J.F. McCartney

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Hamilton's decision not to process an application for the renewal of a body rub parlour licence.

The licence had automatically terminated under the municipal by-law when the controlling interest in the applicant corporation was transferred following the death of its principal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the automatic termination constituted a lawful revocation under the by-law, which permanently reduced the number of available licences and left the City with no authority to issue a new one.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering it to pay $3,000 in statutory compensation to former tenants who had received a notice of termination for conversion of their mobile home site.

The tenants were subsequently evicted for non-payment of rent and owed over $3,300 in arrears.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's findings that the compensation obligation survived the eviction and that the claim was not statute-barred.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the basis that the Board erred in law by failing to set off the rent arrears against the compensation owed, resulting in no net compensation payable to the tenants.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision that found a 9 percent rent increase levied exclusively against pet-owning tenants was an impermissible penalty under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Board held that this penalty substantially interfered with the tenant's reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit and awarded a rent abatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and that the Board properly looked at the real substance of the rent increase.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay $1,400 per month in spousal support.

The Divisional Court found no errors of fact or law in the trial judge's decision, noting the award was slightly below the midpoint of the suggested guidelines based on the parties' incomes at the time.

The court dismissed the appeal but advised the self-represented appellant that he could seek a variation of the support order due to his recent medical leave and reduced income.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondents sought costs totaling approximately $98,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant conceded the respondents' entitlement to costs but argued the quantum was excessive, suggesting $20,000 was appropriate.

The Divisional Court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01, noting the appeal was not particularly complex despite the appellant's conduct lengthening the proceedings.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable rather than an exact measure of actual costs, the court found the respondents' claimed hours and amounts to be unreasonable.

The court fixed total costs at $25,000, apportioned among the three respondent groups.

The appellant appealed a civil jury verdict dismissing his claims for assault, negligence, and intentional infliction of nervous shock against police, ambulance attendants, and store security, and awarding damages on the respondents' counterclaims.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing adjournments, admitting prejudicial expert testimony, and excluding medical reports.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's discretionary rulings on adjournments and evidence, and concluding there was a sufficient basis for the jury's punitive damages award.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision suspending his racing licenses for ten years and imposing a $20,000 fine for administering a performance-enhancing drug (EPO) to a horse.

The applicant argued his confession to investigators was involuntary and obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the statement was admissible under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and statutory compulsion, and that the common law confession rule and section 7 of the Charter did not apply to these administrative proceedings.

The court also upheld the penalty as reasonable given the need for general deterrence in the horse racing industry.

The appellant appealed a decision including a jointly owned life insurance policy in the deceased's estate under s. 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The policy was purchased jointly by the deceased and his spouse to pay down their mortgage, with the survivor receiving the proceeds.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the mere fact of joint ownership of the policy was not enough to trigger s. 72(1)(f), and the policy should be excluded from the estate available for distribution to dependants.

A dissenting opinion would have dismissed the appeal, finding the policy fell within the specific provisions of the Act.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the respondents.

The court fixed the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board's costs at $13,594.16 on consent.

The court declined to award costs for two prior motions that were unrelated to the judicial review application.

The court fixed the co-respondent Kenmar's costs at $8,806.10, noting that the WSIB was the primary respondent.

The applicants sought judicial review to set aside a settlement reached by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board in a subrogated action against the respondent.

The Board, acting as dominus litis, settled the action for $130,000 after considering an independent legal opinion and the applicants' position.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's decision to compromise the lawsuit was reasonable, dismissing the application.

The applicant sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the Ministry of the Attorney General to disclose records provided under the Casino Rama Revenue Agreement.

The applicant argued the records contained commercial information and their disclosure would cause harm.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's finding that the records related to the administration of funds, not commercial operations, and that the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of expected harm.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his civil action for false arrest, wrongful detention, and wrongful search against customs officials.

He alleged he was targeted for a search at Pearson International Airport due to racial profiling.

The trial judge found the customs officer had reasonable grounds for the search based on multiple indicators and that the appellant was not denied his right to counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and no evidence of bias.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on an appeal involving claims of false arrest and Charter breaches.

The proposed evidence included correspondence, expert reports, and training manuals.

The Divisional Court applied the Sengmueller test and found that the evidence was either not fresh, not relevant, or could have been obtained with reasonable diligence prior to trial.

The motion was dismissed, although the factum from the court below was accepted to show the arguments made due to a tape erasure.

The applicant sought to set aside or vary an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court, which had quashed its application for judicial review of an arbitration award administered by a voluntary dispute resolution corporation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with the single judge that jurisdiction to set aside the arbitration award lies exclusively with the Superior Court of Justice under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

Furthermore, the court noted the motion was out of time under Rule 61.16(6) with no grounds justifying an extension.

The Attorney General of Canada sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed its motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim regarding post-confederation annuity payments under a rectified treaty.

The motion judge had refused to strike the pleadings, reasoning that complex constitutional cases involving treaty interpretation should not be decided at the pleadings stage without a complete factual record.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to allow the action to proceed to trial.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision refusing to strike parts of the respondents' Statement of Claim.

The respondents claimed entitlement to increased annuities under a treaty.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and noting that complex constitutional issues should generally not be decided at the pleading stage.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order that reduced his spousal support obligations to $400 per month, arguing it should have been reduced to zero due to his unemployment and suspended driver's license.

The Divisional Court found the motion judge erred in ordering any support given the economic disparity and the appellant's unemployment.

The court reduced the ongoing support to zero as of November 2003, but declined to order retroactive repayment.

No costs were awarded.