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Interim sale of deteriorating mortgaged lands ordered under Rule 45.01(2) despite ongoing contractual disputes.
This case involved urgent motions concerning the sale of land (Huntmar Lands) by Amazon Land Development Corp. to Lioness Developments Inc., which was complicated by a Caution registered by 2718379 Ontario Inc. ("271") based on an earlier "In Principle Agreement" (IPA) with Amazon.
Corfinancial Corp., Amazon's agent, sought orders to facilitate the sale and remove the caution. 271 and 2587410 Ontario Inc. ("258") brought a cross-motion seeking to block the sale, enforce the IPA, and obtain partial summary judgment, arguing Amazon's termination of the IPA was invalid.
The court found that there were too many disputed facts and credibility issues to grant summary judgment on the validity of the IPA's termination.
However, to preserve the deteriorating equity in the property due to accruing mortgage interest and ongoing power of sale proceedings, the court ordered an interim sale of the Huntmar Lands to Lioness under Rule 45.01(2).
The Caution by 271 and a $1 million mortgage registered by 258/271 were vacated, and the net proceeds of sale were ordered to be paid into court, while Corfinancial's proposed mortgage was not registered.
Summary judgment granted to vendors for $430,000 after purchasers improperly refused to close over minor utility easements.
The plaintiff vendors brought a summary judgment motion against the defendant purchasers for damages arising from a failed residential real estate transaction.
The purchasers had refused to close, arguing that four utility easements registered on title were valid requisitions that the vendors failed to remove.
The court found that the easements were standard minor utility easements explicitly excepted under paragraph 10 of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and were clearly shown on the survey attached to the agreement.
The court granted summary judgment to the vendors, finding the purchasers breached the contract, and awarded $430,000 in damages based on the loss from the property's resale.
An application seeking purely declaratory relief regarding the validity of a codicil is not subject to a limitation period.
This appeal concerned the validity of codicils to a will and the application of the Limitations Act, 2002, to an application seeking purely declaratory relief.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision that an application for a declaration on the validity of codicils, without seeking consequential relief, is not subject to a limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act.
The court also affirmed the finding that the codicils were invalid due to insufficient evidence of proper execution and suspicious circumstances, and that summary judgment was appropriate.
Summary judgment motions dismissed as triable issues remained regarding damages, limitation periods, and fraudulent conveyance.
The plaintiff brought an action for payment on a promissory note, damages for fraud, and to set aside a transfer of a matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance, following the defendant's criminal conviction for fraud related to the same loan.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The court dismissed both motions, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the assessment of damages, the credibility of the defendant's explanation for the property transfer, and whether the limitation periods had expired or were extended by restitution payments and the ongoing criminal proceedings.
The court declared disputed codicils invalid due to suspicious circumstances and unproven due execution.
The children of Stanislaw and Jadwiga Wroblewski disputed the validity of codicils to their parents' wills, which purported to gift properties to Krystyna Romoli.
Helen Piekut, an applicant, sought a declaration on the codicils' validity.
Krystyna Romoli moved for summary judgment to dismiss Helen's application as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, while Helen cross-moved for summary judgment to declare the codicils invalid.
The court dismissed Krystyna's motion, finding Helen's application for declaratory relief was not statute-barred.
The court granted Helen's cross-motion, declaring the codicils invalid due to insufficient evidence of due execution, suspicious circumstances surrounding their preparation by Krystyna, and doubts about the testator's capacity.
Fire Safety Commission largely upholds inspection orders requiring smoke alarms, fire safety plan, and Fire Code remediations at recovery centre.
The appellant, operating an addiction recovery centre, appealed four inspection orders issued by the respondent fire department.
The orders required the installation of smoke and carbon monoxide alarms, the submission of a fire safety plan, and the remediation of various Fire Code contraventions including damaged fire separations and obstructed means of egress.
The Fire Safety Commission confirmed the requirement for smoke alarms and a fire safety plan, finding them necessary to ensure fire safety regardless of the building's specific occupancy designation.
The Commission also confirmed most of the Fire Code remediation measures, but rescinded the requirement for a carbon monoxide detector and a metal dryer vent, and amended certain measures relating to fire separations and egress obstructions.
Interlocutory injunction granted to restrain operation of an addiction recovery centre violating municipal zoning by-laws.
The applicant municipality and chief building official sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondents from operating an addiction recovery centre on their property.
The applicants argued the property was not zoned for institutional use, while the respondents claimed the facility qualified as a permitted 'Lodge' or 'Resort'.
Applying the modified RJR MacDonald test for public authorities, the court found a strong prima facie case that the use breached the zoning by-law, as the facility's primary purpose was health and welfare, not catering to the vacationing public.
The interlocutory injunction was granted.
Consent order for directions in will challenge granted due to applicant agreeing to fund investigative costs.
The applicant sought an order for directions to challenge his late mother's will, alleging undue influence and lack of capacity by his brother, the primary caregiver and sole residuary beneficiary.
The court initially declined to sign the consent order, questioning whether the applicant had met the 'minimal evidentiary threshold' required by Neuberger v. York to justify the expense and delay of a formal will challenge.
After hearing arguments, the court granted the order, heavily weighing the respondent's consent and a negotiated term that the applicant would personally fund the investigative steps, which satisfied the goals of proportionality and affordability.