F.L. Myers

Following a successful application maintaining the forfeiture of a $100,000 deposit, the applicant sought costs.

The applicant had made a Rule 49 offer to settle for $95,000 plus partial indemnity costs.

Because the applicant obtained a more favourable judgment, the court applied Rule 49.10(1) and awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed at $19,500 all-inclusive.

The appellant Fund appealed an Arbitrator's decision finding that a taxi company's SPF 6 insurance policy was not a 'motor vehicle liability policy' under the Insurance Act, and therefore did not include Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs).

The court found that while the Arbitrator erred in law by concluding that a corporation is not a 'person' under the Act, the Arbitrator made no palpable and overriding error in determining that the taxis were not driven by employees, agents, or on behalf of the taxi company.

The court upheld the finding that an SPF 6 commercial general liability endorsement is not a motor vehicle liability policy intended to carry SABs.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant Province moved to assign three related actions to case management under Rule 77, arguing that the self-represented plaintiff's conduct had delayed the proceedings and thwarted efforts to schedule summary judgment and strike motions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were not complex and the tension between the defendant seeking summary resolution and the plaintiff seeking discovery was standard fare for Civil Practice Court.

The court noted that case management resources should be conserved for cases that truly require it.

The applicant vendor sought an order that the respondent purchaser forfeited her $100,000 deposit after failing to close a real estate transaction.

The purchaser argued for relief from forfeiture, claiming the vendor would receive an unconscionable windfall because he resold the property for $115,000 more than the original purchase price.

The court applied the two-part test for relief from forfeiture and found that the 7% deposit was not disproportionate to the purchase price, nor was the forfeiture unconscionable.

The court ordered the deposit released to the vendor.

The applicants and a related party obtained orders enforcing letters of request from a Florida court to compel the respondent to produce documents from electronic devices held by an independent third party (PWC).

The US court ordered the respondent to produce non-privileged documents, but on the deadline, his US counsel moved to withdraw, and the respondent unilaterally instructed PWC to revoke his US counsel's access to the database.

The court directed PWC to restore the US counsel's access, finding that the respondent could not unilaterally frustrate the discovery process by firing his lawyer.

In a case management endorsement, the court stayed most of the plaintiff's claims for delayed generic drug market entry pending the appeal of a related decision, except for a claim under section 8 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

The court also lifted a prior consent bifurcation order, directing that the trial of the section 8 claim proceed on both liability and damages to prevent technical delays and ensure the efficient resolution of the ten-year-old case.

Following a successful application by the condominium corporation for oppression and compliance orders, the applicant sought $155,000 in full indemnity costs.

The respondent unit owner's extreme demands for disability accommodation and unreasonable litigation conduct significantly increased the costs of the proceeding.

The court found that while the respondent's conduct was egregious, an elevated scale of costs was not warranted as the applicant did not beat its settlement offers.

The court awarded $75,000 in partial indemnity costs, noting the applicant's right to recover further costs under section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

In a supplementary costs endorsement, the court reviewed the respondents' late-filed Costs Outlines.

The respondents argued that their costs were substantially lower than the applicant's, pointing to differences in the number of counsel billing and hourly rates.

The court found the applicant's counsel's higher hourly rate to be within the reasonable market range and noted that the respondents' outline omitted time spent by another lawyer on the file.

The court concluded that the new information did not alter its prior finding that the applicant's costs were reasonable.

Following the granting of interlocutory injunctions against the respondents, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the respondents engaged in deliberate and high-handed conduct by attempting to unilaterally terminate commercial leases and evict the applicant without legal basis, aiming to frustrate the court proceedings.

The court exercised its discretion to award costs immediately rather than reserving them to the trial judge, fixing costs at $58,000 and $45,000 payable forthwith on a substantial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs commenced a third separate action in Toronto against neonatal care professionals and a hospital for injuries sustained by a newborn, having already commenced two actions in Brampton for the same injuries arising from a car accident and birthing care.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Toronto action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs should have sought leave to add them to the existing Brampton actions.

The court agreed, finding the separate action was a tactical maneuver to avoid the leave requirement and potential limitation period defences.

The court stayed the Toronto action pending a motion to amend in Brampton, while strongly criticizing the parties for engaging in costly and delaying procedural disputes contrary to the culture shift mandated by Hryniak.

The plaintiffs brought a contempt motion against the self-represented defendant for allegedly violating a permanent injunction prohibiting defamatory statements.

At a case conference, the defendant requested an adjournment to retain counsel and apply for legal aid.

The court explained the serious nature of the contempt proceedings, including the potential for a jail term, and adjourned the case conference to allow the defendant time to secure legal representation.

The appellant appealed a property standards order requiring him to remove hoarded items, waste, and debris from his front porch.

The appellant, who lives on his porch year-round, argued the City was harassing him and that his collected items were not garbage.

The Superior Court of Justice found the items violated the municipal by-law and created an unsafe and unsanitary hazard.

The court upheld the order but modified it to specify that only one small welcome mat, one chair, and one side table fabricated for outdoor use could remain on the porch.

The applicant sought to quash a resolution adopted by the City of Toronto directing negotiations for a Voluntary Recognition Agreement with a specific union.

The applicant argued the resolution was discriminatory and created an unlawful monopoly.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the City has the authority under the City of Toronto Act, 2006 to manage its labour relations and pass bylaws respecting its construction projects.

The court noted that the validity of any resulting agreement would be a matter for the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The defendant moved for a third adjournment of a five-year-old civil trial, citing the childcare responsibilities of counsel during the third wave COVID-19 lockdown.

The plaintiff opposed further delay, noting the defendant had also served a late expert report during the interregnum.

The court granted a short adjournment to June 2021 to accommodate counsel's family responsibilities, making the new date peremptory to the defendant, but declined to delay the trial until September to accommodate counsel's competing arbitration commitments.

Parkland Corporation sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent SRAA Inc. and 1064110 Ontario Ltd. from unilaterally terminating their gas station leases and subleases to re-lease the properties to a competitor selling Esso brand fuel.

The respondents argued the agreements were essentially fuel supply contracts and that they were operating at a loss.

The court found that the respondents deliberately breached their contracts and that Parkland would suffer irreparable harm from the loss of control over the sites.

The court granted the interlocutory injunctions, enforcing the leases and the negative covenants in the subleases pending a final determination.

The plaintiffs sought to schedule an urgent motion for an interlocutory injunction to compel the closure of schools to in-person learning in York Region due to COVID-19, prior to commencing a formal proceeding.

Several unions and school boards sought to intervene.

The court scheduled the injunction motion conditionally, requiring the plaintiffs to formally commence an action or application first.

The court declined to schedule the intervention motions on an urgent basis, finding it would be unfair to the responding parties given the tight timeline.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order restricting a unit owner from harassing the board, contractors, and other residents, and compelling him to allow access to his unit for repairs.

The respondent, who suffers from severe disabilities, requested an adjournment to file evidence and argued his actions were requests for accommodation.

The court denied the adjournment, finding it would cause undue hardship to the applicant.

As the respondent had moved out and agreed to most of the relief sought, the court granted the order, restricting his communications with the corporation to his real estate lawyer for the purpose of selling his unit, finding his previous volume of emails oppressive under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The applicant sought a declaration that its insurer had a duty to defend it in an underlying lawsuit.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded under Exclusion 20 of the claims-made policy, which excluded claims of which the insured was aware as of the 'inception date of this Policy'.

The court found the phrase 'inception date' to be hopelessly ambiguous, as it could refer to either the initial policy issuance date or the most recent renewal date.

Applying the principles of contract interpretation, the court construed the ambiguous exclusion clause against the insurer and granted the application, ordering the insurer to provide a defence.

The self-represented plaintiff sued the provincial government, alleging it was liable for workplace harassment she suffered at a hospital in 1999, as well as for the subsequent failure of various tribunals to grant her relief.

The government moved to dismiss the action for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, while the plaintiff moved to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The court dismissed the action, finding that hospitals are not Crown agents and the Crown is statutorily immune from liability for the acts of independent adjudicative tribunals.

The court also declined to extend the time for trial due to the plaintiff's significant delay and the resulting prejudice.

The plaintiff, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced a professional negligence action against his former lawyer without disclosing the cause of action to his trustee in bankruptcy.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the basis that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to sue, as the cause of action vested in the trustee under s. 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff lacked capacity and that the claim could not be validated nunc pro tunc because the limitation period had expired.