J. Gardner Hodder

The respondent commenced arbitral proceedings against the appellant.

The arbitrator ordered the respondent to post security for costs.

The respondent successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the arbitrator's order.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1991 to review the arbitrator's procedural order for security for costs, as it was neither an award nor a ruling on the arbitrator's jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her solicitor negligence claim, arguing the respondent law firm failed to ensure she received independent legal advice before mortgaging her home for a family business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant was a partner in the business and knowingly mortgaged her home to provide funds for it.

The appellant appealed an order refusing a discretionary remedy regarding the carriage of a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant's conduct, specifically her decision to assume the role of a participating creditor, warranted the refusal of the requested order.

The Court noted the respondent's undertaking to pursue the claim forcefully and cooperatively.

Following an appeal where the appellant achieved partial success against multiple respondents, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards.

Recognizing the divided success at both the motions and appellate levels, the court ordered the appellant to pay costs for the motions below, while ordering certain respondents to pay costs for the appeal.

The court accounted for the multiplicity of counsel and the novelty of the appellant's arguments in fixing the amounts.

The appellant, former Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, appealed an order striking out his statement of claim against the CFL, its member clubs, and various individuals.

The claim alleged breach of confidence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, defamation, injurious falsehood, and interference with contractual relations arising from his hiring and subsequent dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the statement of claim was prolix and contained evidence rather than material facts, certain causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and defamation were viable.

The Court struck the entire pleading but granted the appellant leave to deliver a fresh amended statement of claim for the surviving causes of action.

The appellant, former Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, sued the League's member clubs and various individuals for almost $19 million following his dismissal.

The defendants successfully moved to strike out most of the statement of claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims for breach of confidence, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with contractual relations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, permitting certain claims for negligent misrepresentation and defamation to proceed against specific defendants, subject to the delivery of a fresh amended statement of claim to cure pleading deficiencies.

The appellant, a dissolved corporation, sought to enforce a judgment obtained prior to its dissolution.

The motions judge found that the corporation lacked capacity to carry out enforcement proceedings absent authority from the Crown, as its property had vested in the Crown upon dissolution pursuant to s. 244 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motions judge also found an accidental omission or slip under Rule 59.06.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's findings on both capacity and the application of Rule 59.06.

The appellant, an execution creditor of a dissolved corporation, appealed an order dismissing his action for lack of capacity to sue.

The motion judge had found that the appellant's action against the dissolved corporation was a nullity and that he lacked capacity to advance the corporation's claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Business Corporations Act, a civil action may be brought against a dissolved corporation and its property remains available to satisfy judgments.

The court found that the appellant acquired the dissolved corporation's rights from the Public Guardian and Trustee upon execution of his consent judgment, giving him the legal capacity to advance the claim.

The plaintiffs made a pre-trial offer to settle for $55,000, stating they would seek an adjournment if not accepted.

The trial proceeded and concluded.

Before judgment was issued, the defendants accepted the $55,000 offer, knowing the plaintiffs believed it was no longer open.

The motions judge enforced the settlement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the offer had not technically expired under Rule 49, the court should exercise its discretion under rule 49.09 to refuse enforcement.

It was unjust to enforce the settlement because the defendants took advantage of the plaintiffs' mistaken belief that the offer was off the table.

In an addendum to a previous decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined the issue of costs for the application and the appeal.

Agreeing with the submissions of the respondent Director, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

A real estate broker became insolvent after its principal misappropriated trust funds for day-to-day operations.

The Director, representing the trust claimants, asserted priority over the broker's assets, including accounts receivable collected by a secured bank and funds remaining in trust accounts.

The Court of Appeal held that the accounts receivable were not impressed with a constructive trust because there was no clear connection between the misappropriated funds and the generated receivables, allowing the bank to realize its security.

Furthermore, the funds remaining in the trust accounts were not restored trust funds, giving the Crown priority over those funds pursuant to the deemed trust provisions of the Income Tax Act.

In supplementary reasons for judgment, the Court of Appeal clarified its earlier costs order.

The court held that the third party and the defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff's costs of the motion and the appeal.

The appellant employee was wrongfully dismissed and obtained a judgment against his paymaster company.

However, the company had ceased operations and had no assets due to a corporate reorganization.

The employee counterclaimed against the related companies and their directors, arguing they were common employers and seeking an oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the highly integrated group of companies functioned as a single unit and were common employers.

The Court also granted an oppression remedy against the directors personally, finding that their decision to terminate the paymaster company's operations without leaving a reserve for the employee's pending claim was unfairly prejudicial.

The appellant purchased a condominium unit and paid a deposit.

The developer placed the deposit in trust, obtained prescribed security, and then used the funds to repay a building loan.

The developer failed to pay the appellant interest on her deposit during her interim occupancy, as required by s. 53(3) of the Condominium Act.

The appellant sued the developer's directors and others for breach of trust.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding that the trust obligation ended when the prescribed security was obtained.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory trust imposed by s. 53(1) extends to the interest payable under s. 53(3) and is not terminated by the provision of security.

The appellants challenged trial findings arising from the registration of an altered deed and the respondent's instruction that another solicitor be retained before registration.

The Court of Appeal held the factual findings were supported by the evidence and disclosed no error of law.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.