Julia Monique Forward

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court, acting as gatekeeper, reviewed the qualifications and reports of seven proposed expert witnesses.

While the defence conceded the admissibility of most experts, the court ruled on the scope of their evidence.

The court accepted experts in DNA analysis, photogrammetry, gunshot residue, and firearms examination.

However, the court expressed concerns regarding the clarity of reports and the current qualifications of two experts in phone analysis and phone functionality, requiring further clarification or a voir dire before their evidence could be admitted.

The accused was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting his neighbour, a 34-year-old woman with the cognitive capacity of a 5 to 9-year-old.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence proposed 3 to 5 years.

The court found the accused exploited a trust-like relationship and caused profound, life-altering harm to the vulnerable victim.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the accused to 6 years' imprisonment.

K.J. was found guilty of sexual assault against J.C., a 34-year-old woman with the functional capacity of a 5-9 year old.

The sentencing hearing addressed disputed facts, including the extent of sexual misconduct and a history of abuse, which the court found not proven beyond a reasonable doubt except for one incident.

The court considered aggravating factors such as K.J.'s prior sexual misconduct convictions, J.C.'s vulnerability, a trust-like relationship, and the severe impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors were few.

The court applied sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, imposing a sentence of 6 years imprisonment along with ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts of break and enter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions on counts one and four, finding it was open to the trial judge to apply the doctrine of recent possession given the unique combination of stolen items (a marked two-dollar bill and 88-cent stamps) found on the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on counts two and three, setting aside the convictions and entering acquittals, as there was no evidence linking the appellant to those specific break-ins other than proximity, and there was exculpatory evidence regarding the intruder's shoes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable after the trial judge excluded his admission of being the driver under section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the sentence of 60 days imprisonment, two years probation, and a four-year driving prohibition as demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The conviction was supported by in-dock identification and circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's obvious impairment at the scene.

While the 60-day sentence was a marked departure from the usual range, the Court deferred to the trial judge, finding the leniency was offset by the probation order and the lengthy driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.D. principles and adequately explain the reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and had ample evidence to convict.

The Crown appealed the sentence, and while the Court agreed the sentence constituted an error in principle, it declined to set it aside as the sentence had already been fully served.

Both the appeal and cross-appeals were dismissed.