Joseph Perfetto

The appellant appealed convictions for criminal harassment and harassing telephone calls, which relied entirely on the admission of an unsworn video statement.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the statement's reliability by failing to consider evidence that the declarant felt pressured, compounded by the absence of an oath.

Concluding there were insufficient guarantees of reliability to admit the hearsay evidence, the Court set aside the convictions and entered acquittals on those counts, while leaving a breach of probation conviction intact.

The Crown appealed the imposition of a 7-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the respondent's horrendous criminal record.

However, because the respondent had already served 7.5 months of pre-sentence custody (credited at 2-for-1) and completed the 7-month conditional sentence, the equivalent of 22.5 months had been served.

The Court concluded it would not be in the interest of justice to further incarcerate the respondent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof when assessing the risk of eventual control in the community under s. 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the case did not turn on the burden of proof and that the trial judge had carefully weighed all the evidence.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving after the trial judge found that without breath test results, he could not convict for impairment due to alcohol consumption.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by requiring breath test results and failing to consider all the evidence, including civilian testimony and the officer's observation of a stale odour of alcohol.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and his 21-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) Charter challenge regarding unreasonable delay.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's knowledge that the restricted weapon was loaded, setting aside that conviction and substituting it with possession of a restricted weapon, which was then stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The conviction for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by taking into account evidence that ought not to have been considered when making an adverse credibility finding.

Given that it was a close case, the conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud.

The trial judge had imposed a lengthier sentence than originally imposed, explaining the reasons for the increase, including the magnitude of the frauds and the absence of an early guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's inferences regarding the speed and location of the appellant's vehicle were amply justified by the evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's decision to reject a conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a co-accused's prior statement could not be used for its truth against the appellant unless adopted at trial.

The Crown conceded this misdirection.

As the court could not conclude the result would necessarily have been the same without the error, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and using an imitation firearm during a home invasion, as well as his sentence of 16 months secure custody and eight months community supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence compelling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by ignoring the Youth Criminal Justice Act and focusing on general deterrence.

While a custodial sentence was warranted because the home invasion constituted a 'violent offence', the Court varied the sentence to 15 months (six months secure, four months open, five months supervision) due to mitigating factors and confirmed the court's jurisdiction to combine open and secure custody for a single offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assaulting his mother and breaching probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the total sentence exceeded what was appropriate for simple assault and breach of probation.

As the appellant had already served the custodial portion, the Court reduced the term of probation from 24 months to 12 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the Crown witnesses' evidence and erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) framework by not following its exact order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that trial judges are not required to answer every argument raised by counsel, provided the reasons clearly explain the result.

The Court further held that W.(D.) does not mandate a strict, pre-ordained order for assessing evidence, but rather ensures the proper application of the burden of proof when an accused testifies.

The self-represented appellant was convicted of mischief following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing several errors occurred during the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excusing prospective jurors who had been victims of break and enters without the parties' consent, in proceeding with 11 jurors over the appellant's objection without considering s. 644(1.1) of the Criminal Code, and in giving an inappropriate instruction on the late disclosure of an alibi.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and, given the unusual circumstances and age of the minor offence, entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellants were convicted of driving an unsafe commercial vehicle after a roadside inspection revealed defective brakes.

On appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice, they sought to introduce fresh expert evidence regarding the brake measurements, which was rejected based on the Palmer test for fresh evidence.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the strict due diligence requirement of Palmer should not apply to Provincial Offences Act (POA) appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Palmer principles, including due diligence, govern the exercise of discretion to receive fresh evidence under s. 117(1) of the POA.

The appellant pleaded guilty to parental abduction of a child under fourteen after taking his son to Libya and depriving the mother of contact for eleven years.

He appealed his sentence of 19 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by treating the guilty plea as a neutral factor, but concluded the sentence was fit and proper in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.