Judy G. Hamilton

The applicant corporation sought an injunction to prevent approval of contracts related to a proposed light rail transit project in the Region of Waterloo.

The court found the applicant lacked standing, noting it was recently incorporated, had unknown ownership, and possessed no apparent assets or ratepayer status.

The court further held the principal failed to disclose a personal interest arising from expropriation of his property connected to the project, undermining the equitable basis for relief.

The applicant failed to provide an undertaking for damages, did not establish a strong prima facie case under the Planning Act, and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or a balance of convenience favouring relief.

The application for an injunction was dismissed with costs.

The defendant, APP Capital Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of an employment contract and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, the former CFO of the co-defendant corporation, claimed entitlement to compensation under a 2008 employment agreement following the sale of the corporation.

The court applied the framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding whether the moving party was bound by the 2008 agreement.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers due to incomplete documentary discovery and the potential for inconsistent verdicts, dismissing the motion.

A bank mistakenly wired duplicate funds to a recipient’s account and sought summary judgment to recover the second payment.

The respondent argued he merely acted as a trustee for another party and had already disbursed the funds without knowledge of the bank’s error, relying on the defence of change of position in unjust enrichment.

The court held that recovery of mistaken payments is permitted where the recipient is enriched without juristic reason and rejected the change of position defence because the respondent knew or ought to have known of the error.

The evidence showed rapid withdrawals, refusal to authorize repayment, and inability to explain expenditures.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment for repayment of the mistaken funds.

The plaintiffs brought an action seeking a declaration that their mortgage debt to the defendants had been fully paid through a 'savings' agreement whereby the plaintiff worked off the debt on construction projects.

The defendant mortgagee counterclaimed for enforcement of the mortgages and a writ of possession.

The court found that the purported 'savings' agreement was a forgery and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim.

The court granted judgment to the defendant on the mortgages and authorized a writ of possession, but postponed its execution pending the outcome of a related proceeding concerning a recent power of sale transaction.

The applicants brought an application seeking declaratory relief requiring the respondent to contribute 50% of the carrying costs for a residential subdivision mortgage, relying on doctrines of unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and subrogation.

The respondent argued that the contractual agreements limited its investment and contained a mandatory arbitration clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the contractual terms provided a juristic reason for any alleged enrichment and explicitly ousted the court's jurisdiction in favour of arbitration.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant employer appealed a jury award of $468,969.18, including $300,000 in general damages, for sexual assaults committed against the respondent employee.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether other traumatic events in the respondent's life materially contributed to her psychological injuries under the 'crumbling skull' or successive tortious events principles.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in relying on the material contribution test for causation, which led to her failure to leave these questions with the jury.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, concluding the error did not cause a substantial wrong because the evidence that other incidents contributed to the damages was too weak to warrant jury consideration.

The general damages award, while high, was not plainly unreasonable.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing that the motion judge exceeded her authority under the former Rule 20 by making findings of fact and credibility determinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that motion judges had a limited power to make such findings when determining whether there was a genuine issue for trial.

The court awarded costs of $15,000 to the respondents.