Joseph James Colangelo

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the 1996 exercise of a power of appointment was a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the appellant's complete interest in the property and the fraudulent nature of the conveyance were not open to challenge.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a summary trial judgment ordering the return of a $20,000 condominium deposit to the respondent.

The trial judge had found the respondent mentally incompetent to enter the agreement of purchase and sale based solely on a medical report from her psychiatrist.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding that the medical report was improperly admitted into evidence because it was not supported by an affidavit nor filed in compliance with section 52 of the Evidence Act, thereby depriving the appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine the doctor.

Following the hearing of the appeal, the parties made written submissions regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the submissions of the appellants and ordered that the order of the court issue in the form submitted by their counsel.

The appellants challenged a trial judgment dismissing their action on the basis that the trial judge accepted one witness's discovery evidence as uncontradicted and binding.

The Court of Appeal held that the record contained contradictory and countervailing evidence rendering that discovery evidence unreasonable and improbable.

The trial judge therefore committed a palpable and overriding error in treating himself as compelled to accept it.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and a new trial was ordered with costs to the appellants.

The appellant municipality sought to enforce Ontario's building code and development charge regime against a massive redevelopment project at a federally owned international airport operated under long-term leases.

The court held that the entire redevelopment, including terminals, runways, utilities, and air navigation facilities, fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics and also formed part of a federal undertaking, such that provincial laws directly regulating building design, permits, and development charges were constitutionally inapplicable under interjurisdictional immunity.

The court further held that provincial land and property development legislation could not apply to the federal Crown's continuing property interest in leased airport lands.

Ancillary claims based on the ground lease, common law compensation, and refusal of fire services were rejected, with the municipality directed to pursue the statutory grant-in-lieu regime instead.

Phoenix and its subsidiary entered into a development arrangement with Ownix to build a head office.

Ownix became insolvent, and Bird Construction registered mechanics' liens against the interests of Phoenix, Ownix, and Canada Trust for unpaid completion work and leasehold improvements.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Phoenix was an 'owner' under The Mechanics' Lien Act because it requested the work through its agent, Ownix.

The lien was valid against Phoenix for the completion expenditures but not for the leasehold improvements made for third-party tenants, as there was no privity or direct dealing between Phoenix and Bird regarding those improvements.

The appellants sold their manufacturing business to the respondents and signed a restrictive covenant prohibiting them from competing for five years after the sale or after terminating their employment, whichever was later.

Nine years later, the appellants resigned and started a competing business.

The respondents sued for breach of the covenant.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the covenant was clear, unambiguous, and enforceable.

The Court found the covenant reasonable between the parties and in the public interest, rejecting the appellants' arguments that the respondents' alleged monopolistic practices rendered the covenant void.