F.L. Myers

The applicant sought an order under s. 9 of the Estates Act to compel the deceased's lawyer to produce her file to determine if an unexecuted draft will could be validated under s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court considered whether this constituted an impermissible fishing expedition or breached solicitor-client privilege.

Given that the estate trustee did not oppose the relief and the primary beneficiary under the prior will consented, the court ordered the lawyer to produce the file relating to the deceased's 2022 estate planning.

The applicant sought to validate an unsigned note written by the deceased prior to his death as a valid will under s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found that the deceased had testamentary capacity and that the document represented a fixed and final expression of his dispositive intentions.

The court recognized the document as a valid will, appointed the applicant as estate trustee, and awarded costs to the applicant from the estate.

The applicants, adult siblings, sought a declaration that their late father lacked capacity or was unduly influenced when he executed a new will in 2021 that favoured their brother.

They brought a motion for directions and production of the deceased's medical, legal, and financial records.

Applying the minimal evidentiary threshold from Neuberger v. York, the court found that the applicants failed to adduce credible evidence of incapacity or undue influence.

The court noted that the applicants' evidence consisted largely of conjecture, cherry-picked medical records, and unsupported allegations against the father's caregiver.

The motion and application for directions were dismissed.

The responding party commenced family law proceedings in Ontario.

The moving party subsequently obtained a religious divorce in Oman, which was later formalized and upheld by the Omani courts.

The responding party participated in the Omani proceedings, contesting jurisdiction and the merits of the divorce, and seeking custody.

The moving party brought a motion in Ontario to recognize the Omani divorce.

The court granted the motion, finding that the responding party had voluntarily attorned to the jurisdiction of the Omani courts by participating on the merits and seeking substantive relief, precluding her from challenging the foreign court's jurisdiction in Ontario.

The plaintiff sought to schedule motions to set aside two 2007 consent orders that dismissed his actions following a settlement for statutory accident benefits.

The plaintiff intended to argue that the settlement was void due to non-disclosure by the insurer and to raise a constitutional challenge against binding Court of Appeal precedent.

The court declined to schedule a single unified hearing, finding the proposed proceedings too complex and fraught with procedural issues.

Instead, the court directed the parties to first schedule a hearing to determine whether the court has jurisdiction (or if the License Appeal Tribunal is the proper forum) and whether the plaintiff must repay the settlement funds before challenging the settlement.

The self-represented plaintiff sought to note the defendant university in default and obtain default judgment, despite the defendant having counsel and a pending motion to strike the claim.

After the court deferred scheduling the plaintiff's motion, the plaintiff brought a further motion to set aside the deferral.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.02, stayed the plaintiff's motion and issued a notice considering its dismissal as frivolous or an abuse of process, noting that default judgment is inappropriate when a defendant is actively participating.

The applicants, a video game company and two of its employees, brought an urgent ex parte motion for a Norwich Pharmacal order against the respondent telecommunications provider.

The employees had been subjected to severe online harassment, doxxing, and racist threats by anonymous individuals using the respondent's services.

The court granted the order without notice to the respondent, finding that the respondent's policy of notifying customers about such requests could lead to further serious harm, including 'swatting'.

The court held that the test for a Norwich order was met, as the discovery was necessary to identify the wrongdoers for potential legal or police action.

The applicants sought a prescriptive easement over a strip of the respondent's land that had been used as part of their driveway for nearly fifty years.

The court found that the applicants' predecessors in title had openly and continuously used the strip of land for parking and access from 1983 to 2003, prior to the lands being registered under the Land Titles Act.

The court concluded that the easement was reasonably necessary for the better enjoyment of the applicants' land and granted the application.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her involuntary status and finding her incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medications.

The appellant, who represented herself, argued that the Board failed to adequately consider her foresight regarding the risks of the medications and her prior capable wishes.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review and found that the Board made no reviewable errors in concluding that the appellant's mental disorder prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the treatment decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants requested a review of the plaintiffs' statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the action by one plaintiff, who was a declared vexatious litigant and had not obtained leave to institute the proceeding.

The court stayed the action by the second plaintiff, noting the claims against judges and court officials appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and directed the registrar to issue a notice for written submissions on why the action should not be dismissed and his fee waiver cancelled.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $125 million settlement in a class action against a major bank for secondary market misrepresentation related to subprime mortgage investments.

The plaintiffs also sought approval of class counsel fees of $37.5 million, representing a 30% contingency fee.

The court found the settlement to be fair and reasonable, noting the significant litigation risks the plaintiffs faced, including a due diligence defence and challenges to damages calculations.

The court also approved the requested counsel fees, emphasizing the substantial risk undertaken by class counsel over 14 years of litigation and the excellent result achieved for the class.

Supplemental reasons issued to correct an error in the court's previous decision (2022 ONSC 12).

The court corrected paragraph 4 to clarify that Lloyds should not have been listed as a party challenging the forum of the action.

During a case conference, the plaintiffs sought to regularize the late delivery of their motion records for upcoming cross-motions.

The defendants opposed, citing the plaintiffs' continued disregard of court orders and the plaintiffs' counsel's recent administrative suspension.

As the parties could not agree on a procedural path, the case management judge granted leave for the parties to bring meta-motions regarding the late filing and admissibility of the evidence, and vacated the scheduled hearing date for the main cross-motions.

The defendant in a defamation action brought under the Simplified Procedure delivered a notice of motion to dismiss the claim as a SLAPP under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court addressed the scheduling of the motion, noting the routine disregard for the mandatory 60-day time limit under s. 137.2(2).

The court enforced the 60-day limit, scheduling the motion accordingly despite court backlogs, and ruled that the statutory allowance for cross-examination on anti-SLAPP motions overrides the general prohibition against cross-examination in Simplified Procedure actions.

The plaintiffs sought complete indemnification for their costs incurred in successfully prosecuting six counts of contempt of court against the defendant.

The court found that the defendant conducted the proceeding reprehensibly by deliberately stalling, running up the plaintiffs' costs, and abusing the court's scheduling indulgences.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiffs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $226,816.50.

The plaintiff alleged sexual assault by the defendant Nelson while employed by Halton.

Halton settled with the plaintiff and moved for summary judgment on its crossclaim against Nelson.

Nelson sought to amend the motion timetable to adduce late expert evidence from a personal injury lawyer regarding the reasonableness of the settlement, which would require a six-month adjournment.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing the importance of adhering to court-ordered schedules, proportionality, and timeliness, and noting doubts about the admissibility of such expert evidence.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants for alleged breaches of section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms relating to his treatment after immigrating to Canada as a refugee in 1957.

The plaintiff had previously brought an action based on the same facts, which was dismissed in 2019 due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The court initiated a Rule 2.1 review to determine if the second action was an abuse of process.

The court held that the doctrine of res judicata and cause of action estoppel prevented the plaintiff from relitigating the same factual matrix, even with a new Charter claim.

The action was dismissed as an abuse of process.

At a case conference, the plaintiffs sought to adjourn the defendants' upcoming summary judgment motion in a solicitor's negligence action.

The plaintiffs argued they needed to obtain expert evidence regarding the standard of care, which they could only do after cross-examining the defendant lawyer due to a lack of documentary production.

The court agreed that the summary judgment motion was premature and adjourned it, directing the plaintiffs to bring a motion for leave to deliver expert evidence.

The plaintiffs previously obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from publishing defamatory statements about them.

The defendant was subsequently found in contempt of court for six separate breaches of the injunction by broadcasting hateful and defamatory statements.

At the sentencing hearing, the court considered the defendant's complete lack of remorse, his ongoing attacks on the rule of law, and the hate-motivated nature of the breaches.

The court sentenced the defendant to 18 months in prison, consisting of three consecutive months for each of the six acts of contempt.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation over negative online reviews regarding window installation.

Faced with an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiffs attempted to discontinue the action.

The court held that the statutory stay under s. 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act was triggered when the defendants delivered a requisition to attend Civil Practice Court, rendering the discontinuance ineffective.

Applying the Pointes framework, the court found the reviews related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs failed to show there were no valid defences, and the action was a SLAPP suit brought for an improper purpose.

The action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay $164,186.76 in full indemnity costs and $2,500 in damages.