Since Clarkway registered its lien on April 15, 2016, more than 45 days after the general contract's termination, the lien was declared expired.

Costs were awarded to the owner.

The appellant, a plumbing subcontractor, registered general liens against two home development projects after the general contractor went bankrupt.

The general contractor's contracts with the owners stipulated that liens would arise and expire on a lot-by-lot basis.

The motion judge and Divisional Court discharged the general liens, holding that section 20(2) of the Construction Lien Act precludes a subcontractor from claiming a general lien when the main contract contains a lot-by-lot restriction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this interpretation, finding that a subcontractor's right to a general lien flows from the main contract.

The Court also declined to apply the curative provisions of section 6 or treat the liens as excessive under section 35.

The appellant appealed a Master's order denying leave to amend its statement of claim to add its former solicitors as defendants in a breach of trust action.

The appellant alleged the solicitors negligently failed to properly register a construction lien.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by relying on compensable prejudice (delay and expense) to deny the amendment under Rules 26.01 and 5.04(2), and made a palpable and overriding error of fact by concluding the negligence claim was contingent on the outcome of the breach of trust action.

Leave to add the solicitors as defendants was granted.

The owner of a residential subdivision development brought a motion under s. 44(2) of the Construction Lien Act to vacate multiple construction liens upon posting security.

The project contractor had abandoned the project and later became bankrupt, leaving several subcontractor lien claims totaling approximately $2.9 million.

The court held that the owner’s exposure to subcontractor liens could not exceed the amount potentially owed to the contractor under the contract.

After resolving a dispute regarding corrected payment certificates issued by the project consultant, the court determined the correct unpaid certified amount and fixed the security required to vacate the liens accordingly.

The court also determined that security for costs should be calculated based on the owner’s potential contractual exposure rather than the aggregate value of all lien claims.

Following the dismissal of two appeals heard together, the successful respondents sought costs.

One respondent sought substantial indemnity costs based on a Rule 49 offer to settle, while the other sought partial indemnity costs.

The appellant argued that no costs should be awarded because the appeal raised a novel issue of law regarding the interpretation of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court rejected the appellant's argument, finding the issue was not novel and the appellant's interpretation would have rendered section 20(2) of the Act meaningless.

The court awarded costs of $7,500 to each of the successful respondents.

The appellant, a plumbing subcontractor, registered a general lien against all lots in two subdivisions after the general contractor made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The owners had written contracts with the general contractor specifying that liens would arise and expire on a lot-by-lot basis.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's decision to discharge the general liens, finding that section 20(2) of the Construction Lien Act extinguishes general lien rights for both contractors and subcontractors when the primary contract contains a lot-by-lot provision.

The court also dismissed the appellant's attempt to continue the action for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, and refused leave to appeal costs.

Following a successful summary judgment dismissing an action concerning enforcement of an alleged agreement of purchase and sale for vacant land, the court determined costs.

The defendants sought full indemnity or alternatively substantial indemnity costs, relying partly on an earlier offer to settle.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted absent misconduct or other exceptional circumstances, and declined to apply Rule 49 consequences where the plaintiffs recovered no judgment.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis and reduced the defendants’ claimed fees after reviewing the hours spent.

Total costs were awarded against the plaintiffs.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's conclusion that no binding agreement had been formed following negotiations, an offer, and a time-limited counter-offer.

The court held that the counter-offer expired by its own terms and was not accepted within the specified time.

Because there was no communication of acceptance before expiry, there was no meeting of the minds.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

Competing motions for summary judgment arose from a failed real estate transaction involving a vacant residential lot.

The purchasers claimed the parties had reached a binding agreement of purchase and sale and sought specific performance and damages.

The vendors argued their counter‑offer contained an express irrevocability deadline and was never accepted before expiry.

The court applied basic contract principles of offer and acceptance, holding that the vendors’ amended document constituted a counter‑offer that lapsed when the purchasers failed to communicate acceptance within the stated time.

As no meeting of the minds occurred, no enforceable agreement existed and the purchasers’ action was dismissed.

Following a construction lien trial involving landscaping services, the successful plaintiff sought costs exceeding $100,000 based largely on an offer to settle that it had bettered at trial.

The court considered Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality governing costs awards.

Although the plaintiff obtained judgment and had made a favourable settlement offer, the court found the claimed hours and total costs excessive relative to the amount recovered.

Taking into account the defendant’s unsuccessful counterclaim and litigation conduct but emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed costs at a reduced amount.

A contractor brought a construction lien action seeking payment for landscaping work performed at a residential property.

The property owner argued the parties had agreed to a fixed lump‑sum contract and counterclaimed for the cost of correcting deficiencies and completing the work.

The court found no lump‑sum contract existed and instead concluded the arrangement was an open‑ended design‑build project where costs increased as the owner selected upgraded materials and features.

After reviewing a Scott Schedule and evidence of work performed, the court determined the contractor was entitled to payment for completed work subject to deductions for deficiencies.

Judgment was granted enforcing the construction lien for the net amount owed after deducting remediation costs.

The appellant moved to amend its statement of claim after the expiry of the limitation period to add its parent corporation as a plaintiff, arguing misnomer.

The Master and Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it was an attempt to add a new party rather than correct a misnomer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming it was not a misnomer and reaffirming that the special circumstances doctrine did not survive the enactment of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a 'Covenant and Postponement of Claim' valid and enforceable against it.

The appellant argued it was a guarantor, not a principal debtor, and was released from liability due to a failure to receive a demand notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific language of the Covenant precluded the appellant from relying on the lack of notice, and that the appellant had ratified the events that might have otherwise entitled it to release.

The appellant operated an adult entertainment parlour.

The City of Hamilton revoked the appellant's licence for failing to actively carry on business within a reasonable time.

The appellant sought judicial review, arguing a denial of procedural fairness because the City failed to provide proper disclosure of the grounds for revocation as required by its own by-law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the City's failure to provide proper notice and disclosure tainted the hearing from the outset and denied the appellant its right to a fair hearing.

The revocation was quashed and the licence reinstated.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Hamilton to revoke their adult entertainment parlour licence.

The municipality had passed a by-law to reduce the number of such parlours, allowing revocation if a business was not actively carried on within a reasonable time.

The applicants had not opened for business because they were waiting for a liquor licence, which was delayed due to unpaid retail sales tax from another business.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no procedural unfairness, bias, or bad faith.

The court held that the municipality's finding that the business had not opened within a reasonable time was not patently unreasonable, as the delay in obtaining a liquor licence was not the municipality's responsibility.

The appellant purchaser entered into an agreement to buy a parcel of land from the respondent vendor.

The vendor's predecessor in title had obtained a consent to sever abutting lands, conveyed the severed lands to herself, and subsequently conveyed the remaining lands to the vendor.

The purchaser requisitioned the title, arguing the conveyance to the vendor violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act because the predecessor still owned the abutting lands at the time of the conveyance.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the exception in s. 50(6) of the Planning Act only applies if the remaining part is conveyed before the consented part.

Since the consented part was conveyed first, the exception did not apply, and the conveyance to the vendor violated the Act.